

FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

**Reproduced From
Best Available Copy**

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

19991019 079

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-080

CONTENTS

21 DECEMBER 1989

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

West Thaw Said To Affect Middle East [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 20 Oct]	1
Improved Israeli-European Relations Urged [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 26 Oct]	3
Commentator Defends Israel-Panama Relations [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 18 Oct]	4

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Moscow Accused of 'Divide and Rule' Policy [Paris GAMK 26 Oct]	6
End to Reliance on Russia, West Urged [Paris HARATCH 18-21 Oct]	6
Azeri Popular Front Term 'Pan-Turanist' [Paris GAMK 23-24 Oct]	9

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Hizballah Structure, Finances Described [London AL-DUSTUR 6 Nov]	10
Egypt-Libya Ties Seen To Cause Israeli Missile Activity [London AL-DUSTUR 23 Oct]	13
Awqaf Minister Comments on Islamic Holy Places [London AL-HAWADITH 17 Nov]	13
Iranian Charity in Islamabad Alleged Front for Intelligence [London AL-DUSTUR 27 Nov]	15
Iraqi-Gulf Export Fair Described [Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ 31 Oct]	16
First Soviet Eye Clinic in Gulf To Be Established [Muscat AL-WATAN 9 Oct]	16
Press Corrects Report of Iraqi Mission [Port Louis THE SUN 15 Nov]	16
Study Calls for Arab Strategy To Face 1992-EEC [Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ 28 Oct]	16
Editorial Supports USSR Palestine Initiative [Cairo AL-AHALI 4 Oct]	18

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Abu-Iyad Takes Control of Security Affairs [London AL-MAJALLAH 5 Dec]	18
PLO Reportedly Orders Murders [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 25 Oct]	18
PLO-Village Councils Rapprochement Reported [Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR 25 Oct]	19
Alleged Palestinian Collaborators Fight Intifadah [Tel Aviv HADASHOT 26 Sep]	21
Gaza Notable Comments on Banned Hamas [Tel Aviv HADASHOT 2 Oct]	22
Banned Hamas Said To Be Gathering Strength [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 29 Sep]	23
Report Compares House Destruction in Territories [Tel Aviv HADASHOT 28 Sep]	24
Improved Palestinian Press Attitude to Labor Noted [Tel Aviv DAVAR 29 Sep]	24

BAHRAIN

Discussions on Bahrainization Reported [AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ 23 Oct]	25
Agricultural Development, Trade Measures Outlined [AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ 29 Oct]	27
Oil, Gas Statistics Published [AL-BAHRAYN 20 Sep]	28

EGYPT

Foreign Minister on Relations With USSR, Sudan, Israel [AKHIR SA'AH 29 Nov]	30
Ex-NDP Shaykh Discusses Reasons Behind His Expulsion [AL-NUR 15 Nov]	31
SLP Reaffirms Islamic 'Project' [AL-SHA'B 7 Nov]	32
Israel's African Ties Viewed as Threat to Arab Security [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 15 Nov]	33
Writer Sees Israel Trying To Conquer African Horn [AL-NUR 15 Nov]	34
Editorial Criticizes U.S. Policy Goals in Lebanon [ROSE AL-YUSUF 13 Nov]	35
Column Explains Opposition Parties' Unpopularity, Failures [AL-MUSAWWAR 1 Dec]	36
Article Lists Taba Infrastructure Developments [UKTUBAR 8 Oct]	37

Editorial Calls for Forming Islamic Party <i>[AL-NUR 15 Nov]</i>	38
--	----

ISRAEL

Rabin's Positions on Talks, Territories Examined	38
Rabin Reportedly Changing Position <i>[YEDI'OT AHARONOT 22 Sep]</i>	38
Commentator Denies Position Change <i>[DAVAR 25 Sep]</i>	40
National Policy Said To Have 'Bankrupted' Nation <i>[AL-HAMISHMAR 22 Oct]</i>	40
Enlisted Men To Bear Brunt of Fighting Intifadah <i>[HA'ARETZ 17 Oct]</i>	43
Releases To Relieve Prison Crowding Suggested <i>[YEDI'OT AHARONOT 3 Oct]</i>	43
Jerusalem Police Force To Be Reinforced <i>[HADASHOT 17 Oct]</i>	44
Hospitals Conceal Number of Jewish Casualties <i>[HADASHOT 17 Oct]</i>	45
Religious Academies Opened for Arabs <i>[HA'ARETZ 10 Oct]</i>	45
Educator Claims Dehumanization Among Youth <i>[HA'ARETZ 12 Oct]</i>	45
Balfour: 'Israel, Turkey Can Claim Territories' <i>[THE JERUSALEM POST 2 Nov]</i>	46
Commentator Criticizes Pollards' 'Noisy' Campaign <i>[HA'ARETZ 12 Oct]</i>	47

KUWAIT

Study Examines Kuwaitization of Government Positions <i>[AL-WATAN 12 Nov]</i>	48
---	----

SAUDI ARABIA

Minister of Finance Discusses Trade With Pakistan <i>[ARAB NEWS 29 Oct]</i>	51
Industry Official Discusses Industrial Development <i>[ARAB NEWS 25 Oct]</i>	52
Industrial Growth, Foreign Competition Discussed <i>[ARAB NEWS 25 Oct]</i>	54
Official Discusses Growing Role of Private Sector <i>[ARAB NEWS 25 Oct]</i>	55

SUDAN

Ministry Official Discusses Labor Issues, Reform Measures <i>[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH 12 Sep]</i>	56
NIF Reportedly Fundraising Via Front Companies, Investment <i>[London AL-DUSTUR 23 Oct]</i>	59

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Japanese Visitor Suggests India Curb Military Spending <i>[THE HINDU 23 Oct]</i>	60
Population: Rethinking of Policy, Pragmatic Steps Urged <i>[NAV BHARAT TIMES 17 Oct]</i>	60
Trade Board Gives Priority To Export Infrastructure <i>[THE HINDU 2 Nov]</i>	62
Daily in Trouble Over Allegations Against Chavan	62
Allegations Reviewed <i>[THE STATESMAN 25 Oct]</i>	62
INDEPENDENT Editor Resigns <i>[THE TIMES OF INDIA 26 Oct]</i>	63
Cabinet Condemns INDEPENDENT <i>[THE TIMES OF INDIA 26 Oct]</i>	63
More Protests Noted <i>[THE TIMES OF INDIA 26 Oct]</i>	64

IRAN

IRI Ready To Export 5,000 Tractors To USSR Annually <i>[TEHRAN TIMES 25 Nov]</i>	65
Oxalic Acid Produced Domestically for First Time <i>[KAYHAN HAVAI 18 Oct]</i>	65

PAKISTAN

No Confidence Vote: Aftermath Analyzed	65
COP Versus PPP Tussle <i>[THE NATION 14 Nov]</i>	65
Opposition Efforts to Continue <i>[THE NATION 13 Nov]</i>	67
Cabinet Performance, Reshuffle <i>[THE NATION 15 Nov]</i>	67
Deteriorated Relations of MQM, PPP Discussed <i>[THE MUSLIM 12 Nov]</i>	67
PNP Chief Says PPP 'Lesser Evil' <i>[DAWN 20 Nov]</i>	69
'Fragile' State of Country Analyzed <i>[THE MUSLIM 12 Nov]</i>	69

Government's Reaction to Indian Muslims' Issue <i>[THE MUSLIM 12 Nov]</i>	71
Leader Urges Taking Kashmir Issue to UN <i>[DAWN 20 Nov]</i>	72
COP Leaders on Induction of Ministers <i>[THE MUSLIM 12 Nov]</i>	72
Analyst: 'Give Democracy a Chance' <i>[THE NATION 10 Nov]</i>	73
Editorial Views Controversy Over Z.A. Bhutto <i>[THE NATION 10 Nov]</i>	75

West Thaw Said To Affect Middle East

*90OL0125B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ (Supplement)
in Hebrew 20 Oct 89 p 2*

[Article by Binyamin Netanyahu]

[Text] In his book, "Modern Times," British historian Paul Johnson remarks that U.S. support for establishing the state of Israel was considered "among the last of the idealistic luxuries which the Americans permitted themselves" as the East-West confrontation began. Even if Johnson's observation is correct, U.S. policy leaders became increasingly guided, in determining their position on Israel, by the role Israel is suited to play in facing the Soviet threat.

Indeed, over the years, the political history of the state of Israel has become intertwined with the reality of the cold war. Soviet military and political support of the Arabs, followed by the gradual U.S. backing of Israel since the 1960s, transformed a local Jewish-Arab confrontation into an East-West conflict with far-reaching global implications.

American support, which became known for its significant effect on Israel's regional and international status, helped us to defend ourselves and survive in a hostile region in conditions of political isolation. The United States found in Israel a loyal, stable ally against the Soviet threat, and this laid the basis for the U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership which developed over the years.

Outwardly, this situation seems to be changing, and developments are probably occurring faster than many of us believe.

There is a growing tendency in the United States to believe that the East-West struggle is coming to an end. Consequently, new views are developing regarding the political positions which the United States must adopt as this struggle diminishes. Many are asking themselves: If the Soviet threat is weakening, why must the United States be concerned with curtailing it?

A kind of cold war victory euphoria is already being felt in the United States, such that this victory is being viewed as the "end of history." Important voices—from the right no less—are calling for a reconsideration of U.S. participation in the NATO alliance. Those not sharing this optimism fear a drastic cut in defense and foreign aid allocations. The renewed ascent of the old isolationist outlook, which calls for the United States to disengage from "external" conflicts and to concentrate on its internal affairs, can be felt in the air.

These trends are still in their infancy. Certain processes, such as a conservative reaction in the Soviet Union to Gorbachev's reforms, are liable to curtail these reforms in their prime. Nonetheless, it should be assumed that if the liberalization trend continues in the Soviet Union, traditional U.S. policy goals are also likely to change.

Such a change would affect Israel's status and position decisively. It should be emphasized that we have no

reason to be sorry about the end of the cold war. As citizens of the world, we must fear the horrible results of an East-West conflagration. As a democratic society, we give our blessing to the liberalization of the Eastern Bloc, which we hope will also result in improved relations between these countries and the people of Israel.

Regarding the Middle East, it should be expected that the moderation of the East-West conflict will bring an end to massive Soviet support of radical Arab regimes and organizations that are leading the struggle against us. The absence of large-scale Soviet backing of the Arab armies will deprive them of a guarantee against a bruising defeat, a guarantee which has encouraged them time after time to wage war against Israel.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Soviet Union, despite all its support for the Arab world, has in certain cases served to curb the military aspirations of several Arab states (such as Syria in recent years). This restraining effect is liable to end with the termination of active Soviet involvement in the Middle East as a rival to the United States. Also, the end of this involvement might result in growing pressures in the United States for a gradual or rapid reduction of U.S. involvement in conflicts in the region. Israel might consequently find itself isolated without warning in the face of a military coalition of Arab states.

Some believe that such a development would not endanger us, if we can just manage to reach peace agreements with the Arabs before the East-West conflict ends. This line of thinking reflects a naive, almost illusory, view of a new tomorrow coming in the wake of the signing of such agreements. We all aspire to attain peace with our enemies. However, a signed piece of paper will not preserve the peace for long. As Kissinger rightly said: Almost all wars in modern history erupted in situations in which there were peace agreements (including the inter-Arab wars in our region).

The preservation of peace cannot be assured either: by a social, political structure based on proclivities to moderation, reconciliation, and stability, which make conflict management through conciliation possible (i.e., democracies); or, in the absence of this condition, by a balance of military forces which deters the aggressive party from starting a war.

It is a dangerous delusion to assume that the winds of liberalization and conciliation blowing from several Eastern Bloc countries will spread to the Arab world. To our sorrow, the situation is completely to the contrary. "It is too early to speak about the victory of democracy in the Middle East," stated a senior Egyptian politician recently. According to him, it is more reasonable to expect that the less developed states in our region will continue to be ruled by authoritarian regimes.

In addition, even if the liberalization process continues in the Eastern Bloc, there is no guarantee that the Russians would not continue attempting, one way or another, to increase their power in the world at the

expense of the United States. The White House also professes this prudent, realistic approach, and we should support it.

Moreover, it is unreasonable to assume that the United States would withdraw from all strategic positions which it views as vital to its security and well-being. No state would do so, even in a time of peace and thaw, because it is impossible to know what might happen in the future (we too must adopt this approach regarding possible agreements with the Arab states). From this standpoint, Israel's position as a stable, reliable ally need not change. The United States could limit its involvement in places where it has weak or reserved support, concentrating instead on those holdings which seem firmer to it. If this is to be the case, our strategic partnership with the United States could paradoxically expand, not contract.

In any case, the United States and Israel have common interests in the region outside of the East-West struggle: An interest in securing maritime and air supply and transportation routes, an interest in preventing the renewed spread of international terror from the Middle East, an interest in assuring the existence of moderate regimes, and above all, an interest in preventing adventurous regimes from using lethal weapons which endanger the peace of the entire world.

These interests will not disappear or contract with the disappearance of East-West competition. On the contrary, these dangers (and others) will mount with the weakening of the major powers' restraining influence on the radical states in the region. These considerations could be additional layers in the existing basis of the U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership.

Indeed, Arab regimes are more resistant to democratization trends than other regimes in the world. Particularly at present, Arab governments are subject to the growing influences of extremist Islam, and several of them continue to nourish aspirations to regional hegemony by inflaming anti-Israel sentiment. Therefore, the political structure of the Arab states, as is the case with the internal forces active among the populations of these states, cannot guarantee us the preservation of peace in our region.

Thus, there remains the balance of forces, i.e., our ability to maintain a military disposition that will deter any array of Arab forces liable to line up against us. If we were to disarm our military deterrence capability, would there be any doubt that the Arab states would descend on us as birds of prey swoop down on their quarry, even if they signed peace agreements with us? The ability of a state to defend itself—its deterrent force against an attacker—is the main factor determining whether we survive. If Israel has so far been helped by U.S. support to create such a deterrent force, it now faces the problem of maintaining this deterrence in this epoch of East-West thaw.

This is the main challenge currently facing Israel. Israel must act in three areas to contend with it: consolidation of the alliance with the United States, the creation of new

partnerships, and the enhancement of Israel's deterrent force by developing a new military disposition.

Consolidation of the alliance with the United States in a changing world:

We must first strengthen the trend of preventing a rapid withdrawal of the United States from strategic positions which it holds. Many in the United States are cautioning against the abandonment of defensive frameworks, such as NATO, and regional alliances to which the United States is linked, because of the ever present possibility that the internal process occurring in the Soviet Union could be stopped by an internal reaction, which would restore the previous status quo (which happened in China).

The creation of new partnerships:

Several of the considerations likely to motivate the United States to continue maintaining its partnership with Israel could also influence several other states to develop partnerships with Israel. Ultimately, all of the developed states have an interest in maintaining orderly supply lines, stopping terror, and restraining unruly states.

On these foundations, Israel can strengthen political cooperation with several of the major states in Europe, and there is no reason to assume that the "new" Soviet Union—if indeed it completes the liberalization process—would be excepted from these relations. Such political partnerships would dovetail nicely with the economic and cultural relations in which Israel is currently investing development efforts regarding the European Community countries and Japan.

The enhancement of Israel's deterrent force by developing a new military disposition:

Above all, concern must be focussed on the development of an independent Israeli deterrent force. In any possible peace agreement, Israel would be required to maintain a strong army to guarantee its security and enable it to maneuver militarily and politically. Even if U.S. support of Israel continues under the conditions of the East-West thaw, we must prepare on the basis of the least optimistic assumption of reduced levels of support. In such a case, Israel would be compelled to rely on itself much more than in the past.

These changes will oblige us to update the concept of Israel's security. We will have to devote much greater efforts to diversifying weapons sources, especially through self-development. We will have to think about developing new, cheaper, more sophisticated weapons. In particular, we will have to develop combat means enabling rapid tactical superiority on the battle field, which, in itself, will also enhance our ability to deter a new war. This is not the place for a detailed discussion regarding this matter. However, Israel's political-defense leadership must devote maximum attention to it.

Reality could evolve in completely different directions. However, in the changing world in which we exist, Israel must prepare, in advance, plans for possible action in the

political arena, just as it prepares plans for possible action in the military arena.

Improved Israeli-European Relations Urged

44230042A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 26 Oct 89 p 14

[Article by Yo'av Tucker: "Before We Miss the European Train"]

[Text] An anxious outcry about Israel's failure to integrate in the European unification process has broken out among our top leadership: For quite some time now, worries have been voiced in Jerusalem about accumulating neglect that has placed Israel, just 3 years before the unification of the 12 European community members, "in a sensitive and unpromising situation." Ambassadors and consuls to the 12 European capitals in question claim that things are not moving at the required pace and that, come the unification deadline, this accumulating neglect may put us in a situation that will be more than "unpleasant."

From a European viewpoint, the problem has been clear for a long time: Jerusalem thinks and acts—regarding policies, and even economics—in terms of relations with the United States. Because the American market is so much larger than each one of the European countries, for the past 20 years or more Israel has been focusing its attention on America, at the expense of Europe.

During the special meeting of Israeli ambassadors to European community countries that was held this week in Brussels, Foreign Minister Arens (who is suspected even more than others of concentrating on the United States at the expense of Europe) stated: "We are indeed somewhat late in discovering how many things we should have done and can still do." Less diplomatically, Deputy Foreign Minister Binyamin Netanyahu described the Israeli lack of initiative (and to a certain extent, its long-term thinking) as "criminal negligence." Almost without exception, the ambassadors used superlatives to describe the slowness and delay in treating topics with which other countries have been carefully dealing for years, with a view to appropriately preparing for European unification, which will turn 12 European countries, with their 320 million inhabitants, into the largest economic giant in the world.

This week's consultation at the senior Israeli Foreign Ministry level was marked by attempts to flesh out the structural decision recently made to establish an additional Israeli embassy in Brussels, accredited to European Community organizations and working separately from our embassy in Belgium. The question was whether it was sufficient to allocate staff, a building, and resources in order to make up for accumulated neglect, and to what extent this structural addition may complicate even more the system of internal talks and coordination among the various European embassies and between them and the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem.

Israeli diplomatic thinking has always tended to bunch together the political elements involved in Europe's "community" activities in the Middle East with economic-commercial elements stemming from the new economic landscape of the community. The basic assumption was that the implementation of European unity on 1 January 1993 will not significantly change, at least in the initial stage, the way in which political decisions are made by the 12 community members; it is not to be assumed that in 3 years European foreign policy will be much closer to a "United States of Europe." The centers of political decision—concerning the Middle East, too—will continue to be the foreign ministries and prime ministers' offices in the various capital cities. Thus, most experts believe it is a mistake to try to speed up Israeli preparations for a unified Europe based on traditional endeavors to contain European ambitions to actively interfere in the Mideast peace process.

For years, foreign policy leaders in Jerusalem entreated the Europeans to keep a low profile, or more precisely, to disappear discretely from the arena, so as not to complicate the system of relationships and pressures at the center of which stood Washington. The basic assumption was always that any European involvement in this political cauldron will not, in the final analysis, be welcomed by Israel because of the baggage of obligations and history between most European countries, and North Africa and Arab countries. All the European talk of "our southern basin in the Mediterranean" always worried Israel, and the standard tactical procedure was to show polite interest, to express appreciation for Europe's proffered goodwill services, and to be happy that it was keeping its distance.

The economic elements of the picture are, however, quite different: the deadline for lifting boundaries in West Europe is rapidly approaching; an increasing number of decisions are being transferred to community bodies in Brussels. By 1993 those will hold considerable power to steer decisionmaking in member countries. Moreover, Brussels will be directly connected to economic centers of power within international markets, and an increasing number of partnerships will be formed in those markets among various industrial and service sectors, investment and development initiatives, and various areas on all sides of national borders.

Thus, the rules of the game will change considerably. Also, the relative authority of the various national governments over their own economies will be gradually reduced, and the paths between individual policies established in the various capitals or in the community center in Brussels and coordinated initiatives by industrialists and bankers throughout the continent will be shortened. This entire process will acquire even more extensive ramifications if indeed the process of liberalization continues in East Europe. If present developments continue in Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and perhaps East Germany and other satellite countries, rapprochement between East and West will necessarily affect the economic picture and may increase the upsurge and significance of the European factor. From a

European viewpoint, political and economic elements become intermingled here, but from an Israeli viewpoint, thinking-style and capability to mobilize for rapprochement to an economic Europe do not have to go hand in hand with political issues, which constitute Israel's main interest. At the present, Israel's trade deficit with the 12 European Community countries is approximately \$3.5 billion. In the past year Israel imported some \$6.7 billion worth of products from community countries (more than half of Israel's overall imports) and exported to Europe about \$3.2 billion worth (about one-third of all Israeli exports).

The new European regulations that have been coming out at an increasingly fast pace in recent months, may exacerbate the difficulties experienced by Israeli agriculture and industry, since after 1993 European policy will call for commercial uniformity among the 12 members, but it is also possible that it will permit each one of the 12 to establish independent import rules in relation to countries that are not members of the community. All the advantages that community firms will enjoy from each other will become obstacles for nonmembers. In this regard, Israel may find itself in a particularly embarrassing position because much of Israel's exports to Europe are intended for government offices and public services, on which regulations will be more strictly applied than on private sectors in European economies.

During the 2 days of talks at this week's meeting, Foreign Ministry leaders and ambassadors took note of a long string of ideas apt to speed up new Israeli involvement.

The hope is that, with the establishment of the new triple structure—a new, special embassy in Brussels, a special staff to deal with Common Market matters in Jerusalem, and the various European embassies—it will be possible to bring Israeli industrialists and entrepreneurs around to "think Europe" in a more intensive manner.

Commentator Defends Israel-Panama Relations

90OL0125A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 18 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by Avraham Tamir]

[Text] Conflicts of interests at different levels exist in relations between states everywhere, even between the United States and Israel. However, U.S.-Israel relations are too strong to be shaken as a consequence.

Israel has objections regarding the quality of U.S. military aid to Arab states which still maintain a state of war with Israel. However, the debate has remained confined to types of military assistance and has not spilled over to the substance of U.S. relations with Arab governments. Israel believes that a government with which it has relations is legitimate as long as it does not act against Israel or the Jewish people. Israel has certainly not exploited relations to undermine the position of the United States, its ally.

The United States is very sensitive—correctly, from its standpoint—to the nature of governments in Central America, an area vital to its national security. Panama, being a transit state between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, has special strategic importance. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the Panama Canal's strategic importance has declined greatly, because the canal is no longer an influential factor affecting the freedom of strategic action of the superpowers' fleets. The United States also has difficult problems with the regimes of Nicaragua and Cuba.

Israel has friendly, traditional ties with Panama, encompassing exports, technical assistance, and Panama's support of interests important to Israel. Israel has no reason to end these relations, which are not intended to harm the United States. If the world behaved according to the criterion of severing relations because of U.S. dissatisfaction, all ambassadors of U.S. allies would have to leave Panama, and they have not done so.

The causes of the U.S.-Panama crisis seem not to lie solely in accusing Noriega of drug deals. Whether Noriega is guilty of these deals has yet to be determined in a judicial proceeding, and Noriega is unwilling to appear before the court in Miami, arguing that it is unacceptable between independent states for a person of his stature to be brought to trial in another country.

A comprehensive examination of U.S.-Panama relations shows that the United States still treats Panama as a dependency, despite the agreement signed on 7 September 1977 for the transfer of the Panama Canal and all of its installations to full Panamanian sovereignty on 31 December 1999, and the evacuation of U.S. forces from Panama. In 1986, Noriega, who was a loyal friend of the United States until then, refused a U.S. request that Panama serve as a base for contra activities in Nicaragua. The United States also rejects Noriega's good relations with the leaders of Cuba and Nicaragua.

Central America is indeed the strategic backyard of the United States. However, it must be asked whether a policy of closing the door to possible internal changes would be more strategic than a policy of opening the door. In the meantime, the policy of opening the door has proved to be wiser, based on what is currently happening regarding the handling by the United States and its allies of the changes occurring in the Soviet Union and its dependencies. This could also be attained in relations with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Panama.

Attempts to unseat Noriega through opposition to his regime or a military coup have so far been unsuccessful. Direct intervention by the U.S. Army to topple his regime would also be unreasonable, given the lessons of U.S. military involvement in Central American countries. Of course, for those longing to unseat Noriega, the "hand-of-fate" option remains. However, this could not serve as a basis for policy, especially since it cannot be known how his successors would act.

In the treatment of Panama, the name of Mike Harari has also become interjected, incorrectly and falsely. Harari clearly maintains the necessary balance between his private business and Israel's interests, to which he has contributed much regarding Panama in coordination with governmental elements in Israel and with their full confidence in him.

He acts within the law. He has never had dealings in Colombia, nor has he visited it. Moreover, former Mosad [Central Institute for Intelligence] Chief Tzvi Zamir stated that one would have to be insane to believe that Harari has dealt in drugs. For years, he was active in covert and sensitive operational missions, reliably and amid danger. The time has not yet come to recount his deeds in this area.

The state of Israel could establish political and economic relations with the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua, just as it has done with those of Eastern European countries.

From my experience, I know that considerations regarding relations with Central American countries are influenced disproportionately by U.S. policy on those same nations. Meanwhile, the United States has an embassy in Nicaragua, while Israel does not, lest it anger the United States.

Fertile ground exists for developing relations between Israel and Nicaragua, without harming the United States.

I could add examples of relations which Israel maintains based on its interests, which are also unacceptable to the United States, or relations which Israel could establish if U.S. opposition were not a consideration. A provision for reaching an understanding to avert political shocks already exists in the form of a forum for U.S.-Israeli discussions on activities in Third World countries. More than once in these discussions, we have presented Israel's intentions to avoid damaging vital U.S. interests, not to obtain its approval.

Moscow Accused of 'Divide and Rule' Policy*46050004B Paris GAMK in Armenian 26 Oct 89 p 3*

[Article by "Kh.": "The Firm Stance of the Armenian Deputies Foiled the Conspiracy"]

[Text] It is reported that thanks to the resolute stance of the Artsakh deputies [in the USSR Supreme Soviet] a conspiracy that was being plotted with regard to the administration of NKAO [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] has been foiled. The plan which would be wound around the neck of the Armenian people meant surrender to the enemy, submission to the will of Azerbaijan and the forces that support it and delivering Artsakh and its brave Armenians to the tyranny of pan-Turanism.

Although final victory remains distant, this was a success and a step toward final victory for the Armenian people.

The plan, which was examined on 20 October, envisaged to appease the pan-Turkists of Azerbaijan and to create a situation in which the Turkish and Tatar elements would have the final say.

Given the flaws of the proposed plan, there was no doubt that it could not bring about a fair and lasting solution to the Artsakh problem. Everyone with any understanding of politics could see that. Everyone could see it but was either unable or unwilling to oppose the plan or to find a just solution for the Artsakh problem. But it was obvious that the proposed plan was flawed and that it suffered from many deficiencies. Nothing could be resolved with that plan. The plan envisaged to perpetuate the domineering presence of the Azerbaijani government in the affairs of our people in Artsakh—something that the Armenian nation could not tolerate. Such a move would not only force the Armenian people to stand their ground firmly and unequivocally with regard to their demands over Artsakh, but would also draw Azerbaijan into a confrontation with Armenia which would prolong the interethnic conflicts, intensify the Artsakh crisis and magnify the political upheavals in Transcaucasia.

Given these facts, one is inevitably led to ask: Who benefits from these upheavals that are created? Who gains from the protraction of the Karabakh problem? Obviously it is not the local peoples who gain. There is growing evidence to suggest that the winner can be none other than the central government. Is not a "divide and rule" policy at work in Transcaucasia? Was Grachya Hovhannisyan exaggerating in his speech before the Armenian Supreme Soviet when he charged that the central authorities are implementing a colonialist policy with respect to the union republics, including Armenia? Is there no attempt to postpone the solution of the Karabakh problem and to prolong the blockade around Artsakh with the hope that the eagles' nest will fall under economic pressure?

Setting aside the analysis of the policies being pursued and the dirty tricks being staged with respect to the Karabakh problem, we wish to emphasize the fact that

the Armenian deputies performed very well at the sitting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Their alertness, their firm and brave stance, their awareness of the interests of the Armenian people and their diplomatic maturity are encouraging signs which assure us that this time the shameful episodes of the past will not be repeated in Armenian-Azeri and Armenian-Russian relations. The Armenian deputies must be congratulated for their stance.

Given that the aforementioned plan will be submitted as it is to the full sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet in late October and that this may result in unexpected developments for the Armenian people, we count on the Armenian deputies of Armenia and Artsakh to maintain their resolute stance, alertness and bravery so that the conspiracy that was thrown out of the door will not enter the house from the window.

While we have faith in the optimism of the Soviet Armenian leadership, we believe that the Armenian people must push ahead with their demands against those who persist in their uncompromising stance with regard to our national interests and Karabakh demands, because every retreat may lead to the failure of the battle our people have undertaken. That would have tragic consequences.

End to Reliance on Russia, West Urged*46050004C Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 18-21 Oct 89*

[Article in four installments by Rafayel Ishkhanian, member of the faculty of Yerevan State University and a member of the administrative council of the Armenian Pannational Movement: "The Rule of the Exclusion of the Third Force"]

[18 Oct 89 p 2]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] We must admit that the political mentality of a considerable proportion of our people and its leaders is simplistic. For example, Armenians generally believe that it is patriotic to swear at the Muslims and particularly the Turks, to talk extensively about the genocide and to reiterate relentlessly that the Turks are savages. Past Armenian leaders who are considered most patriotic are those that cursed the Turks most and those who killed the most Turks. The purported patriots of more recent times are the assassins of Turkish ambassadors in Europe. Of course, not all Armenians think this way, but this is the predominant disposition among us. This is a psychological trait which has its other end in a fondness for Europe and Russia. The former party secretary of the [Yerevan State] University said in 1985: "Patriotism for Armenians means affection for Russians and hatred for Turks." [passage omitted]

Bellicose anti-Turkish articles have recently multiplied in our press in both Armenia and the Diaspora. Many books have also been published in the same spirit. The

slogan "Turkey is our eternal enemy and Russia our eternal friend" has been carved into the minds of many Armenians.

It is obvious that psychologically our bellicose anti-Turkish posture is rooted in our awareness of the Russian power standing behind us. The Turks and the Azeris (including those in southern Azerbaijan) today number 65 million, while there are total of 6 million or at most 7 million Armenians in the entire world. According to military figures, Turkey's army is the most powerful noncommunist European army. Meanwhile, the Armenians have no army. Turkey is an organized state, while we do not have a real state. Then who are we relying on when we raise our fist against the Turks? Clearly, we are relying on Russia and sometimes on the West.

This is the third force. The second force is our neighbors. [passage omitted]

[20 Oct 89 p 2]

[Excerpts] We are told that if the Russian army withdraws from Armenia, the 3 million Armenians who live on these 29,000 square kilometers will remain alone against our five large neighbors who number in the tens of millions: the Turks, the Persians, the Kurds, the Georgians and the Azeris.

The rule of the exclusion of the third force says that we must see ourselves as being alone, now and always, in dealing with these five neighbors. Once we do that, much can change in our thinking. We can think about finding ways of living together in mutual peace with our neighbors rather than pelting them with useless curses, and we can prepare to have a national state. We can be ready. I repeat: The exclusion of the third force does not exclude having allies. An ally is a power whose interests coincide with ours at least for a certain period of time. We can have allies only if we can be a sovereign power. But one does not depend on one's allies; one does not make plans on the basis of the strength of its allies. An ally is only a helper. The more servile we act toward Russia the less it respects us. It will respect us when we stop acting like sycophants.

But, as I stated earlier, we seem to be unable to exclude the third force as a nation, in our minds and in our instincts; we rely on it, we curse our neighbors, and all of our plans are based on expectations from that third force. This also applies to the nonofficial organizations that have been formed in Armenia and the Armenian national parties [in the Diaspora].

For example, the Dashnak Party today runs all of its affairs by relying on the third force. One of its leaders, [Armenian Revolutionary Federation Bureau member] Mr [Hrair] Marukhian, said in an interview that the Soviet Union, that is Russia, is the claimant of Armenian lands. I repeat: Russia has never intended and does not intend now to return to Armenians any part of their historic homeland. The same Dashnak Party has been knocking on the doors of another third force, the

Western powers and the UN, to win recognition for the Armenian genocide. [passage omitted]

The posture of the Hay Dat [Armenian Cause] organization of Yerevan is similar to that of the Dashnak Party. Even worse, while the Dashnak Party puts emphasis on the preservation of the Armenian language, the Armenian school and the Armenian education of the younger generations, Hay Dat considers the Armenian language, national education, speaking and writing in Armenian and Armenian literature—in other words the principal elements of our survival—unimportant (as evidenced by their monthly publication). Its objective is only lands and lands. Apparently, they believe if they demand land at the top of their voice someone (perhaps Russia or the West) will give land to the Armenians. They do not see that if they demand land while ignoring our language and school, Armenia and the Armenian nation may fade away and vanish. When that happens, when there is no Armenia, what will the lands be unified for?

As if this were not enough, Hay Dat has been seeking new enemies, this time pointing a finger at the Jews. It is "fighting" on three fronts against pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism and Zionism—of course while relying on Russia. While Russia has said and continues to say that it has no intention of fighting pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism and while it has been taking steps to make peace with Zionism, our Hay Dat has persisted on its course and continues "to fight" against these three forces. Here, it is appropriate to quote [folk poet] Jivan: "Come to your senses."

The Hunchak and the Ramgavar parties have also been relying on the third force, in their case Russia. They cannot imagine an Armenia without Russia. For the last 50 to 60 years their entire policy has been based on the mentality of being devoted to Russia in spirit and flesh.

The proponents of independence in Yerevan, the Self-Determination [Inknoroshum] Association and those who have separated from it, also take comfort in the third force. Their leader, my dear friend Baruyr Ayrikyan, speaks before the European Parliament about Armenian independence putting his hopes on that body. He sends letters and tapes to Armenia urging the people here to declare independence and to invite UN forces into Armenia. The European Parliament and UN forces: these are the third forces on which the Self-Determination Association relies.

While our proponents of independence put their hopes on the Western third force, they harbor enmity toward Russia. I think that hostility against Russia or the West is as foolish as dependence on them. It is strange. Why do we think that any Western nation or Russia will protect and support us? How foolish can one get? We forget that every nation and state has its interests. Why should any state sacrifice its interests for the sake of Armenians? No rational state would undertake such a sacrifice. [passage omitted]

When Nikolay Ryzhkov visited Armenia he met with Armenian intellectuals. Zori Balayan spoke and rehashed the same old song about how bad the Muslims, the Azeris and the Turks are, how good we Armenians are and why the Russians must protect us. Mr Ryzhkov reprimanded him and said: "Stop this. It is not you who will teach us how to act or who is bad and who is good. We know what we will do very well." He was right. But Mr Balayan did not learn his lesson. In a speech in Russian before the Armenian Supreme Soviet in 1989, he once again addressed the Russians and reiterated that the Turks are bad, we are good and that the Russians must protect us. Of course, once again his pleas remain futile. [passage omitted]

[21-22 Oct 89 p 2]

[Excerpts] It is generally useless to demand from other governments and the UN to recognize the Armenian genocide. Suppose all the governments of the world and the UN acknowledge that we were massacred. Then what? Some naive Armenians reply: "Then they will give our lands back." Dear friends, what does the recognition of the genocide have to do with the return of lands? For example, the UN recognizes the genocide of American Indians. Why do the white people not leave America and return the land to the Indians? Until when must we remain so naive? Moreover, has anybody thought about whom the Armenian lands should be given to? Should they be turned over to Russia (USSR)? Does Russia need more land? In any event, Russia (USSR) has officially declared that it has no territorial claims on Turkey. Finally, even if Russia takes over Armenian lands from Turkey what makes you think that it would turn them over to the Armenian SSR? If it had any intention to do so, it would first turn over Nakhichevan and Artsakh which it now holds.

But I strayed away from the subject of proponents of independence. They apparently believe that by shouting "independence, independence" they can make Armenia independent. Most of them apparently think that they invented the word "independence" and independence itself, as if serious Armenian politicians from Aram, the progenitor of Armenians, to Aram Manukian [president of the independent Armenian republic of 1918-1920] did not aspire for national independence. By shouting "independence" and writing about it in their papers, they have designated themselves as the leadership and provisional government of Armenia. Our proponents of independence are playing independence just like children playing games. None of this has anything to do with real Armenian independence.

Dear proponents of independence: Independence will not come by shouting and writing that word relentlessly. We will get independence the way we got it in 1918. We must prepare for independence so that we are not caught with surprises as we were in 1918. First the nation must be made independent spiritually, mentally and morally. To do that our nation must be made to shed its mentality of relying on a third force, and we must establish relations and a dialog

with our five neighbors. The Armenian people must be assured that it is capable of surviving as a sovereign nation without relying on a third force. Most importantly, we must also reinstate the Armenian character of our increasingly Russified Armenia. In contrast, many of our independence advocates cannot even sign their names in Armenian. Some of them generally write in Cyrillic rather than in Armenian, but continue to shout "independence." [passage omitted]

Finally, our path toward sovereignty and independence would be rocky if we do not return to our Christian faith from which most of our nation is deprived today. We will fail if we try to do everything without faith in our maker. God has preserved and continues to preserve our nation provided that we have confidence in Him. He has never turned away from us; it is we who have turned away from Him and suffered calamities. A return to Christianity is as essential as the air we breathe. Rather than relying on a third force, let us have confidence in our maker and the national forces we have and we will have. [passage omitted]

The slogan declared by the Arstakh [Karabakh] Committee, "We have neither permanent enemies nor permanent friends," is a step toward the renouncement of the third force and a definite indication of political maturity. The Committee's statement on pan-Turkism (read before the Armenian Supreme Soviet) is also such an indication. However, that Committee's work so far does not reflect any serious intention to make the nation genuinely sovereign. The Committee is also indifferent toward our language and schools and the issue of restoring the Armenian character of Armenia. The truth is that the correctness and usefulness of the work of any organization is measured by how strongly it is committed to the endeavor to restore the Armenian character of Armenia. [passage omitted]

I am convinced that Armenians can be a sovereign nation and survive in an area surrounded with Muslims if we act not by emotion and feelings of revenge but by reason. Let us take an example from Israel which maintains good relations with West and East Germany today even though Germany exterminated nearly 7 million of its children. Let us learn a lesson from Germany itself. Russia divided that country into three parts (East and West Germanies and West Berlin), annexed large chunks of its territory to Poland and Czechoslovakia and took a large piece (East Prussia) for itself. But today, both Germanies maintain good relations with Russia. There are many similar examples. That is how nations which have the will to survive behave. If Armenians want to survive on this land, we have only one choice: To learn a lesson from Israel, Germany and others, that is not to think that the third force will always be in Armenia and to remember that it can leave at any time. We have only one alternative: We must act not with feelings of revenge but with the reasoning of survival. Then our survival will be assured. God will help us if we do that. If we survive, grow stronger and act always wisely, our lands will gradually reunite with Armenia.

But if we do not act rationally and if we surrender to our emotions and to the call of revenge we will lose even this piece of land and we will vanish forever.

We have relied on the third force for 300 years, and we have repeatedly lost for 300 years. We were able to keep this piece of land because we did not rely on the third force and we renounced that force. Aram Manukian must teach us a lesson.

Today, the only correct path and our highest priority task is to make our nation spiritually and mentally sovereign and independent and to restore the Armenian character of Armenia by invoking the rule of the exclusion of the third force.

Nobody is going to solve the Armenian problem. Only we, the Armenians, can solve that problem. And the Armenian problem can be solved only if we accept and implement the rule of the exclusion of the third force.

Azeri Popular Front Term 'Pan-Turanist'

46050004A Paris GAMK in Armenian 23-24 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by G. Shushanian: "Pan-Turanism is What Unites the Azeris"]

[Text] The Azeri side has experienced political developments of its own during the 1-and-1/2-year history of the Artsakh movement. Since March 1989, the Azeri political stage has featured a group called the "Popular Front of Azerbaijan" which declared at the time of its founding that its principal goal is to establish a democratic movement in Azerbaijan.

Soon afterwards it became evident that the Popular Front, which pretends to be an opposition group, closely collaborates with the Azeri government. This collaboration has been especially pronounced in recent months when the Azeri authorities imposed a blockade around Soviet Armenia and Artsakh on behalf of the Popular Front.

The promotion of the Popular Front by the Azeri authorities had three objectives which were largely attained. First, as a democratic movement, the Popular Front established ties and cooperation with all-Union democratic circles thus weakening the standing of the Armenian popular movement within those groups. In addition, the all-Union democratic movement began to view the Armenians and the Azeris on an equal footing rather than seeing the former as the oppressed and the latter as the oppressors, which is the truth. Lastly, the Azeri side succeeded, with Turkey's active assistance, to change the

more or less positive posture of the Western world with regard to the Artsakh movement and, on occasion, to present a perverted view of the situation.

None of the actions of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan have brought it closer to democracy. On the contrary, they have endorsed the imposition of an economic blockade which is the most undemocratic means possible. More recently, the Popular Front has stopped trying to conceal its true identity. In an interview with the Arabic daily AL-BAYAN, one of the leaders of the movement said: "The ideology of the Front is based on deductive reasoning. An example of that reasoning is the mode of development that was put in place by Turkey's late leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk whom we consider the spiritual father and leader of the Turkish nation."

This leadership role reserved for Turkey in Soviet Azerbaijan has also been reaffirmed by that republic's communist leader, A. R. Vezirov, who declared at a recent session of the Azeri Supreme Soviet: "Let us resolve that the land and territory of the Republic are indivisible, as is stated in the constitution of the Turkish Republic."

In the said interview, the representative of the Popular Front also said: "Turkey is the westward-looking window of all the Turkic peoples of Asia and Caucasia. Our goal is to create a 'Greater Turkey' or the unification of all Turks under Turkey's patronage."

The blockade around Soviet Armenia and Artsakh, the infiltration of Azeri Turks into Soviet Armenia's southern regions, such as Zangezur, and initiatives to establish economic and diplomatic ties with Turkey are part of the implementation of this pan-Turanist plan.

It is this pan-Turanist campaign that unites the diverse official and popular circles in Soviet Azerbaijan.

In the face of this pan-Turanist campaign, the only alternative left to the Armenians is to defend themselves employing an appropriate strategy knowing that Azerbaijan and Turkey are not different fronts, but different components of the same front. Resisting one means resisting the other. This resistance must be waged on alternating basis taking into account the superpowers which support the two and which appear to be in accord at least on this issue.

Finally, we must realize that pan-Turanism remains alive inside and outside the Soviet Union, not because some Armenians have sounded alarm bells about it but as a result of a complex combination of geopolitical and strategic factors.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Hizballah Structure, Finances Described

90OL0107A London *AL-DUSTUR*
in Arabic 6 Nov 89 pp 22, 23, 25

[Article by Dr 'Ali Nuri Zadeh: "Hizballah in Beirut From A to Z: Finances, Orientation, Organization"]

[Text] More than 80 foreign journalists and correspondents attended the press conference which was held in Tehran last Monday in the president's office. At that press conference, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani declared that Iran could not free the hostages. Rafsanjani said that those who had kidnapped the hostages were not under the control of Iran's leaders. He said that what was being said about ties between Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Amal Movement, [on the one hand], and the Iranian Revolution, [on the other], was only part of the truth, since these organizations operate independently of Iran, although "they sympathize with our revolution and look upon it with sympathy and affection."

These statements, which were made at the same time that leaders of Lebanese and Palestinian organizations with ties to Iran were visiting the Iranian capital, raised many questions inside and outside Iran. While a few foreign correspondents saw Rafsanjani's statements as indications that differences do exist between Tehran and Hizballah and that Hizballah was refusing to allow the new leaders in Iran to use the party, well-informed circles in Iran thought that references made by the Iranian president constituted an intelligent step taken by the president to achieve three goals.

The first goal was to show that Iran had no direct relationship to the terrorism which was being practiced by Hizballah and its allied groups.

Second, Rafsanjani wanted to show that Iran had nothing more than influence with leaders of Hizballah and other groups. He wanted to show that Iran was willing to use this influence to secure freedom for the hostages if the West gave in to its terms.

Rafsanjani's third goal was to show that Hizballah was an independent, political party struggling for the liberation of Lebanon and the establishment of an Islamic regime in the country. He wanted to show that a small number of our troops were in Lebanon to help the Lebanese people find a way out of their tragedy.

According to an Iranian source Rafsanjani was repeating what Turkish president Kenan Evren had done when he announced that Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turks in Cyprus, was an independent Cypriot figure. President Evren declared that Turkey recognized the Republic of North Cyprus as an independent, sovereign state. With regard to the presence of 50,000 Turkish soldiers in Cyprus, Evren said, "These soldiers went to Cyprus at the invitation of President Denktash. As soon as the president asks them to leave, there will not even be a one minute delay in their

return to the homeland." The Syrian regime employed the same reasoning to justify the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon, and this time, Rafsanjani used it to mislead public opinion in the world.

Having previously revealed grave information about the relationship between the Islamic Republic and terrorism as well as information about the Islamic Republic's role in the blow up of the American passenger airplane and the civilian French aircraft, AL-DUSTUR is providing its readers with a file report on Hizballah and its organization. AL-DUSTUR's report contains information on the kind of relationship which exists between this Lebanese organization and the ruling regime in Iran.

Late in 1982 when Israeli tanks were on their way to Beirut, Iran's ambassador to Damascus at the time, Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, summoned leaders of the Amal Movement to his office to inform them that Ayatollah Khomeyni was upset by some of their statements and actions. Mohtashemi said that running away from a confrontation with Israeli forces, an approach taken by Amal Movement president Nabih Birri, who did not attend the meeting, was completely unacceptable to Tehran. Mohtashemi called upon Amal Movement leaders to oust Nabih Birri as president of the movement and replace him with Hasan Hashim, member of the Political Bureau. According to one Amal Movement leader who strongly criticized Mohtashemi's recommendations on the grounds that they represented intervention in the movement's affairs, most leaders of the Amal Movement who took part in the meeting refused to yield to Mohtashemi's recommendations, and one of them asked Khomeyni's ambassador for the reason why the Islamic Republic had not sent its troops to Lebanon to oppose Israel. He asked why the Islamic Republic was asking us, the Lebanese, to resist the Israeli enemy when we have no ammunition, no weapons, and no personnel to put up such resistance?

Tehran decided after the Damascus meeting that it would break up the ranks of the Amal Movement so as to bring its role to an end once and for all. The operation of breaking up the Amal Movement was carried out by Mohtashemi late in 1982 and early the following year. Mohtashemi induced Husayn Musavi, leader of the Amal Movement in Ba'labbakk District, to declare that he was withdrawing from the party and establishing an Islamic Amal Movement. Because Mohtashemi placed large amounts of money at Musavi's disposal, Musavi was able to attract approximately 20 percent of the movement's cadres and militia leaders in east Lebanon. While Tehran entrusted the Islamic Amal Movement with the task of exporting Khomeyni's ideology to Lebanon by establishing military bases as well as political and military organizations with the assistance of Revolutionary Guard Units, which had entered Lebanon in 1983 with approval from Damascus, the Iranian regime tried to deny the Amal Movement its religious cover. That is, the Iranian regime tried to deprive the Amal Movement of the Shi'ite clerics who had been providing the movement with funds and individuals.

After the outbreak of the revolution in Iran, some of these clerics, who had relations with Khomeyni and his entourage, went to Tehran to receive their share of the revolution's spoils. AL-DUSTUR's sources indicate that SAVAMA [Sazeman-e Amniyat Va Ettela'at-e Melli-ye Iran] managed to recruit a number of them who were to be used with the Amal Movement as the Trojan horse was used with the people of Troy. When disagreements arose between Nabih Birri and Tehran, the Iranian regime's intelligence operatives tried using those people who had been hiding inside the movement to score a strike against Amal. It was the failure of that attempt, however, which led Tehran to expose those individuals and induce them to declare their separation from the Amal Movement and the establishment of Hizballah.

At first, that organization was nothing more than a media front around which 18 shaykhs rallied. These shaykhs were led by Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, prayer leader at Imam 'Ali Mosque in Bi'r Hasan. At that time Fadlallah was director of the Ayatollah al-Ozma Kho'i Charitable Institution in Lebanon. Because that institution played a role in providing expenses for approximately 500 students of religion, and because these funds were in the possession of two [of Fadlallah's] friends in south Lebanon, Tehran chose Fadlallah to lead Hizballah. In other words, Fadlallah, with his army of students of religion in Tyre and Ba'abbak, provided Tehran with a base which was ready for the launching of Hizballah.

Although at first, the Islamic Amal Movement was more important than Hizballah, Hizballah later became a broader, umbrella organization comprising all extremist groups and organizations, including the Islamic Amal Movement, whose existence now had become nominal. As of 1986, the movement's cadres became involved in Hizballah's political, military, and cultural councils. In the meantime Hizballah seized control of the Islamic Amal Movement's funds, weapons, and bases. Hizballah expanded its bases inside and outside Lebanon during the past 7 years by establishing revolutionary cells whose membership was not restricted to Shi'ites. In fact, some cell members are Sunnis, and some are Armenians and Palestinians. These people became members of the party so they can carry out plans which had been devised by the Iranian regime. The organizations and groups which are under the direct control of Hizballah are:

- Islamic Jihad
- The Organization of the Dispossessed on Earth
- The Islamic Revolutionary Justice Organization
- The Jundallah Organization
- The Imam's Followers
- The Islamic Amal Movement
- The Coalition of Islamic Scholars, led by Mahir Hamud, a Sunni cleric
- The League of Jabal 'Amil Scholars
- The Faithful Resistance Troops, a group which broke with the Amal Movement under the leadership of Mustafa al-Dirani, who is also known as Abu 'Ali
- The Islamic Revolutionary Party
- Islamic Jihad in Palestine, led by Dr Fathi al-Shaqafi

Groups dealing with Hizballah under the guidelines of the Universal Revolutionary Council to export the Iranian Revolution and spread chaos and terrorism in the region are:

A. Palestinian organizations:

- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the General Command: Ahmad Jibril's group
- Fatah, al-intifadah [the uprising], the forces of Col Abu Musa
- The Palestinian Rescue Front, Abu-Khalid al-'Umlah

B. Lebanese organizations:

- The Islamic Group, 'Ali 'Ammar's group
- The Popular League
- The Islamic Unity Movement
- The Armenian Revolutionary Movement
- The Revolutionary Christian Gathering, George 'Abdallah's group. It is worth noting that the 1986 operations which were carried out against France by the Revolutionary Justice Organization benefited Hizballah.

Besides these groups, there is total coordination between Hizballah and extremist and terrorist groups in the region, such as the Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, Hizballah in west Saudi Arabia, the Repudiation and Renunciation Society in Egypt, the Islamic Tendency in Tunisia, the Imam's Followers in Morocco, the Islamic Movement in Algeria, and so on and so forth. Hizballah's budget, which initially was not more than \$3 million, amounted to \$120 million last year. The government of Iran paid that sum directly to Hizballah, even though the movement's profits from its drug trafficking operations last year exceeded \$100 million. The movement also realized huge profits as a result of the fact that some of its members run agencies and dealerships in Lebanon and Africa for goods imported from Iran.

The Organizational Makeup

Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah has been the movement's grand master as well as the chairman of its revolutionary council from December 1982, when Hizballah was founded, till June 1989. He was ousted from his leadership position when a network of individuals with ties to the United States and Israel was discovered in Fadlallah's office and home. Khomeyni, who had been Fadlallah's chief and foremost supporter and backer on the scene, was out of the picture by then. Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, member of the Revolutionary Council and leader of the movement in the south, was appointed president of Hizballah. Although Fadlallah continued to serve as the party's grand master, his role now was limited to a symbolic one. According to a prominent Iranian source, the part that Fadlallah is playing now is similar to that which is being played by Jerry Adams, president of the Irish Republican Army's secret political wing in Ireland. Adams meets with journalists and speaks with them in the name of the Irish

people. Although he publicly defends the secret Irish Republican Army's directions and tendencies, he plays no part in what that secret army does. Fadlallah now meets with the correspondent of TIME, the American magazine, he speaks in the Imam 'Ali Mosque, and participates in celebrations held in Ba'labbakk Mosque commemorating the birth of the prophet. And yet Tehran does not trust him because he continues to have a relationship with Ayatollah al-'Ozma Kho'i, a senior Shi'ite authority who represents the real and solid opposition to the ruling regime in Iran. It seems that Tehran gave out the real roles to be played to those who carry out the orders they receive from Tehran meticulously, without adding to them their personal interpretation.

At the present time, and after the recent changes which have been made, Hizballah consists of the following:

- The Revolutionary Political Council
- The Military Council
- The Cultural Council
- The Intelligence Agency
- The Financial Agency

The Revolutionary Political Council, which is regarded as the highest authority in Hizballah, includes the following:

- Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli
- Shaykh Husayn Muhammad Fadlallah
- Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah
- Shaykh Zuhayr King
- Mr Ibrahim al-Amin, the official spokesman for Hizballah
- Mr Hoseyn Musavi
- Mr Abbas Musavi
- Shaykh Hasan Malak
- Shaykh 'Afif Nabulsi
- Mr 'Isa Tabataba'i, representative of al-Shahid [Martyr] Institution in Lebanon
- Mr Muhammad al-Gharuri, Khamenei's representative in Lebanon

Sunni members of the council include:

- Shaykh Muhamarram al-'Arifi
- Shaykh Mahir Hamud
- Shaykh Muhammad Yazbak
- Shaykh Yusuf Muslimani
- Dr Fathi al-Shaqaqi, president of Islamic Jihad in Palestine

Council members meet once a month. The council has a quorum, and its decisions are considered legal when a council meeting is attended by two thirds of the council's members.

The council elects six of its members every six months for the Executive Committee. At the present time that committee includes al-Tufayli, Abbas Musavi, Ibrahim al-Amin, Muhammad Yazbak, Hasan Nasrallah, and 'Isa Tabataba'i. This committee is responsible for implementing the council's decisions.

The Military Council: Hizballah's Military Council, which has 30 members, oversees the activities of 6,000 individuals in the party's militia. These individuals are assembled in 4 paramilitary divisions and 30 paramilitary battalions and regiments. The council is chaired by Abbas Musavi, and reference must be made to some of its prominent members: Hoseyn Musavi, Muhammad Hamadi, Abu 'Ali al-Dirani, Ahmad 'Abbas Khalil, 'Ali Maghniyah, Muhammad Haydar, and Muhammad Awa'i, chief of staff of the Guards in Lebanon.

The Military Council has three large military bases in Ba'labbakk: the Shaykh 'Abdallah Barracks; al-Sayyidah Zaynab Camp; and Raghib Harb Camp. It has five subordinate camps in al-Dahiyah, Qabr Yakha, Jibshit, and Tyre.

The budget for Hizballah's military activity is approximately \$70 million. Militia members and leaders receive between \$140 and \$800 a month in salaries, but members of the Military Council as well as party leaders, whose salaries are between \$1,400 and \$4,000 a month, receive their pay directly from the Iranian Embassy.

It is obvious that the party's success in attracting a large number of the Amal Movement's members is due to the big difference between the salary of an Amal Movement fighter, whose monthly salary is 800 Lebanese pounds, and the salary of a Hizballah fighter, who receives \$140 immediately after joining the party.

The Cultural Council in Hizballah, which is still run by Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, manages property owned by theological seminaries [howzeh-ye 'elmiyah] in Lebanon. It sends approximately 500 middle school graduates to Iran every year to continue their higher education in Iran's state-owned religious universities. The council is also responsible for spreading Khomeyni's ideology and promoting it in Lebanon. It is worth noting that between 70 and 130 clerics who completed their studies in Iran are sent by the council to Africa every year to manage the affairs of the Shi'ite community in African countries. The council oversees Hizballah's newspapers and radio and television broadcasts. It also provides the main subject matter for the sermons delivered by Friday prayer leaders in areas which are controlled by Hizballah.

The Intelligence Agency in Hizballah, which is one of that party's most important agencies, is directly subject to the management of Hoseyn Niknam, the Iranian charge d'affaires in Beirut. Its supreme board includes Mohsen Armen, the official responsible for Iranian intelligence in Beirut; 'Isa Tabataba'i; Zuhayr King; 'Imad Maghniyah; Shaykh Hasan al-'Abdallah; and Hajj Amin Zaki. The intelligence agency prepares and carries out all terrorist plans. Also, the western hostages who are now being held in Shaykh 'Abdallah Barracks and in what used to be the Iranian embassy in the southern section of Beirut were kidnapped when that agency gave the signal that they were to be kidnapped. It is obvious that the subject of releasing the hostages is something that Hashemi Rafsanjani and his political cohort, 'Ali Khamene'i, do control. Both men have now extended Niknam's term for another 3 years.

It is 'Isa Tabataba'i who runs the movement's financial agency from behind the scenes, but it is Shaykh Zuhayr King and Mr Ibrahim al-Amin who sign the checks. The financial agency furnishes expenses for the movement, pays members' salaries, and offers them assistance. Besides the sums of money which are received directly by the financial agency from Tehran, there are other sums, which are received. Most importantly, there are funds which the movement receives from its drug trafficking activities. These activities are carried out by a secret network that includes Syrian intelligence officers and a few members of Hafiz al-Asad's family. Followers of Walid Jumblatt are also involved in this activity. For approximately the past 6 years vast areas of land in al-Biq'a' have been cultivated with narcotics. Opium is turned into heroin in laboratories which employ Iranian and Syrian experts.

Hashemi Rafsanjani tells foreign correspondents in Tehran that the Hizballah Movement is an independent movement. He tells them that Tehran is not involved in terrorism and that it is not holding the hostages.

At the same time members of Hizballah's Security Agency meet in Beirut in Hoseyn Niknam's office for a briefing about Rafsanjani's new recommendations regarding the hostages.

Egypt-Libya Ties Seen To Cause Israeli Missile Activity

*900A0096A London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 23 Oct 89 p 6*

[Article: "Israeli Warning to Egyptian-Libyan Rapprochement"]

[Text] Prior to the statement on the official meeting in Marsa Matruh, the Egyptian border city, between President Muhammad Husni Mubarak and Libyan President Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, Staff Major General Husam Suwaylim, Egyptian military advisor, expressed to AL-DUSTUR his belief that the missile Israel launched about two weeks ago 400 kms away from Benghazi was meant as a warning to Egyptian-Libyan rapprochement and a message that Israel is capable of reaching deep into Libya.

In his statement to AL-DUSTUR, Staff Maj Gen Suwaylim said that the missile is an upgraded version of the "Jericho" missile family which Israel began in 1978 south of Crete Island and upgraded to the 1,450-km range "Jericho-3" missile against which the Soviet Union submitted a protest and a warning to Israel because of its capability to reach the southern Soviet republics.

Maj Gen Suwaylim added: "Following the launch of the Israeli satellite last year, there was evidence that it was produced by Israel because these kinds of satellites are only launched by highly effective and very powerful missiles. This confirms Israel's intention to invade space and use nuclear warhead missiles alongside its planes that carry nuclear weapons. Maj Gen Suwaylim believes that Israel has been disturbed by the Egyptian-Libyan

rapprochement in the wake of the recent modifications to the Libyan political directions, for it is afraid of Egyptian troop withdrawal from Egypt's western borders and their concentration along the occupied Palestine borders. It is forever intent on keeping these troops far away from it and, therefore, normalization of Egyptian-Libyan relations entails troop withdrawal which is contrary to Israeli strategic objectives."

On the other hand, a recent report put out by the Egyptian Military Research Center said that Israel is in the forefront of countries that have surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and that it has actually succeeded in producing the 1,450-km range "Jericho-3" missile which it launched in the Mediterranean close to the Libyan coastline.

The report also said that these missiles got into the country because of the Israeli belief that they pose a direct threat to its national security and they upset the balance in the region, while the Arab countries view them as an effective factor in achieving a strategic balance with Israel and in compensating for deficiencies in their air force capabilities.

The report attributed the factors that helped the spread of such missiles in the region to the aggravated conflicts, regional threats, and failure by the parties to the conflict to resolve the situation, thus calling for the need to stockpile deterrent weapons, to drain the counterforces, and to embark on research in some countries to upgrade and modify their parts. This is coupled with the fact that most countries in the area cannot own an effective air force able to face foreign threats due to superpower restrictions on selling modern airplanes to the countries of the region.

The report identified the perils of Israel possessing modern, highly effective types of weapons in increased tensions in the area, imposition of power and dominion, continual Israeli aggressions against and threat to Arab countries, shifts in strategic and military balance in Israel's favor, not to mention the possibility of equipping these missiles with nuclear warheads. This is particularly the case given the fact that it is capable of producing chemical weapons. In addition are the perils of Israel equipping them with nuclear capabilities, in view of the fact that military scientific reports have established that Israel has a formidable nuclear deterrent force.

Awqaf Minister Comments on Islamic Holy Places

*900L0113A London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 17 Nov 89 p 51*

[Interview with Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Khayyat, minister of Awqaf: "Jordan's Awqaf Minister, Tells AL-HAWADITH, 'Al-Ibrahimi Mosque Has Been Turned Into a Jewish Synagogue; Excavations Around al-Aqsa Mosque Removed Islamic Landmarks"'; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Once again Israeli settlers are intensifying their criminal and vicious attacks on the holy city of Jerusalem. They tried laying down the cornerstone for what they called the Temple of Solomon near al-Aqsa Mosque.

What are the implications of these new Israeli practices against Jerusalem and against Islamic holy sites? That was the focus of the interview which AL-HAWADITH conducted with Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Khayyat, minister of Islamic affairs, holy places, and awqaf [religious trusts]. Dr al-Khayyat revealed reliable, new secrets about the Jewish plan to attack al-Aqsa Mosque. The text of the interview follows.

[AL-HAWADITH] In your opinion, what are the implications of the attempt to build the (Temple of Solomon)? [parentheses as published]

[al-Khayyat] Actually, the city of Jerusalem in general and the holy al-Aqsa Mosque in particular have been the object of an unending series of attacks since the Israeli occupation. The remaining mosques and the holy sites of Islam in the occupied land have also been the object of such attacks, which include tearing down Islamic landmarks and neighborhoods in Jerusalem and doing everything to give these locations and sites a Jewish character and obliterate their Islamic characteristics. Such attacks also include excavations, and these are being carried out around the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque and under its foundations. In some areas these excavations are being carried out at a depth of 20 meters. Although it is alleged that a search for the foundations of the so-called temple is underway, the main goal of these excavations is the destruction of al-Aqsa Mosque and forcing the Islamic world to face an accomplished fact.

[AL-HAWADITH] Excavations around al-Aqsa Mosque have been going on since 1967. What stages have the Israelis gone through in that regard?

[al-Khayyat] Yes, these excavations did go through four consecutive stages, and some progress was made at each stage. But because of international and Islamic opposition and disapproval, the Israelis cannot finish the job at once. Thus, the first stage for these excavations started after the disastrous fifth day of June when bulldozers tore down al-Magharr Quarter in Jerusalem and exposed al-Buraq Wall. Moving west from the south side of the mosque, the excavations continued at a depth of 14 meters, threatening the collapse of al-Aqsa Mosque, of the Islamic Women's Mosque, and of the honorary minaret. The second stage was started late in the year, moving north from the southwestern corner of the holy mosque all the way to Bab al-Maghribah. These excavations were conducted under the tomb and mosque of Imam al-Shafi'i, may God be pleased with him, and under the homes of the Abu-al-Sa'ud family. Many of these properties, which are held in religious trusts, were structurally undermined.

The third stage of these excavations started in 1969 under the old religious court near al-Tankaziyah School, which is considered one of Jerusalem's oldest Islamic monuments.

This excavation moved north below five gates in the holy city of Jerusalem. These are al-Silsilah Gate, which is the main gate; al-Mutaharah Gate; al-Qattanin Gate; al-Hadid Gate; and al-Habs Gate, which is called the Gate of 'Ala'-al-Din the Knowledgeable and also the Supreme Islamic Council Gate. These excavations, which are 180 meters long, run under a group of religious, cultural, commercial, and residential landmarks, which also include mosques, the well-known Qaitbey Minaret, al-Qutt Market, and a number of Islamic schools, including al-Khatuniyah School. The Ottoman school and the Ribat al-Kurd suffered structural damage as a result of these excavations which were 10 meters deep.

Excavations for the fourth stage, which came after 1973, are located in land that is held in an Islamic religious trust behind the holy al-Aqsa Mosque. This land lies to the east of al-Aqsa Mosque, all the way to its southeastern corner. Excavations for this stage reached a spot which is located under the dome of al-Aqsa Mosque, going through a tunnel that cut through the southern wall of the mosque. The operation was exposed by Arabs who were doing maintenance work on al-Aqsa Mosque because of the fire which had occurred at the mosque in 1969.

[AL-HAWADITH] What do the settlers want from their vicious attack?

[al-Khayyat] Their excavations led them to discover a tunnel, which they claimed led them to the location of the alleged temple, the Temple of Solomon, even though this tunnel is nothing more than a well in the hall of the holy mosque. Using numerous methods of destruction, they would use extremist groups, Knesset members, and members of the army to carry out these destructive activities, and all of this was done with official protection and legal support. The Israeli judge, Ruth, had issued a ruling giving Jews the right to pray in the mosque. The ruling was issued in response to an appeal that was submitted by a Jew, requesting permission for Jews to pray in al-Aqsa Mosque because praying in the mosque was one of the things to which they were entitled. Israeli settlers, acting through some extremist groups, also filed a lawsuit against Islamic religious trusts in an Israeli court. They asked the court, according to them, to hold authorized official circles in Jerusalem accountable for their failure to prevent the Department of Awqaf in Jerusalem from refurbishing and maintaining the courtyard of al-Aqsa Mosque without a permit. This case is still pending and has been postponed till further notice. It will be considered after Israel's justice of the courts issues a ruling that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and that the laws which apply to it apply also to Jabal al-Bayt [Har Habayit]. The mayor would thus be given the right to oversee al-Aqsa Mosque.

Israeli soldiers are always breaking into the courtyards of al-Aqsa Mosque. Last January they threw 14 gas and tear gas bombs inside al-Aqsa Mosque. They threw five other bombs inside the mosque at the Dome of the Rock to start a fire in the mosque and to kill worshipers inside the mosque. Worshipers are prevented from entering

al-Aqsa Mosque to pray and to worship, and a military siege is laid around the city of Jerusalem to isolate it, especially on Fridays. No one is allowed to go into Jerusalem without showing his identity card.

[AL-HAWADITH] Are other mosques in the West Bank and Gaza subjected to such actions and attacks?

[Dr al-Khayyat] Of course they are. Al-Aqsa Mosque is not the only mosque being subjected to such conspiracies. In fact, all mosques in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are. Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron is one example. The entire mosque has been seized, the Israeli flag is being flown from its minarets, and copies of the Torah were forcibly introduced into the mosque where they were placed in a safe. The Israelis wormed their way gradually into the mosque. At first, they asked for permission to enter certain areas of the mosque, but now Muslims are denied entry in al-Ibrahimi Mosque except during the times of prayer. In fact, Muslims have been prevented from praying there in any section of their choice since a group of military soldiers entered the mosque. The soldiers who have been occupying the mosque around the clock, have turned a large part of the mosque into a Jewish synagogue. In other areas, Jews turned some mosques in Jerusalem and elsewhere into museums, gambling casinos, or recreational areas. This is what happened in al-Qal'ah Mosque, which is located in Bab al-Khalil; in al-Ahmar Mosque in Tzefat; and in mosques in Be'er Sheva', Ramla, Lod, and Haifa. Attempts to do the same thing in Hasan Bey Mosque in the Arab city of Yafo failed. Israeli authorities removed more than 300 Islamic monuments in Jerusalem because of the excavations.

[AL-HAWADITH] Who manages and provides the necessary finances for Islamic holy places in Jerusalem and in the West Bank since Jordan announced that it was breaking its ties with the West Bank?

[al-Khayyat] Jordan's Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs, and Holy Places does that. It is known that the West Bank was part of the Kingdom of Jordan before the Israelis occupied it in 1967. Jordan's Awqaf Ministry continued to manage the Islamic holy places and the courts after the occupation. That was part of Jordan's total commitment to the West Bank. When King Husayn's decision to break administrative and political ties with the West Bank was issued, I asked the Jordanian government to maintain the existing relationship between religious trusts, the courts, and Islamic holy places on the one hand and Jordan's Ministry of Awqaf on the other. Being well aware of this matter, His Highness the King affirmed that the relationship would continue because the loss of those ties would mean the loss of Islamic civilization in the occupied land.

Although Israel's Ministry of Religious Affairs tried repeatedly to lure employees of those agencies away from their employers, promising to double their salaries if they were to work for it, they categorically refused to do so, and they

continued receiving their salaries from the Jordanian government. It is known that the Islamic Awqaf includes al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy city of Jerusalem with everything in it and around it. The Islamic Awqaf covers the wall around Jerusalem, the Dome of the Rock, open galleries, memorial shrines, the museum, the College of Religious Principles, the large squares, and the ancient schools. In addition, the Islamic Awqaf covers the mosque of Ibrahim al-Khalil, which is an ancient Islamic mosque beneath which, it is said, lies the burial place of our lord, Ibrahim, may God bless him and grant him salvation; our lord Ishaq; our lord Ya'qub, and their wives; may God bless them all and grant them salvation.

In addition, the Awqaf covers 750 mosques in the West Bank and Jerusalem; religious colleges and schools; the Islamic Museum; a manuscript library; and an office for refurbishing Islamic antiquities. Jordan's Ministry of Awqaf designates half of its annual budget to pay the salaries of employees in those places; to start religious trust projects; to meet regular maintenance and refurbishing expenses for mosques and for al-Aqsa Mosque; to attract more people to al-Aqsa Mosque and its courtyards; to appoint guards for al-Aqsa Mosque (200 guards); to save some of the real estate held in religious trusts and other real estate from being taken over by Jews; and to adopt citizens' causes in an attempt to put an end to attacks and infringements on them and their property. The ministry also enters into contracts with teachers who work in the schools of Jerusalem to preserve the Arab, Islamic appearance of the schools and prevent the instruction of Jewish curricula in those schools. The ministry offers monthly assistance payments to the families of people who lost their lives in the intifadah [uprising], paying them between 50 and 80 dinars a month. It also makes payments to university students who have not been receiving funds from their families because of the intifadah. It is paying those students in excess of 50,000 dinars a month, at the rate of 50 dinars a month per student. These funds are paid out of the al-Zakah [Charity] Fund.

Iranian Charity in Islamabad Alleged Front for Intelligence

45000038 London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 27 Nov 89 p 3

[From the "Bayn al-Qawsayn" column]

[Text] AL-DUSTUR has learned that the new social and charitable society, whose establishment the Iranian Embassy in Pakistan announced in Islamabad under the name of the Society of the Imam, will be a new front for Iranian intelligence activities in order to penetrate deeply into Pakistani society. AL-DUSTUR's sources state that Mohammad 'Ali Zeydi, who has been chosen general secretary of the society, was formerly an Iranian intelligence official in Lahore.

Iraqi-Gulf Export Fair Described

90OL0118A Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 31 Oct 89 pp 1, 5

[Article by Zahra al-Hamdan: "Minister of Trade to AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ: Iron and Aluminum Exports to Iraq Increase; Economic Cooperation Explored With Iraq"]

[Text] Habib Ahmad Qasim, minister of agriculture and trade, leaves today for a meeting in Baghdad with Iraqi minister of commerce Dr Muhammad Mahdi Salih in order to discuss the best means for bolstering economic trade relations between the two countries and to attend the inauguration of the 26th International Baghdad Fair which opens tomorrow.

Minister of trade Habib Ahmad Qasim said in an exclusive statement to AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ that Bahrain is keen to exhibit its national products at the fair and that the action was prompted by a directive from the astute leadership to participate in all Arab exhibitions whose list is headed by the Baghdad international fair.

He added that the fair is important as a means of acquainting Iraqi citizens and merchants with the export capability of Bahrain's heavy and light industrial output.

He expressed hope that as many companies as possible exhibit at the fair, as it represents an opportunity for product distribution and marketing, and that trade between the two sister countries continues to develop, grow, and multiply, since both countries have good potential.

He mentioned that heavy exports of iron and aluminum have actually increased and that other exports, especially of light industrial output, are also hoped to increase.

It is noteworthy that ministers of commerce of the Gulf Cooperation Council states will take part in the opening ceremonies, along with other official of Arab countries that are keen to attend and participate. Some 70 Arab and foreign countries will participate in the fair which be held from 1 through 15 November. An area of 220 square meters of exhibition space has been put aside for Bahraini exhibitors.

First Soviet Eye Clinic in Gulf To Be Established

90OL0119B Muscat AL-WATAN
in Arabic 9 Oct 89 p 12

[Text] The Middle East has been chosen as the first region outside the Soviet Union in which a floating eye clinic is to operate.

It is worth noting that the roving ship, Peter I, which has been converted into a hospital, is due to arrive in Dubai on 18 October. It will drop anchor in the Jabal 'Ali area for a period of 6 months.

The group of doctors, which consists of 6 surgeons, is expected to perform about 5,000 operations, using

methods and techniques followed by world renown Soviet eye specialist Vladislav Theodorov.

Dubai was chosen as the location for the ship's stop in view of the great demand for Soviet treatment by eye patients in the Middle East.

The 6-year old ship was converted to a floating hospital a year ago registered in the name of an organization called "Folks" [as published], which is a joint project between "Moscow Eye Clinic" and "Sovconfelt", a major Soviet shipping company. The project has cost \$12.75 million (approximately 47 million dirhams).

More than 200 patients will be able to visit the ship every week in order to receive treatment for myopia, cataract, glaucoma, and near-sightedness. Eye patients will first undergo a complete diagnostic test by computer. This costs \$500 and requires staying two nights on board the ship. After consultation and diagnosis, the patient undergoes treatment or surgery.

Press Corrects Report of Iraqi Mission

90EF0091Z Port Louis THE SUN
in French 15 Nov 89 p 8

[Text] In answer to a question posed by MMM [Mauritian Militant Movement] Deputy Bashir Khodabux, Sir Anerood Jugnauth told the Parliament yesterday that the recent mission carried out by Minister Clarel Malherbe in Iraq was not an official one, and that no official delegation was dispatched.

The prime minister explained that on last October 10, the embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Dar-es-Salaam sent an invitation to the minister of external affairs. The invitation, coming from the Regional Command of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, was addressed to the following parties, which were asked to send one representative each to participate in the celebrations scheduled to mark the rebuilding of the town of Faw: (1) the Mauritius Socialist Movement (MSM), (2) the Mauritian Social Democratic Party (PMSD), and (3) the Mauritius Labor Party (PT).

Sir Anerood added that minister Malherbe attended the celebrations in his capacity as secretary general of the Labor Party, and not in his official capacity. He explained that the MSM and PMSD were also represented as parties.

The prime minister also noted that the sum of 38,000 rupees (1,560 pounds sterling) was provided to the minister for this "party-level, not official, visit," and that this allocation has been repaid.

Study Calls for Arab Strategy To Face 1992-EEC

90OL0119A Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 28 Oct 89 p 8

[Text] A recent study has called for the establishment of a unified strategy and a coordinated joint plan between

the three Arab councils—the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC], the Maghreb Union, and the Arab League of States [four named as published]—in order to face international trade blocs, that is “1992 Europe.”

The study, published by the London-based AL-IDARI magazine, stressed that there is a vital, historical, and security need to lay down a general rule that would apply to the existing Arab councils in order to strengthen work ties between them and expand jurisdictions and authority in order to avoid conflict of interests and competition that might intentionally or unintentionally occur.

The study calls for the establishment of a council on the Arab League level to be called “The Council of Arab Challenge 1992” in order to evaluate the concept of the EEC and its effects on the Arab countries. The council is to be assigned the following jurisdictions and tasks: Protect Arab economic interests by holding bilateral and collective meetings in order to create a strategy for trade and investment development, and establish a cooperation framework for joint research in industrial technology.

The council would seek cooperation with the Arab governments within a framework of activating trade, investment, and technological cooperation. It would also seek the governments' support for the business sector's efforts by providing financing for the 1992 opportunities.

The study also pointed out that these actions and initiatives should include active concentration on the trade sector, joint projects, exchange of technology, investments, and training programs for new exporters to the united European market.

With regard to Europe 1992 strategic considerations, the study says that the unified market program is moving ahead toward its objectives despite the temporary obstacles and setbacks. So far, 40 percent of the legislation necessary for it have been issued. This makes it incumbent upon Arab institutions and companies to radically review their strategy toward Europe in its new era.

The study states that changes will involve not only the 12 EEC members, but also the 6 countries forming the European Free Trade Association [EFTA]—Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland—that will take the necessary steps to make their legislation compatible with the line of the unified European market and its legislation.

The study said that rules governing the entry of foreign exporters and companies into the market are not yet clear, despite an opinion poll that confirms that the EEC companies are certain that the initial effect of the 1992 program will be greater competition from abroad rather than reinforcement of trade barriers, that is with the exception of machinery, steel, and communications.

It is worth noting here that the “Uruguay” session for collective trade discussions will play an important and effective role in the establishment and development of

the unified EEC. This is contrary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Organization [GATT] conference which, by its own nature, constitutes the brakes restraining the shape of the internal market in the unified EEC. This is as a result of a number of regulations, compliance with which is stipulated by international commitments that have already been incorporated in the general agreement.

The Uruguay session provides additional exceptional opportunities to third world countries that would effect the shape of 1992 Europe through bilateral negotiations with the EEC and which do not go beyond the frameworks of this session.

The collective discussions are expected to end before 1992 and the results reached regarding new issues concerning services, literary royalties, and investment-related trade will affect the final shape of the unified EEC.

With regard to investment considerations, the study shows that companies not included in the unified market, EFTA, North America, or Japan, will show great interest in exploiting benefits from production facilities inside the unified EEC, rather than in shipping their products as foreign exports. It said that investments created by the market will go toward those countries with low-level infrastructures and high intensity labor.

In this regard, the study lists the manufacturing companies in France, Germany, Italy, Britain, and Spain that prefer production and export to the rest of the EEC markets. This also applies to the service sector companies, with the exception of Britain and West Germany, which enjoy preferential treatment.

With regard to technology programs, the study shows that liberalization of financial services and free movement of capital are, to a large extent, among the encouraging factors for companies operating in the field of services, especially banking, finance, and manufacturing as advantages of great importance for the unified market program.

The study also shows that the movement of those working in the field of services is of equally great importance. These are the auditors, legal firms, and engineering consultancy firms who will fully benefit from mutual reliance on professional skills in 1992.

To demonstrate the importance of the subject for the governments and companies, the study points to a poll backed by statistics carried out among 426 manufacturing and services companies operating in the EEC.

The poll campaign has proven that 60 percent of the service companies feel that the 1992 program will have a moderate to strong impact on EEC companies with respect to competing for the third world markets.

Editorial Supports USSR Palestine Initiative
900A0096B Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 4 Oct 89 p 2

[Editorial by Muhammad Sid Ahmad: "Why Is Cairo Ignoring The Shevardnadze Initiative?"]

[Excerpts] Strange how Arab capitals, led by Cairo, ignored the call the Soviet foreign minister, Edward Shevardnadze, made to the government of Israel and the PLO to hold direct talks in Moscow.

It is understandable that Israel should turn down the Soviet initiative, given the fact that it is still determined not to deal with the PLO.

It is also understandable that Washington should turn down the initiative because it is determined to hold on to all the settlement cards and would like to believe that the Soviet Union is preoccupied with its domestic problems and, therefore, is no longer qualified to assume a super-power role in regional conflicts and because its participation in these conflicts is solely aimed at "neutralizing" it completely and ensuring that it is not playing any independent role.

All this is understandable, but why is Cairo's position on this issue similar to that of America and Israel?

Cairo took the initiative by presenting its ten points in the hope that they would open the way to fruitful Israeli-Palestinian negotiations between the government of Israel, on one side, and the PLO, on the other side. But what happened? [passage omitted]

The real value of the Soviet initiative is the reaffirmation that the Palestinian people's right to self-determination is the crux of the conflict that cannot be ignored and, therefore, there will not be a settlement unless it is held with the people involved, who are qualified to speak for the Palestinians and that any attempt to circumvent this fact or overlook it will inevitably lead to an impasse.

The Arabs often blame the Soviet Union for going out of its way to improve its relations with Israel and for affecting a Soviet-Israeli rapprochement far beyond that achieved between the American government and the PLO which, thanks to the Soviet Union, tips the balance of power in the area against the Arab cause.

It behooves us to ask here: Does not the Shvardnadze initiative offer an opportunity to test this maxim? Is it not an opportunity to ask the Soviets to employ Israel's need to improve its relations with Cairo to temper the Israeli rejection and to force the Israeli government to deal with the PLO?

This test, however, is contingent on the Arab capitals, led by Cairo, taking the Shevardnadze initiative very seriously and giving up their customary position of restricting the Arab bet to the American horse alone.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Abu-Iyad Takes Control of Security Affairs
44000128 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 5 Dec 89 p 14

[Text] In accordance with the resolutions of the fifth general conference convened by Fatah in Tunis last August, the Palestinian leadership, in the meetings it held recently, made a resolution to unify the entire Palestinian security apparatus in a single framework giving it a new name, the Palestinian National Security Apparatus. Fatah Central Committee member Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyad) was chosen to head this apparatus which includes, in addition to Unified Security, the Central Security Apparatus, the Protective Force, and Force 17, which has been renamed "the Presidential Guard Apparatus."

According to this resolution, two deputies have been chosen for Abu-Iyad; they are Hayil 'Abd-al-Hamid (Abu-Rida) and Hakam Bal'awi (Abu-Marwan). It is expected that this step will lead to the restoration of respect for the former Palestinian security apparatus and avoid a duplication of effort which previously caused serious mistakes.

PLO Reportedly Orders Murders
44230041A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Oct 89 p 1

[Text] A cache of secret documents was recently discovered in the Gaza Strip. The documents prove that the PLO hires professional killers to eliminate Palestinians who refuse to cooperate with the organization and to carry out military operations against Israel.

Among the documents was a letter from a senior PLO official active in Tunis and Amman, to Fatah members in Gaza, in which they were ordered to stage attacks "in two areas," namely against collaborators, and "directly against the enemy, using hand grenades." The letter, bearing the date 18 August, provided specific details on how the attacks were to be carried out and instructed the perpetrators to claim responsibility, but under the assumed name of the "Organization of Revolutionary Eagles." "We want to act in this manner," the letter stated, "in order not to damage negotiations with the United States by attributing the attacks to the PLO."

It is possible that the letter, which was circulated by a senior Israeli intelligence officer, was a fake. However, the addressee, Hamadi Siyah Khalil, is known as an active Fatah member in Gaza. Khalil, 46, was arrested in September on suspicion of murder of several Palestinians in Gaza. His lawyer, Fayiz Ziyarah, said that he was not permitted to see his client and that he didn't know what Khalil was going to plead in court. Israel's reaction was to state that Khalil had not yet been formally charged and that he was still being questioned.

Khalil's pay was also specified in the letter—\$10,000. He was also instructed to "concentrate on people whose behavior is particularly negative," particularly one Kamal al-Wahudi. Aside from al-Wahudi, Khalil was requested to kill a woman "who is a prostitute and is having intercourse with Israeli policemen in Gaza." Upon completing his mission, Khalil was expected to send a note to the press stating that the Organization of Revolutionary Eagles had tried and executed an "enemy spy." Indeed, a Gaza worker by that name was shot and wounded toward the end of August.

Shortly after that incident, Khalil and several others who were probably working with him were arrested. They have been under intensive interrogation since then. One of them, Hasam Amudi, led the investigators to the document cache. In the past few weeks an organization calling itself Revolutionary Eagles indeed claimed responsibility for several attacks on Gaza inhabitants who collaborated with Israel. The documents were given to THE NEW YORK TIMES last month, but will not be published before a serious investigation in Israel.

The senior Israeli intelligence officer who produced the letter said that Amudi did not do so willingly, but he stressed that Israel was not extracting confessions from Palestinian detainees by torture.

Aside from the letter sent to Khalil, additional documents were found in the cache, whose contents have not been revealed, but it is reasonable to assume that among them there were letters from Khalil to the PLO leadership with his recommendations on whom to eliminate next, in view of the fact that permission to eliminate a certain person is issued by PLO leadership at the recommendation of local commanders.

The director general of the prime minister's office, Yosi Ben-Aharon, said that since Yasir 'Arafat condemned terrorism in November, there have been at least 100 attacks by Fatah members, out of which 79 were carried out against Palestinians and 21 against Israelis. "This activity," Ben-Aharon said, "is arousing our suspicions." He added that because of continued terrorism, the Israeli right is reluctant to support the U.S. and Egyptian peace plans, which permit PLO participation—even covert—in the process.

Although 'Arafat and other PLO leaders publicly came out against killing Palestinians without permission from the organization, at least 125 Palestinians have been murdered by other Palestinians since the outbreak of the intifadah, most of them in the past few months.

PLO-Village Councils Rapprochement Reported
44230041B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 25 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by Pinhas Inbari: "The Black Panther Thumbs Its Nose at 'Arafat"]

[Text] At a certain point close to the Lebanon war, Minister Sharon met with the leader of the Village Councils, Mustafa Dudin. The meeting sealed the fate of the councils. Mustafa Dudin was not willing to cooperate with Israel in matters concerning settlements. Moreover, on a previous occasion he requested that Qiryat Arb'a be dismantled. From that moment on Sharon, who understood that the village councils were not about to fulfill the role in which he had cast them, lost interest in the councils.

A basic difference has emerged between collaborators in the Hebron area and in Samaria. While in the Hebron area the basic structure of the village councils rested on large clans, and there was a red line which they refused to cross in their relations with Israel, in Samaria the village councils, or private individuals associated with them, did cross the line and were willing to collaborate with Israel and with the settlers in everything. Consequently, the attitude of Qiryat Arb'a settlers to the councils was negative. Elyaqim Ha'etzani, for example, conducted a fierce campaign against Dudin, while in Samaria village councils, or notables associated with them, organized joint events and demonstrations of "friendship among peoples" with settlers. Thus, after the outbreak of the intifadah, attacks on collaborators were directed particularly against council remnants in Samaria, while councils in the Hebron area preserved their basic strength and inner solidarity, in view of the fact that under Likud they had refrained from crossing the red line.

One must not generalize, and from personal experience I know that in Samaria, too, there were excellent people who collaborated not out of treason, but out of political considerations. Some of them had previously been active within the PLO and had been disappointed by it, and others thought that alliance with Israel would serve Palestinians better. However, this line of thought was more prominent in the Hebron area. There were too many traitors and opportunists among the councils, but the broad masses compelled council members in the Hebron area to give a political account of their actions. They claimed that the PLO was wrong not to recognize Israel, and as long as it didn't recognize Israel they were not going to obey it. Jamil al-Amlahh, for example, chairman of a Hebron Village Council, announced immediately after the PLO recognized Israel, that he was now supporting the PLO.

The deep changes wrought by the intifadah in the political structure of the territories and in the PLO's status in the world, and especially the PLO's recognition of Israel, brought about a development that Palestinian nationalists in the territories had trouble digesting: the possibility of reconciliation between Fatah and the councils, perhaps an alliance between them against a common enemy, and perhaps even cooperation between Israel and Fatah in political and security matters.

This potential stemmed from the meeting held last month in Tunis between Yasir 'Arafat and two village council chairmen from Hebron, Dudin and al-Amlah.

Palestinian nationalists had trouble reading the meaning of that meeting, since the two were viewed as symbols of treason. On the surface, the explanation was that 'Arafat had proven that even people of that kind were in the end coming to him to beg his forgiveness and to make national amends.

The real meaning, however, was far more significant. Collaborators were no longer a threat to the PLO's status in the territories. On the contrary, all developments involving the pursuit and killing of collaborators in Samaria constitute a tough challenge for Fatah in its ambition to place the PLO and the Palestinians on governmental tracks. After 'Arafat declared statehood, it was no longer acceptable to have street gangs murder collaborators at will, without benefit of governmental procedures such as trial and sentencing, which are state prerogatives.

Earlier this week collaborators in the large village of Hawwarah near Nablus circulated an irregular flier casting light on Fatah's problems with collaborator killings. The filer, signed "Hawwarah Defenders—Security Arm," requested executioners of collaborators to cease and desist within 15 days, otherwise the collaborators would attack and eliminate them.

It is not a coincidence that only now have conditions ripened to allow such a flier to be published by collaborators. The street gangs were not feared only by collaborators, the entire Palestinian population had had enough of them. And it was no coincidence that Nablus, Samaria's capital, where collaborators' blood had been spilled, was the venue of violent gangs, who had chosen for themselves names that had nothing to do with the national struggle, but were borrowed from Ninja movies. Particularly discredited were two gangs: the Black Panther and the Green Eagle. They not only eliminated collaborators, but issued daily instructions of all sorts to the population, usually contradictory. At least eight groups were active on behalf of Fatah itself.

The gangs refused to comply with intifadah discipline and did not join Nablus' accepted command. Two weeks ago, however, they carried it too far when, after 'Arafat personally appealed to the Black Panther on PLO radio from Baghdad, masked individuals brutally killed Layla Mavruhah, whom they suspected of collaboration. The intention was indeed to deal a blow to collaborators, but no less to Yasir 'Arafat's pretension to impose governmental discipline on them. The base murder of Layla Mavruhah was a cruel manifestation of the joint interest beginning to emerge between Fatah and council circles that under Likud were so careful not to cross the red line of treason.

As for the specific matter of Hawwarah, the Black Panthers appropriated gold bars "for the intifadah" from a village businessman living in Nablus, something that created popular resentment of this intifadah practice in the village, thus allowing collaborators to stage a propaganda counterattack.

As it is, what began as systematic elimination of collaborators recently became mutual elimination, particularly between PLO supporters and religious currents, and there is no knowing any more who was suspected of collaboration and who was murdered on other grounds.

About 3 months ago there was a sulha [reconciliation] ceremony in the village of Khalkhul in the Hebron area, which was attended by Faysal al-Husayni. During the ceremony it was not entirely clear and nothing was specifically stated, but the sulha was between the Milham family and Fatah, whose men in 1969 had killed nine members of the family on suspicion of collaboration with Israel. That was not the first sulha between Fatah and the Milham family. Seemingly, the more sulhas they have the more the wound refuses to heal. The timing of the latest sulha carried a message from Fatah to Hebron, namely that Fatah was willing to turn over a new leaf with the villages, including the village councils, because the increasing polarization manifest in the territories within the intifadah was forcing Fatah to recruit every possible group willing to help. The village councils in the Hebron area did not act in a national spirit under Likud, but they did not step over the red line. Now they were requested to prove themselves from a national viewpoint in order to join the Palestinian governmental framework. According to unconfirmed reports, the person who mediated between Fatah and the village councils was the deported mayor of Khalkhul, Muhammad Milham, one of the members of the family that was so hard hit because of the blot of collaboration.

The relationship forged between Fatah and the village councils is creating serious problems for Fatah in the territories and is adding fuel to the tension existing between Fatah and the Unified Command. 'Arafat's willingness to meet with Dudin and al-Amlah has still not made the latter nationally worthy in the eyes of the intifadah Unified Command. Proof of that is the flier published on 22 October in the village Bayt 'Ula—Jamil al-Amlah's village—in the name of the Unified Command, according to which there is no pardon for traitors. The flier revealed that, after the meeting between al-Amlah and 'Arafat, Israel's treatment of the village became worse and the village was added to the list of those whose houses deserved to be demolished. However, the flier urged people not to be led astray by hasty conclusions, such as al-Amlah having thereby become a national figure, because the authorities did not destroy his brother's house, although it, too, was built without a permit. The flier admitted that one of the difficulties that was delaying the development of national awareness stemmed from the villages' strong clan consciousness. That serves to explain why the village councils in the Hebron area survived the storms of the intifadah.

However, the incipient contacts between village councils and Fatah may have another, more far-reaching significance. Rightly or wrongly, in the Palestinians' eyes, Dudin and al-Amlah are linked to Israeli security forces. 'Arafat's willingness to confer with them may have been meant to signal to Israel his willingness not only to make

peace with Israel, but also to enter into an extensive political alliance. But those are already projections on which it is still far too early to speculate any further.

Alleged Palestinian Collaborators Fight Intifadah

44230029C Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 26 Sep 89 pp 4,5

[Article by Oron Me'iri: "Ahmed Uda: 'An Army of Collaborators Will Liquidate the Uprising'"]

[Text] "There is no militia of collaborators in the territories, but an army of collaborators such as the Army of Southern Lebanon must be established. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] must train the collaborators so that they will be able to control in the field. An army such as in Southern Lebanon is the solution to the intifadah in the territories. If we weren't under the control of the Jews, the collaborators would become the strongest organization in the field," says Ahmed Udah, a land trader, known as one of the chiefs of the collaborators with Israel in the territories.

Udah lives in the village of Habalah near Qalqilyah. There are four guards in his home, and every evening, according to him, collaborators meet in his home and tell him about the problems in their villages. "We have weapons for self-defense, but we have never competed with the PLO. To this day, the collaborators have not killed a single Arab, but we are being killed like dogs.

"We obey the law and are punished for each of our offenses. We don't search homes. All in all, we defend ourselves," says Udah. He relates that masked individuals tried several times to enter his home and to throw incendiary bottles, but that he succeeded in chasing them away with the weapons in his possession and with the aid of his guards. "It's quiet now in my village because I met with the individuals and took care to clarify who's the strong man here, and since then everything is quiet and they don't cause any more problems."

According to Udah, the whole business of the news about the militia began in Yabed village in the Jenin region, and it was blown out of all proportion. "In all, the people wanted to live in their village, so a girl of 14 was killed and cars were burned, and when they tried to respond, they wrote defamatory articles about them." According to Udah, if the collaborators work together, they will have great strength in the region, and, in his opinion, the establishment of an army is the best solution.

"The PLO tries to make a mess for us, but if there's no choice, we'll give them the answer." According to him, most of the collaborators are educated and are former PLO members, and they know how to carry out military activities as required. His home has become the center of collaborators in the Tulkarm region. According to him, persons come and volunteer to be collaborators, after they've been injured by the violence and they see that the intifadah is weakening and they decide to collaborate with the authorities.

[Box, p 4] When THE NEW YORK TIMES Writes, They Believe

When an American newspaper writes something about what's going on in Israel, and especially about what's going on in the territories, people begin to relate to the revelation as if it were a fact. When an Israeli newspaper barks, the caravan goes on with closed eyes. It happens that Israeli newspapers, as well, after revelations abroad, seek out what they had relegated previously to the right-hand corner of page 13.

Thus it was also with the subject of the collaborators. Already at the beginning of the intifadah, we related here about one family, the family of Najer, from Yabed, whose home had been burned and who had been driven out in disgrace. The Najers swore to take revenge. About a month ago, Gil Sadan showed them going around armed in the village, collaborators. The fact that the collaborators already have an IDF abbreviation also shows that the phenomenon is institutionalized.

About 2 months ago, we told a story here about a meeting with armed collaborators near the Military Government [HQ] in Jenin. Apparently, it is to that group that THE NEW YORK TIMES refers today. There were about 20 armed persons there, who terrorized their surroundings. They said that the IDF takes care of everything that they lack ("A car is burned, they buy a new one. Money's no problem"), but Miki Kartzman, the cameraman, caught them red-handed in a side occupation: for a fistful of dinars, they will take care of an approval across the Jordan River, licenses, tax matters, and permits. There are villages where this cannot be done without the aid of the collaborators.

Some of them said that the IDF uses them to keep order in the region. While we were talking, as if to supply living proof, a white Subaru with a yellow license plate suddenly pulled up, and in it sat four collaborators, who waved their Uzi in the air. After a brief discussion with a Border Police officer, the four apologized, saying that they had to get moving. "We're going out on a little assignment." The collaborators told frankly of roadblocks and controls that they carry out on the roads in the region.

These things are supported by testimony of the victims. There is also testimony that collaborators abducted wanted persons in villages and turned them over to the IDF. They tried to give the impression in the conversation that they are part of the security authorities. Our impression is that these are spontaneous activities. Since they were banned and banished from their villages, the collaborators are going around in the field with nothing to do and are looking for confrontations. The IDF, which cannot throw them to the dogs, has no choice but to support acts of hooliganism.

By the way, not all the collaborators are armed. Those who are armed have been working with the authorities for years. The most screwed ones are those who collaborated recently in prison. They have no means of

defense. In contrast to what was attributed to THE NEW YORK TIMES, representatives of the IDF told us laconically that they knew nothing of the phenomenon.

Gaza Notable Comments on Banned Hamas

44230029D Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 2 Oct 89 p 19

[Interview with Palestinian National Council member Fayiz Abu-Rahmah by Oren Cohen; first six paragraphs are introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] There has always been competition between the secular movements in the territories and the religious movements. This stands out especially in the Gaza Strip, where a hard core of a religious movement called the Islamic Mujama' developed, which engaged in community activity and bringing people to the bosom of religion. This movement has a strong ideological affinity to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement, and most of its activity has been power struggles against the secular movements for influence over the population.

The Israeli military government sees the potential inherent in these power struggles. They thought that it would be possible to exploit the internal rivalry for the continuation of Israeli rule in the territories, according to the maxim of divide and conquer. Therefore, they encouraged the religious to fight the despised PLO. In 1973, the Islamic Mujama' movement was registered as a legally-recognized Ottoman society. The number of the movement's supporters grew, and at the same time, the number of mosques in the Strip grew meteorically. The Mujama' calls for a quiet revolution. Its leaders believed that redemption would come if the residents of the territories repented and the regional political situation changed in a manner that would make possible the establishment of an Islamic state.

All this was correct—until the appearance of the Islamic Jihad movement, which called for armed struggle, and saw the solution of the Palestinian problem as the key to the beginning of a process of establishing the Islamic state.

The men of the Mujama' made a reassessment, and decided to adopt a similar line. They established a military arm for the Muslim Brotherhood organization called Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and published a new covenant, based on the destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of Palestine.

In the end, Israel was forced to ban the Hamas.

One of the open expressions of the struggle between the secular and the religious movements was always the attacks on the leaders: burning of vehicles and property, and even attacks on individuals, incidents of murder and assault and battery. This should be taken into account when you read this interview, with attorney Fayiz Abu-Rahmah, who is identified with the PLO mainstream, and, some say, one of the opponents of the Hamas movement.

[HADASHOT] What is the practical significance of the new order that bans the Hamas?

[Abu-Rahmah] This is an order that declares the Hamas an association that is not permitted according to the Emergency Regulations of 1945. According to the regulations, they are considered to be illegal if the military governor declares them to be such. This order will be given to the court as unappealable evidence that the Hamas is not a permitted association, and no one will have to prove that any more.

[HADASHOT] In Israel, there are those who believe that many Palestinians are happy about this order.

[Abu-Rahmah] Hamas was never declared to be legal, and all Palestinians know that Hamas and all other organizations are not legal. Therefore, this order has added nothing to what was known already in any event. But the judicial process requires this order from the legislative viewpoint.

[HADASHOT] Let's leave the legal plane. Could it be said that Israel over the years had with its own hands created a monster? After all, the Mujama' flourished under Israeli rule.

[Abu-Rahmah] Yes. A blind eye was turned. In the past, they were not persecuted by the authorities.

[HADASHOT] Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the leader of Hamas, was captured in the past with weapons that were meant to be turned against Palestinians such as you.

[Abu-Rahmah] Correct.

[HADASHOT] What kind of a feeling does that give?

[Abu-Rahmah] These things have been forgotten, and Palestinians don't deal with it now. We are confronted with the present circumstances, and deal only with them.

[HASDASHOT] In the present circumstances, as well, Hamas and the leadership of the uprising don't see eye to eye on the solution. There are separate leaflets and opposing instructions.

[Abu-Rahmah] There are different ideologies. It is a matter of coexistence. We must exist together as two ideological movements; despite the contradictory positions, we have no obligation to cause problems. We don't have to fight among ourselves, for example—not to create battles between members of the two movements. In the nature of things, we will in the end have to live together.

[HADASHOT] Is the gulf between your outlooks bridgeable? After all, Hamas will oppose any solution that is less than an Islamic state.

[Abu-Rahmah] The difference between us and Hamas is that Hamas deals with the impossible. The establishment of an Islamic state is called for throughout Palestine. That is not possible. The PLO gave up dealing with the impossible, and deals only with possible solutions. Two

states for two peoples. This is the moderate position, to which most of Palestinians adhere.

[HADASHOT] Are you maintaining that if such a thing were realized, you would be able to coexist?

[Abu-Rahmah] In all countries there are differences of opinion between political groups. We are not different from anyone else. We, too, have radicals and moderates, super-radicals and supermoderates. Every party will be responsible for its own opinions. That's democracy.

[HADASHOT] On what part of that scale would you place Hamas?

[Abu-Rahmah] Hamas is without a doubt extremist.

[HADASHOT] Who benefits from the present situation, when the process is stuck?

[Abu-Rahmah] Hamas is trying to use the present situation, and there is no doubt that they are benefiting from the impasse, though their profit is not so great.

[HADASHOT] What does that mean?

[Abu-Rahmah] Most of the people follow the leadership of the PLO. Hamas does not express the majority. They represent 10 or 15 percent of the population in all. If this situation continues, they may become stronger, but they may also lose strength.

[HADASHOT] Is there any legal Palestinian organization in the territories?

[Abu-Rahmah] All the trade unions and charitable societies are legal, but there is not one legal political organization, so that the policy of not allowing political organizations has weakened the population, which was not able to express itself or to decide about its future.

[HADASHOT] In the past, such orders were issued against the al-Shabibah youth movement. What has happened to them since then?

[Abu-Rahmah] As a journalist, you certainly know more than I do about that, but, in my opinion, the al-Shabibah simply evaporated. We don't see them anymore.

[HADASHOT] But there are many other names.

[Abu-Rahmah] Yes. We have the ones with covered faces, the masked ones, and the popular committees.

Banned Hamas Said To Be Gathering Strength

44230029F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 29 Sep 89 p 8A

[Article by Uri Nir]

[Text] The security authorities' decision to ban Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] is first and foremost an indication that it had become stronger. This strengthening occurred on several levels: the broadened scope of its activity, which now includes murderous attacks

against Israeli soldiers and against residents suspected of collaboration or acts contrary to Islam (prostitution, gambling, drunkenness); the rise in its strength and influence in the West Bank in recent months, after it had become a leading force in the Strip; and its institutionalization as a crystallized Palestinian faction with subversive and terrorist apparatuses, such as the Palestinian nationalist organizations.

The main characteristics of Hamas are:

- The name Hamas is the initials of Harakah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah—"The Islamic Resistance Movement," but it is also an Arabic word whose dictionary definition is exaltation or fanatical intensity.
- Establishment and organizational basis: The movement was founded shortly after the outbreak of the intifadah, as an organizational framework of the Muslim fundamentalist activists, especially in the Strip. An educational and religious infrastructure of Islamic organizations, which had been established earlier in the Strip and had been encouraged by the Israeli military government (especially the Islamic Mujama' umbrella organization), served for recruiting cadres and indoctrination according to Hamas doctrine.

The Palestinian activists of the fanatical Pan-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood movement, which is presented in the writings of the Hamas as its spiritual father, entered the uprising in a position of relative inferiority. For many years, they had preached educational and cultural activity within the Muslim community in the territories, before the thrust of the revolution shifted to actual activity against Israel. The reformist approach inherent in the idea of preparing hearts and minds served as the reason for the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood to refrain for many years from violent activist activity against Israeli authorities. Their opponents in the fanatical Islamic camp in the Strip, the activist "Islamic Jihad," which increased their strength in the Strip from the middle of the 1980's, enjoyed much greater prestige than the men of the Muslim Brotherhood. The fanatical Muslims in Gaza take credit, to a great extent justifiably, for lighting the fire of the intifadah in December 1987, and assertions in this spirit appeared in many statements by members of Hamas.

Graffiti and leaflets by Hamas already appeared in the first months of the uprising, and the definition of the organization as the strong arm of the Muslim Brotherhood appeared in a Gazan leaflet in February 1988. But the official announcement of the establishment of the organization came in fact only on 18 August 1988, the date of the publication of the "Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement." (Incidentally, the first mention of Hamas by that name appeared as early as March 1987, before the outbreak of the uprising, in an Islamic leaflet against the drug plague in the region that was distributed in the Strip.)

- **Ideology:** The Hamas covenant spells out the main points of the organization's beliefs and principles, which are given briefly below. The movement is "a unique Palestinian movement, that seeks to raise the flag of Allah over every bit of land in Palestine"; the Jihad (Holy War) against Israel is an individual obligation, imposed on all Muslims.

Paragraph 8 of the Covenant states: "Allah is the flag of the movement, his emissary is its commander, the Koran is its constitution, the Holy War is its path, and death for Allah is its most exalted wish"; the land of Palestine is defined as Waqf (Muslim consecrated) land, of which it is forbidden to forego all or part, and which must be liberated by Jihad; the struggle in Palestine is seen by the organization as a Jewish-Muslim struggle, and its writings are full of strong anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic expressions; the organization sharply criticizes the PLO for its secularism, and also for the line of appeasement that the PLO leadership adopted in recent years. "The PLO bows down to Israel," says the spiritual leader of the organization, Shaykh Ahmed Yasin, in a newspaper interview a year ago.

Activity: With the establishment of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood in the territories joined the open and violent struggle against Israel, after 21 years of social and communal activity, which focused on university campuses and mosques. The members of Hamas established a kind of intifadah-activating system parallel to that of the "Central Command of the Uprising," which is considered to be an arm of the PLO in the territories. Hamas publishes a series of its own numbered leaflets, calls for separate general strike days, and takes care to enforce them, sends activists onto the streets for demonstrations and disturbances, conducts terrorist activities with firearms, its members murdered Palestinian residents suspected of being collaborators, and, apparently, carried out several murderous attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians.

Report Compares House Destruction in Territories

44230029B Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 28 Sep 89 p 7

[Article by Oren Cohen, Michal Kedem]

[Text] The Israel Center for Human Rights in the Territories submitted a report yesterday edited by Roni Talmor, editor of the monthly POLITICS, on the destruction and sealing of houses as a means of punishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the intifadah. A draft of the report was transmitted to the bureaus of the cabinet ministers, to the chief of staff, and to the legal advisor to the government.

According to Talmor, the most important finding is the striking contradiction between the figures supplied by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] spokesman and those published by the Ministry of Defense. Since the beginning of the intifadah, a total of 173 houses were

destroyed in the West Bank, compared to 63 in the Gaza Strip, while 79 were sealed in the West Bank, compared to 19 in the Strip.

According to the report, there is a difference in policy on destruction and sealing between the West Bank and the Strip: "In the Gaza Strip, a serious action, such as suspected murder or manslaughter and attempted murder or manslaughter, or another action involving a threat to life, is required for destruction, while in the West Bank, in addition to all these reasons, homes of those suspected of stone-throwing, incitement, and of forcibly resisting arrest also were destroyed. In the Strip, only the home of the suspect or of his parents was destroyed, while in the West Bank, homes of more distant relatives were destroyed and sealed." [closing quotation supplied]

According to the editor of the report, "The inescapable conclusion is that the decision to destroy or to seal a house is, to a great extent, arbitrary, lacks clear criteria, and depends in large measure on those involved in the field."

The IDF spokesman said yesterday that the IDF policy on destruction and sealing is carried out in the territories according to the law, which gives the military commanders the authority to order the destruction or sealing of houses that were used for attacks on soldiers and civilians, or in which persons who participated in violent activity lived. The statement said that the decisions go through many controls.

"Destruction and damages in the amount of \$8 million were caused by IDF soldiers from the beginning of the intifadah until today to UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] installations and equipment in the Gaza Strip," asserted the Gaza team of the Society for Civil Rights in a letter that it sent 2 days ago to the Commander of the Southern Command.

In a letter sent by the Gaza team to the Commander of the Southern Command it was asserted that sources within UNRWA, who refuse to be identified for obvious reasons, assert that since the beginning of the intifadah, IDF soldiers caused damages amounting to gigantic sums to UNRWA installations and equipment throughout the Strip. The Gaza team noted that an accounting of the sum of \$8 million, with details of all the damages, was submitted officially to the Israel delegation to the United Nations by representatives of UNRWA. It was also stated that the damage involved the destruction of security walls of schools and kindergartens, breaking of windows and roofs of infirmaries and food distribution centers, the destruction of fences and doors in public places, and the destruction of lavatories and other public buildings in the Strip.

Improved Palestinian Press Attitude to Labor Noted

44230029E Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 29 Sep 89 p 15

[Article by Dani Rubinstein]

[Text] The Israeli position refuses, as is known, to see in the PLO a discussant or partner in any negotiations for a solution in the region. For that reason—at least, from the official viewpoint—there is no Israeli interest in the political positions of the PLO. Prime Minister Shamir has stated to the Americans that he is not interested in receiving information on their dialogue with the PLO. Foreign Minister Arens refuses to receive the French foreign minister, who wanted to give him details on 'Arafat's meetings in Paris. For official Israel, it is enough that about once each month, the spokesmen of the prime minister and of the foreign minister will announce that 'Arafat and the PLO have again "taken more extreme positions," somewhat confused announcements, as no Israeli spokesman ever admitted that the PLO had become (as it were) more moderate. And if the announcements of Israeli spokesmen from previous years are added, the strange picture emerges that the PLO continually takes only more extreme and sharper positions without any limit.

In contrast, if we are to judge according to the Palestinian-Arab press in the territories, which generally expresses the PLO line, there is a tremendous interest in the Israeli positions. Every day there are commentaries and analyses of the Israeli positions to the very smallest detail. The Arab press publishes a wealth of translations of articles and statements from the Israeli press, and the editorials refer almost daily to declarations and statements of Israeli cabinet ministers.

Up to a few weeks ago, all the East Jerusalem newspapers expressed their reservations about the Israel positions, without much differentiation between the ministers of Likud and Alignment. (The only exception was Minister 'Ezer Weizmann.) The newspaper AL-NAHAR (which was formerly close to Jordanian positions, and today presents positions almost identical to those of the PLO) published nearly a month ago a caricature of Rabin, Shamir, and Peres acting like the three well-known monkeys. Rabin doesn't see, Shamir doesn't hear, and Peres doesn't speak. "That's the situation with Israel's leaders," writes AL-NAHAR.

The change in attitude towards the Israeli positions followed Yitzhaq Rabin's trip to Washington and Cairo, and especially after Prime Minister Shamir said, "I am surprised by Yitzhaq Rabin," and the minister of defense replied, "I am surprised by Shamir's surprise." All the Arab newspapers responded to this exchange with interest and excitement. Afterwards, there were careful expressions of satisfaction in several editorials with the positions of the Labor Party, primarily great emphasis on the news about a meeting between Deputy Finance Minister Yosi Beilin and PLO representative Basam Abu-Sharif. The newspaper AL-SHA'B, for example, pounced upon the statement that Rabin made in the United States, according to which the Israeli peace initiative (of Prime Minister Shamir and himself) was at an impasse because there is no Palestinian side in the territories that is willing to be an alternative to the PLO. "Rabin admits: The Israeli elections plan has failed and has lost its influence," wrote AL-NAHAR. And

from here, the paper did not have to go far to come out this week (23 Sep) with the banner headline "Will Rabin Lead the Peace Process?" Even though this was written with a question mark, these words are definitely extraordinary in the uniform landscape of formulations in the Arab press, which generally denounce Israel's leaders, including the minister of defense, the repressor of the intifadah.

Every reference in the East Jerusalem press to the positions of the parties and cabinet ministers in Israel are part of commentaries on President Mubarak's 10-point plan. In contrast to the vague statements of the PLO spokesmen from Tunis, which alternately support and object to the 10 points, the East Jerusalem newspapers have shown more support for the Egyptian initiative. The support did not stem from the fact that the 10 points are what the Palestinians have been yearning for, but rather because they "embarrassed the Israeli government," as the weekly AL-USBU'A AL-JADID (which leans toward Fatah, and whose senior editor is Hanna Sinyurah, the editor of AL-FAJR) put it. In all the East Jerusalem newspapers, Mubarak's 10 points were referred to as an excellent instrument to expose the stubborn refusal of Prime Minister Shamir, who is not willing to accept them.

The Palestinian hope in the territories came this week from the chance for the emergence of a Washington-Cairo-Labor Party triangle that would get the negotiations wagon moving. The one that cooled these hopes was the East Jerusalem Left weekly (the Communist) AL-TALI'AH (whose distribution in the territories is banned). Along with an interview with the Palestinian Communist leader Suleiman al-Najab (who was expelled from the West Bank 15 years ago), AL-TALI'AH warned, "We must not bet on the Labor Party...it's nice that its chiefs accept Mubarak's 10 points, which have much in them that is positive, but these 10 points are entirely insufficient. And in the final analysis, the Labor Party—like the LIKUD—opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state...Therefore, it is forbidden to bet on it," AL-TALI'AH stresses.

These things can't be measured. But the impression is that the interest that is being shown in the territories in the positions and declarations of Israeli policymakers is no less than the interest we, the Israelis, show regarding this subject. "It affects our lives," says the attorney and journalist Ziyad Abu-Ziyad. The result of the internal debate in Israel will determine for them whether there will be negotiations, or the continuation of the routine bloodshed, violence, and suffering of the intifadah.

BAHRAIN

Discussions on Bahrainization Reported 900L0109A Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 23 Oct 89 p 8

[Text] The 5-year training and Bahrainization plan was put into effect last July. The Ministry of Labor has sent

letters to more than 400 companies and institutions outlining the obligations of each of these parties toward this plan. Also the Ministry of Labor recently began expanding the plan, at present confined to industrial, construction, and major institutions in general, to involve the service sector institutions and companies.

Presently the Ministry of Labor is attaching great importance to this plan and to following it up. Recently it has appointed Yusuf al-Harami as a coordinator or liaison between the ministry and the institutions and companies involved in implementing the plan. Jasim Busuhayl, head of the employment unit, is helping in managing the work on this important task. The two men are very enthusiastic about the plan.

Reports being prepared by the Ministry of Labor confirm that companies and institutions are showing great cooperation in implementing this plan, which indicates that it will achieve the objectives set for it.

The Ministry of Labor, according to the letters sent by the minister of labor to the companies and institutions concerned in the plan, is showing flexibility and understanding with these companies and institutions. It is avoiding rigidity, pressure, and compulsion that might be counterproductive. Accordingly, officials responsible for implementing the plan at the ministry are meeting these days with officials of the parties concerned in order to hear their views and suggestions regarding the method of implementing it. They are readily willing to take into consideration all proposals that might serve the implementation according to the established standards.

In order to find out the views of those concerned in companies and institutions, we went out to interview some of them.

Mubarak al-'Utqi, the director responsible for implementing the Bahrainization plan at the Yusuf Bin-Ahmad Kanu institution, said that the 5-year plan the government proposed through the Ministry of Labor for Bahrainization primarily aims at providing the new generations with employment opportunities. The period of economic recession has led to the emergence of a generation lacking experience; this generation is in need for employment as a means of earning a livelihood.

Mubarak said that the Kanu institution is not disinterested in achieving the Bahrainization plan. In fact, it laid its own Bahrainization plan some 10 years ago, that is, 5 years before the government plan.

He added, "But as the government is implementing the Bahrainization plan, officials should not forget that several factors and conditions should be taken into consideration. These include the fact that we, just as in any other institution, employ local citizens. But during the training period or after completing it and learning the work methods, they leave the job. We agree and confirm that Bahrainis have priority to jobs over foreigners, but what can be done if they do not settle down? After leaving us upon completion of their training, they leave us with a difficult problem,

because we would by then have dispensed with the services of the experienced foreigner and it will be difficult for us to bring him back."

"The basic problem here," Mubarak al-'Utqi said, "is that I cannot force the Bahraini to stay with me in the job because there is no legal means that would enable me to do so. Therefore, as we are implementing the plan, we must take note of the fact that in order for an institution to continue it must make a profit, and if it does not make profit then it cannot employ or train anybody. Moreover, an institution has obligations in the market and toward clients. There are commitments to be met within a specified time. Employment, resignation, reemployment, experienced people leaving, then looking for them again—all this is bound to throw any institute into confusion."

He added, "I wish there were directives that force a Bahraini who is employed and has gained experience to stay in the institution in which he is employed. I can force the foreigner to stay by means of work contracts that incorporate conditions ensuring that."

"The problem," Mubarak al-'Utqi said, "is that the ministry has sent us the plan in order to be implemented, but it deals only with figures. It says: You have 40 foreigners, dismiss 20 of them and replace them with Bahrainis. This is not an easy matter. Can I be sure that the 20 persons that I will employ all at once will do the work with the same standard as before? The ministry must take into consideration, for example, that a service institution is in competition with other institutions and that there are specific commitments which the institution is obliged to meet. We offer travel and shipping services and are linked to international networks. We must keep abreast with scientific and technological progress in this field."

Mubarak added, "We are Bahrainis and are no less enthusiastic and patriotic from any other party. We recognize that there is idle Bahraini manpower that needs to be employed. But when the Ministry of Labor sends to us some business graduates, will they be able to deal with modern shipping and other equipment? Their training needs time and the institutions that are engaged in work of a special nature should be given sufficient time and the matter should not be dealt only with figures and with the "dismiss and employ" system. This cannot be applied in a country whose business is to provide services. Success in this field needs competence. Frankly, I need experience more than I need graduates."

"I am saying this," he said, "despite the fact that the Kanu institution is now implementing a full Bahrainization plan which was launched 5 years ago, and another plan for training to which appropriate budget allocations have been made. We will place new graduates in a 4-year full training program in the hope that we will obtain the necessary experience in the field of our specialized services."

In an interview with Shakir 'Iqab, the director responsible for training and Bahrainization at Shakir Institution for Management Consultation, said that the 5-year

plan for training and Bahrainization is the first well-studied and precise plan implemented by the Ministry of Labor in this field. It has been laid down in the light of reality and the actual needs for domestic manpower in places of work and foreign manpower available in those places. For the first time we have in our hands something tangible that we can discuss and talk about.

He said, "It is true that the Ministry of Labor is adopting an attitude of give and take towards us, but we are still asking it to be more flexible so that we can avoid obstacles and remove them from the path of implementing the Bahrainization plan. However, I have felt that the Ministry of Labor is adopting a reasonable stand which is in the interest of continuing the progress of production in all places of work, while clinging to the need to provide jobs to national citizens. For example, they told us not to dispense with the services of foreign experts all at once, but rather to employ a Bahraini alongside the foreign expert. You can also define the period required for training and acquiring full experience. Meanwhile the ministry will not hesitate to extend the foreigner's residence permit."

Shakir 'Iqab said, "Suppose we employ a Bahraini citizen and find that he needs 3 years to acquire experience, but then we see him leave after a year and a half. We have put this question to the ministry's officials and, in fact, they were positive with us. They said we will give you another Bahraini who will continue with the training and we will extend the foreigner's residence permit until the trainee acquires the desired experience and takes over from the foreigner. This is an extremely flexible and positive. In summary, we are no less enthusiastic than the Ministry of Labor officials about the Bahrainization plan because our national duty dictates this upon us."

In the 'Ali Bin-Ibrahim 'Abd al-'Al institution, we spoke with Sa'id al-Hawwaj, its director. He said, "All efforts must be joined so that the 5-year plan for training and Bahrainization will succeed. I refer here to the government and the private sector. Everybody should note that we have been seeking to implement this plan even before it was issued. Keeping the foreigner when national expertise is available is unjustifiable. But, on the other hand, there are certain gaps in the plan that would make certain other institutions hesitate or fail to implement it. For example, the Ministry of Labor is fully behind the worker and against the employer. This is not to the advantage of employing Bahrainis. When a worker complains to the ministry, any employer is guilty and at fault even before hearing what he has to say. The ministry should give advice to the worker rather than show him strong sympathy that would make him even more rebellious against the employer. Therefore, when we give the worker a written warning against repeating a mistake, he refuses even to sign it and he rushes to the Ministry of Labor. When the employer tries to reach agreement with the ministry, we find that it will immediately send the case to court because it sided with the worker from the beginning. This creates a kind of constant alienation and misunderstanding between worker and employer, which

is not in the interest of the Bahrainization plan. This situation will remain so as long as the worker feels that he is backed by the Ministry of Labor."

He added, "However, not all the Bahraini workers abuse the Ministry of Labor's sympathy with them. Some Bahraini workers have a high standard of understanding and responsibility. Therefore, they have shown patience and persistence and proved their existence, reaching leading positions. I am one of them. I joined the institution as a clerk and I was sent to attend several courses and scholarships until I obtained a master's degree. Now I occupy a senior position in the institution."

"Therefore," he continued, "the Ministry of Labor should adopt the system of reward and punishment so that the Bahraini worker will proceed on the right path. A worker proclaiming he is Bahraini does not mean that all doors should be wide open to him without any restrictions and expertise and the best interests of the work should be wasted. The Bahraini should not be a superman who wants to be pampered, who leaves work any time he wants, and who complains to the Ministry of Labor against the employer for the slightest reason. There is no difference between a Bahraini and a foreigner except in the amount of what he gives, produces, and is loyal to the job, because if we deviate from this course we will be acting contrary to the interest of work. In any case," Sa'id al-Hawwaj, concluded, "we have a well-studied plan to employ and train Bahrainis because we realize that a loyal and hard-working Bahraini is a thousand times better for us and for production than a foreign worker, but we should not ignore the interest of work."

Agricultural Development, Trade Measures Outlined

90OL0118B Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 29 Oct 89 pp 1, 9

[Article: "AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ Interviews the Minister and Officials of Trade and Agriculture: Steps Taken To Develop Agriculture and Bolster the Commercial Sector; Land Reclamation Company To Be Founded; Prolonging the Harvest Season and Increasing Arable Land Discussed; Commercial Register Controls Guarantee That Right to All Who Qualify"; date and place not given]

[Text] AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ, as part of its program to host and interview cabinet ministers, yesterday hosted the Minister of Trade and Agriculture Habib Ahmad Qasim. The minister was accompanied by Hasan al-Nisf, undersecretary of the ministry; Ahmad Hubayl, assistant undersecretary for corporate affairs; Sidiq al-'Alawi, assistant undersecretary for agriculture; and Muhammad Baqir al-Tajir, director of supply and price oversight. They met with this newspaper's editorial family for a comprehensive dialogue on citizen problems in the commercial and agricultural sectors.

The minister discussed the ministry's efforts towards agricultural expansion and said that his highness the country's exalted emir, his highness the prime minister, and his highness the heir to the throne, are all highly interested in

developing agriculture. He added that studies are underway for founding a land reclamation company and for measures to prolong the harvest season and expand the area of arable land. The minister also said that commercial register controls exist but that they safeguard the right to obtain registrations for all who qualify.

The minister stated, "The ministry is presently expending a great deal of effort to support and stimulate the services sector in order to respond to citizens's needs and make their lives easier. The ministry also continues to work hard for the completion of a series of relevant legislations of which several, including the company law, are already on the books. The legislation regulating accountants and auditors will be issued soon." He added that the ministry, at the direction of his highness the prime minister, is currently implementing measures and coordinating with other competent authorities in order to put an end to red tape and remove obstacles to the rendering of services to citizens and the speedy handling of their affairs.

He emphasized that the ministry is currently focusing on stimulating the country's economic and commercial activity and encouraging the founding of new stock companies of which none was founded in the past 5 years because recent developments in countries of the region discouraged the demand for shares. The ministry has begun to restore citizen confidence in stocks via the stock exchange and other procedures to be implemented consecutively.

Mr Habib Ahmad Qasim said, "The ministry is also working to stimulate exports and reexports by supporting local output and coordinating with other authorities such as the ministries of development and finance and national economy. He added that work is progressing on the new exhibition center scheduled for completion next year. The center will accomplish several objectives simultaneously. It will serve as a permanent exhibit of domestic products while serving as a site for Arab and international fairs. Certain countries may also want to keep their products on permanent display at the center and the issue is currently being discussed with a number of countries."

The minister of trade discussed plans and projects for agricultural development in Bahrain, pointing out that their highnesses the exalted emir of the country, the prime minister, and the crown prince, are all highly interested in developing Bahraini agriculture and in supporting, encouraging, and motivating farmers. He added that several steps are being taken to assure that citizens turn to agriculture and that this tendency has been noticeable, and has been spreading lately because of reduced urban infringement on farmlands. Some 15,000 hectares would be suitable for farming when reclaimed. A study is currently underway to determine the feasibility of establishing a specialized company that would do reclamation work for the department of agriculture and for private citizens. The company's legal and operational frameworks are now being discussed.

The minister added, "The ministry is presently expending a great deal of effort to implement modern irrigation techniques that save 50 percent of the water needed for farming. A program for using treated water in agriculture is being implemented on a wide scale. The entire 'Adhari region will be irrigated solely with treated water by next month."

Planting has already begun of land reclaimed by the state at a cost of 10 million dinars. Some 150 hectares around the town of 'Isa have been reclaimed and planted with trees and fodder. Fruit trees have been planted on 150 hectares reclaimed to the east of Bahrain. Reclamation projects in the western region will begin shortly. The national planning administration and the ministry of housing are currently discussing the designation of whole regions as farmland protected from urban encroachment. Other discussions with the ministry of finance seek to fund reclamation projects, encourage the trend to farming, and support agrarian investment while focusing on capital expansion in agriculture. There is great diligence to overcome obstacles to farm development in the country. Important experiments, for instance, are being conducted to lengthen the harvest season. The ministry is also working to create an equilibrium between protecting consumers and encouraging citizens to invest in agriculture. It is also seeking a formula for a structured market to sell farm products to countries of the region.

Mr Habib Ahmad Qasim said that the ministry has instituted restrictions on commercial registration. A registrant cannot be an employee, must be over 18 years of age, and cannot hold more than 3 registrations. This does not in any way interfere with general Bahraini guidelines granting Bahraini citizens the freedom of engaging in commercial activity and the ministry cannot deny commercial registration to a qualified citizen who meets those conditions. He added that there has been great demand lately for commercial registration, especially by Bahraini women. Most applicants for registrations are women. The ministry received 7,387 registration requests over a period of 9 months but granted only 460. The number of commercial registrations in Bahrain has climbed recently to 22,067.

He explained, "A number of rules and regulations has also been imposed in order to control the phenomenon of leasing registrations out to foreigners. For instance, checks issued by the commercial establishment must be signed by the registrant who would also have responsibility for the establishment's employees." "Over-tightening of commercial registrations could lead to the creation of a black market in them," he explained.

Oil, Gas Statistics Published

90OL0118C Manama AL-BAHRAYN
in Arabic 20 Sep 89 pp 12-13

[Article: "BANOCO Reports: 66.7 Million Barrels of Petrochemicals Produced in 1988; Gas Production Was 597 Million Square Feet Daily"]

[Text] The Bahrain National Oil Company (BANOCO) was able last year, despite oil market disruptions, to export some 66.7 million barrels of petrochemicals to all parts of the world, according to the company's recently released annual report.

As for exploration, development, and support of future activity in well drilling and reservoir management, the company has reexamined select seismic surveys in light of a reevaluation of available seismic data.

The focus was on the gas field. Geological and seismic data collected in 1982, as well as other data collected in pre-1959 surveys, were reevaluated in light of modern scientific developments.

Company specialists, using seismic echo technology, have also gone over 74 kilometers of seismic survey lines for the purpose of organizing seismic plans and defining the level and depth of 5 important geological formations.

A comprehensive geological study was also made to identify the region's formation and stratigraphic relationships and determine the geological age of its various strata.

Gas Production

The company said in its report that average daily production of oil and liquefied natural gas during the year amounted to 42,941 barrels per day (bpd) for a total of 14,452 barrels [as published] in addition to 1.222 million barrels of liquified natural gas. This compares with 1987 production of 14,329 million barrels and 1.03 million barrels in 1987 [as published].

The output of associated gas averaged 124 million cubic feet per day, helping to bring the central gas treatment facility to its maximum capacity. Aggregate output of associated gas during the year amounted to 45,212 million cubic feet, compared with 45,985 million cubic feet in 1987.

Natural gas from the al-Khuf strata had an average daily production of 597 million cubic feet year-round for an increase of 5.5 percent over 567 million cubic feet in 1987. Minimum demand was sometimes as high as 800 million cubic feet. In other words, the rate of production was in step with the aggregate demand of major industries in the country. Production facilities were able to satisfy gas demand at its peak.

Maintenance Programs

The report explained that 1988 was a time for evaluating development drilling completed under the 5-year plan in order to maintain the Bahrain field at its output level during its first and second stages in 1986 and 1987, when only 43 wells were drilled.

Available resources were dedicated to a comprehensive program to maintain and reform depleted wells. Work in 1988 included the implementation of a number of well

maintenance and reform operations as well as the reformation of certain wells in order to maintain the mandated level of production.

Maintenance and reform operations implemented during the year numbered 71—an all-time record for the field of Bahrain.

In order to accomplish oil production objectives and meet the anticipated increase in demand for associated gas, the report said that a major project is currently underway to reactivate the gas cycle at certain reservoirs. Meanwhile, work continues on a project to mine and increase the efficiency of production facilities. Four gas separation units were installed at four gathering centers as part of another program to modernize and raise the efficiency of surface production centers. Plans have also been completed for a pipeline to transport tail gas to the electric generation station at Satrat.

A comprehensive concentrated program was put into effect at oil gathering centers to maintain and raise the efficiency of heating equipment, water separation units, and gas separation units. A large number of storage tanks also underwent a similar program for maintenance and productivity.

International Marketing

As for the world marketing of national output, the report said that oil price stability during the early weeks of 1988 raised optimism that prices would remain stable through the year at the median official price set by OPEC.

However, continued pressure on oil markets generated by supply and demand imbalances, trade speculation, and seasonal consumption variations, resulted in persistent softness in the prices of oil and refined products in the period from February to November. Accordingly, [oil] income declined from its 1987 levels.

Exported Oil Products

The report said the company exported 901,000 barrels to Australia, 10.32 million barrels to the Far East, 8,949 million barrels to the Middle East, 31,005 million barrels to Southeast Asia, 7,639 million barrels to Africa, 3,400 barrels to Europe, and 7,603 million barrels to the United States.

Meanwhile, sales of aviation fuel at the Bahrain International Airport grew last year at the rate of 4.3 percent because of increased arriving and departing traffic. Sales totalled 1.93 million barrels compared with 1.861 million barrels last year.

Domestic Sales

The report revealed that domestic sales of petroleum products as a whole increased by about 4 percent and that gasoline consumption rose by more than 8 percent.

Aggregate sales amounted to 2.792 million barrels of which 121,000 barrels were kerosene, 225,000 barrels

liquefied gas, 124,000 barrels asphalt, 1,687 barrels of gasoline, and 634,000 barrels of diesel fuel.

BANOCO sales of ship fuel grew in 1988 grew at a record annual rate of 36 percent, perhaps due to unusually heavy traffic in the Gulf for long periods of the year. Total [sales] amounted to 1.244 million barrels compared with 913,000 barrels last year.

Domestic Distribution

In order to meet growing domestic demand for petroleum products, the fleet of overland tankers has been modernized and expanded by adding a new trailer with a capacity of 30,000 liters and 6 new hauling vehicles.

The report said that the company implemented in 1988 a program to modernize and develop electrical machinery and equipment. Two petroleum storage tanks were also completed and pressed into service during the year. The company has therefore completed the first stage of the program to modernize and develop this important utility.

Bahrainization at BANOCO

The company's Bahraini employees account for 82.8 percent of its work force of 670 employees. 14 [Bahrainis] are in top management, 226 in middle management, 175 are professionals, 139 are technicians, and 7 workers are nonspecialized.

BANOCO has sponsored several educational seminars in order to maintain and improve the performance and potential of its work force. It has also taken part in symposia dealing with such varied topics as operations, administration, shop safety, technical development, engineering, finance, computers, and other oil and gas topics. It also took part in sessions organized by several scientific and technical institutions in Bahrain and overseas.

Consumer Services

BANOCO has continued to build new service stations and increase the capacity of existing ones under a policy to meet the challenge of persistent growth in gasoline demand and in order to better serve the consumer. The report revealed that in 1988 the company built and opened new service stations in the towns of 'Isa and Hamad.

EGYPT

Foreign Minister on Relations With USSR, Sudan, Israel

900A0166B Cairo AKHIR SA'AH
in Arabic 29 Nov 89 p 15

[Interview With Foreign Minister Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid by Qamar Shah Dhu-al-Fiqar; "Question and Answer With Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid: Amidst World's Problems, Egypt Is Balanced Politically; Normal and Good Relations With USSR; Egypt and Sudan—Fraternal and Good Relations"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [AKHIR SA'AH] What is Egypt's position on perestroyka in Soviet policy toward the Middle East?

['Abd-al-Majid] The Foreign Ministry has been observing with utter interest the developments in the USSR since Gorbachev assumed power. Our assessment of Gorbachev is that he is a reformist leader who has identified and put his finger on his society's drawbacks and problems and who has formulated alternate ideas to replace the ideas that have dominated the Soviet society since the Soviet revolution.

What is also important is that Gorbachev's policy has had an influence on foreign policy. For example, we find that the Soviet-U.S. relationship has turned from confrontation to cooperation in various areas, especially in the areas of disarmament and international detente. What is more important is that this transformation has had an obvious influence on regional problems. We find that there has been cooperation to solve the Afghan problem, the Gulf war, the Angola and the Lebanon issues, and other problems. The Middle East situation and the Palestinian issue have also been among the issues that have seen cooperation between the two sides. No U.S.-Soviet summit or ministerial meeting has been void of a discussion on the Palestinian issue. There has been so much discussion on the issue that we find that the two superpowers' positions have moved closer to each other. We hope that this will act as an additional element leading to a peaceful, just, and comprehensive settlement to the issue.

Egyptian-Soviet Relations Are Good

[AKHIR SA'AH] How have Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union been recently?

['Abd-al-Majid] Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union can be characterized as normal and good. My visit to Moscow in May 1988 was a convenient occasion to reflect these relations. President Mubarak has received an invitation from Leader Gorbachev to visit the Soviet Union. His excellency has accepted the invitation, the date of which will be set at a proper time, depending on the president's commitments. [passage omitted]

Egyptian-Sudanese Relations Are Fraternal

[AKHIR SA'AH] To what degree have the Egyptian-Sudanese relations developed since the National Salvation Revolution established itself firmly and how true are the rumors that these relations are frozen?

['Abd-al-Majid] [passage omitted] Sudanese-Egyptian relations can be characterized as good fraternal relations. Whoever casts doubt on these relations and whoever judges these historical relations by a short period of time is wrong. [passage omitted]

Africa Is Very Important to Egypt

[AKHIR SA'AH] What is Egypt's African policy toward:

- The Andogo countries?
- Settling bilateral disputes?
- The Namibia issue?
- South Africa and its relations of cooperation with Israel on nuclear weapons?

[‘Abd-al-Majid] [passage omitted] Perhaps the elections held in Namibia in the past few days are nothing but the result of African effort and international pressure on South Africa to agree to holding elections in Namibia so that it may get its independence, which we will celebrate shortly. Moreover, Egypt established many years ago the Africa Technical Aid Fund to provide the Egyptian expertise needed by the friendly African countries. By virtue of its experience with the continent's affairs, Egypt has worked to encourage trilateral cooperation with the advanced countries wishing to aid certain African countries in coordination with Egypt. [passage omitted]

As for the Israeli-South African cooperation on nuclear weapons and on the delivery of such weapons by medium-range missiles, Egypt has expressed its strong concern over the reports, confirmed by official U.S. and other international sources, on the nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa and on the development of a medium-range missile capable of carrying nuclear heads, because of the escalated tension such cooperation creates in the southern part of Africa and in the Middle East. This is our firm position which we have repeatedly declared. We have made it known to Israel that it can underline its goodwill by signing the nonproliferation treaty and by responding to the positions that demand that the Middle East be kept a region free of nuclear armament.

Ex-NDP Shaykh Discusses Reasons Behind His Expulsion

900A0138B Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 15 Nov 89 pp 1, 2

[Article: “The Story of Shaykh Ramadan 'Arafah and the National Party: 'I Was Expelled because I Would Not Accept Rif'at al-Mahjub; This Is What Really Happened in Front of President Mubarak'”]

[Text] Shaykh Ramadan 'Arafah, member of the People's Assembly, told AL-NUR the story of his expulsion from the National Democratic Party [NDP] early in the new parliamentary session of the People's Assembly which started last Wednesday.

Shaykh 'Arafah affirmed that he declared his rejection of Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub as the nominee for the position of speaker of the People's Assembly, particularly because the assembly has many qualified people who can carry the load of such a weighty and grave position. Besides, al-Mahjub is still recovering from an illness.

Shaykh Ramadan 'Arafah said that declaring himself a candidate for the speaker's position was intended to emphasize his rejection of al-Mahjub's candidacy.

Shaykh Ramadan 'Arafah revealed what really happened in front of President Husni Mubarak while the NDP's

parliamentary committee was holding a meeting to select a speaker for the assembly and two deputy speakers. He said, “Kamal al-Shadhli, assistant secretary general of the party, took everyone by surprise when he stood up during the meeting and said, 'The party's parliamentary committee unanimously nominates Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub to serve as speaker of the new session of the People's Assembly.' Al-Shadhli said that all members were recommending Dr al-Mahjub's nomination.”

Shaykh Ramadan 'Arafah added that no comments were permitted after that, and no nominations were allowed from the floor.

Shaykh 'Arafah went on to say, “On the following day when the People's Assembly was convened with all parties represented, it was announced that nominations for the speaker's position would be accepted. Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub declared himself a candidate, and it was expected that someone from the opposition would come forward and declare himself a candidate. But that did not happen, so I used my constitutional right to run for office, and I declared my own candidacy. After it was announced that al-Mahjub had been elected speaker, I took the floor and reminded al-Mahjub of the promise he had made to me and to members of the People's Assembly. Al-Mahjub had promised that Islamic laws, especially Egypt's Penal Code, would be taken out of filing cabinets and passed.”

Shaykh 'Arafah added, “I was taken by surprise the following day when Kamal al-Shadhli announced that I had been expelled from the NDP for violating the party's commitments. I have not yet received the expulsion decision from the president of the party, who is also the president of the republic.”

Shaykh 'Arafah indicated that there were other reasons behind the rush to announce the decision to expel him from the party without conducting an investigation. Among these reasons was his refusal to agree to the expulsion of Wafd Party member Tal'at Raslan from the People's Assembly despite the parliamentary committee's decision. He also objected to the nomination of Justice 'Abd-al-Salam Hamid to the post of socialist public prosecutor. In addition, Shaykh 'Arafah had submitted a bill to ban the sale and production of alcoholic beverages, and that was one bill which had been put away in a filing cabinet.

Shaykh Ramadan 'Arafah made it clear that he will not stop asking for the swift approval of Islamic laws. He asked that the Religious Affairs Committee, which is chaired by Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Nimr, adopt this matter instead of being interested only in caring for the handicapped and the aged and looking after usurped religious trusts and mosques which are structurally unsafe.

Shaykh 'Arafah added that he will not join any other party and that he will serve in the People's Assembly as an independent.

SLP Reaffirms Islamic 'Project'900A0164B Cairo *AL-SHA'B* in Arabic 7 Nov 89 p 8

[Article by SLP Youth Secretary Dr Ibrahim al-Ja'fari: "Let SLP Project Spring Forth"]

[Text] The project presented by the SLP [Socialist Labor Party] 3 years ago is not receding. For those who need to be reminded, the gist of the project is to eliminate the contradiction between the Islamic tendency and the pan-Arabist, not Marxist, tendency.

Radical supporters of the Islamic tendency believe that pan-Arabism clashes with Islam and the pan-Arabists reiterate the statement that the Islamic solution is inappropriate for the present. Both sides have attacked each other for a long time. Ultimately, the young generations have had to shoulder the consequences of this division and to bequeath it to the future generations.

It is from this bitter reality that the SLP project emerged. It was formulated in late 1986 in the intellectual document of the fourth congress. It was published on the pages of *AL-SHA'B* under the title of "To the Islamic Youth and the Nasirist Youth." Dialogues were launched with the Islamic and Nasirist factions, beginning with the dialogue with Farid 'Abd-al-Karim.

The 1987 legislative elections caught the SLP unawares. The developments in those elections ascertained the Islamic identity of the Egyptian scene. Following those elections, the party's sons put the party's house in order and this resulted in the outcome of the fifth congress elections which reaffirmed and determined the party's identity.

As to the accompanying reactions which continue to accompany, the developments in the SLP, the pan-Arabist tendency's reactions have been apprehensive and there have been whispers that the SLP's "great" role to which the pan-Arabists had attached their hopes has begun to recede.

Therefore, it is important to reaffirm continuation of the SLP project, especially since this project is nurtured by six things:

First, the good initiatives which were launched by a number of leaders of the Islamic and pan-Arabist tendencies and which resulted in the recent conference that was organized by the Arab Unity Studies Center.

Second, the start of the phase of internal criticism by each tendency. This criticism has been objective and free of embarrassment.

Third, the 10 points presented by the Islamic alliance during the April 1987 elections were accepted and welcomed by both Nasirists and Islamists.

Fourth, the emergence of a strengthened "Islamic vision" among a sector of the Nasirists.

Fifth, the vast difference between the Muslim Nasirist factions and the Marxist pan-Arabists and the Nasirists' desperate endeavors to remove the suspicion of Marxism from Nasirism.

These new developments in the Egyptian political arena are what gives the SLP project a strong boost. This project operates within the Islamic circle and is based on the following:

- The Islamic circle is large enough to accommodate more than one Islamic political project. Therefore, there is no harm in having all the political tendencies spring forth from the Islamic base.
- Egypt will have no stable political future unless within the framework of an Islamic political project. Eliminating the contradiction and the disagreement between the pan-Arabist tendency, meaning the "religious" and not the "Marxist" pan-Arabist tendency, and the Islamic tendency will hasten [the realization of] this project.
- The challenges currently facing Egypt and the Arab and Islamic nation are more deadly than the challenges which prevailed in the first half of this century. This dictates that all intellectual capabilities be channeled toward the future, not the past.
- The SLP project relies on a struggle history that predates the revolution—the Young Egypt, the Islamic National Party, and the Socialist Party. It also relies on the accomplishments of the 23 July 1952 revolution. It is not preoccupied with the negatives and with the mistakes made by the revolution, except within the context of political history and political planning.
- The SLP acknowledges the national distinctions within Islam and gives priority to the Arab state which embraces Islam as its religion and culture. Moreover, the project seeks to support Islamic struggle in every part of the world.
- The SLP project is an open project that acknowledges internal dialogue and relies on consultation and justice in establishing the system of government. It is an Islamic political project, not an ecclesiastic religious project.
- The SLP project does not rely on individuals but is founded on the people's faith and struggle. The leaderships have their respect and their role, but the project acknowledges the mistakes of individuals, regardless of their positions, because they are human beings.
- All the Islamists, regardless of the methods of action they employ, act on the basis of the SLP project as long as they accept Islam as their religion and law and as long as they side with the powerless in Egypt and in the Arab and Islamic nation.
- The SLP project is a radical project which employs the means of legitimate democratic struggle, meaning that it is in fundamental disagreement with the current regime.
- The SLP project is a national-pan-Arab-Islamic project existing within three inseparable, unbreakable, and uncontroversial circles. Its nationalist and pan-Arabist approaches are infused within an Islamic spirit. The project does not condone fanatic racial

- rancors and it views them as opposed to Islam.
- The SLP project is a strategic project. It is the leader of future change and the guide, the pilot, and the executor. It has the quality of perpetuity and continuation and is not a phased frontal project.

Israel's African Ties Viewed as Threat to Arab Security

900A0171A London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT*
in Arabic 15 Nov 89 p 3

[Article: "Increasing Egyptian Interest in Confronting Danger of New Israeli Infiltration of Africa; Tel Aviv-Addis Ababa Relations Pose Immediate Threat to Arab Security; Secret and Role of International Firm in Bringing Israel Back to Continent"]

[Text] Cairo—The agreement Israel and Ethiopia concluded last week to restore their diplomatic relations has aroused extreme interest in Cairo and the agencies concerned with foreign policy have begun to examine the various effects of this agreement. Some Cairo observers assert that Egypt's chairmanship of the current OAU [Organization of African Unity] session requires redoubled interest from Egypt in connection with this development of Israel's role in Africa and in the likelihood that this role will influence the Afro-Arab relations which Egypt is seeking to strengthen.

Ethiopia is the eighth African country to resume its diplomatic relations with Israel within the span of 7 years, i.e. at nearly the rate of one country annually. The source of the danger lies in what the observers expect to be an accelerated rate in the coming period unless an effective Arab movement is launched to curtail this phenomenon, especially since the Arab and international efforts being currently made to move the peaceful settlement process dictate that pressures be applied to Israel. A most important aspect of these pressures is to impose some sort of an international blockade on Israel to compel it to respond to the Palestinian peace initiative.

New Israeli Infiltration

Zaire was the first African country to restore its relations with Israel. It did so on 14 May 1982. It was the belief at the time that the development was tied to Zaire's special circumstances and to its political leadership's connections with Israel, considering that President Mobutu had been partly educated there. But hardly 15 months had passed on this development when Liberia resumed its relations with Israel on 13 August 1983, followed by the Ivory Coast which resumed the relations on 18 December 1985, i.e. 2 years and a few months later.

Afterward, the Cameroon restored its relations on 6 August 1986, Kenya on 11 September 1987, Togo on 13 February 1988, Central Africa on 18 January 1989 and, finally, Ethiopia on 3 November 1989.

This means that the new Israeli infiltration of Africa has come to represent a regular phenomenon at a time when

diplomatic sources in Cairo assert that a number of other African countries are preparing to restore their relations with Israel in the coming period, most significantly: Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, the Gabon, Tanzania, and Zambia.

These sources have pointed out that a gigantic transcontinental firm engaged in broad activities in a number of African countries has been recently playing a prominent role to accelerate the restoration of Israel's relations with the largest number of African countries possible. These relations were severed in 1972 and 1973 within the context of the wave of the large-scale Afro-Arab solidarity in opposition to Israel's occupation of parts of the Arab territories.

The sources say that this firm acts in coordination with a number of Israeli firms and firms owned by European and U.S. Jews and that the firm's top officials are tied by strong relations to a large number of the Israeli leaders. Therefore, this firm's activities are not confined to the economic work it does in the continent but extend to the area of arranging confidential meetings between African leaders and Israeli politicians.

Two Infiltration Inlets

It is noticed that the current Israeli infiltration relies on two main inlets, namely: The economic inlet which is embodied in participation by some Israeli firms in implementing agricultural, irrigation, and tourism projects in an increasing number of African countries on economic and technological terms that are convenient to these countries.

The second inlet is of a security nature. The Israeli military offer to train and develop these countries' army and police forces and they look into supplying the weapons and munitions these countries need on convenient terms. The Israeli General Intelligence Agency (Mosad) also supervises organizing the special security protection given to the leaders of some of these countries.

Threatening Arab Security

Cairo observers note that the current Israeli infiltration of Africa has reached the point of posing a threat to Arab national security, pointing out Ethiopia in this regard by virtue of its strategic position on the Red Sea—a position which may offer Israel extremely significant advantages.

It is well known that Israel has not had a foothold in this sensitive area for a long time, especially since Ethiopia severed its relations with it on 23 October 1973 and since Djibouti joined the Arab League in 1977. This situation imposed further shackles on the Israeli strategy in the Red Sea.

Some observers point out that the danger of a meeting in the Israeli and Ethiopian interests at the present time lies in obstructing Arab control of the Red Sea. It is proven that the Israeli policy has had for a long time a strategic

line based on strengthening its relations with the countries surrounding the Arab world, especially Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey, in order to besiege the Arabs and paralyze their movement.

This line, formulated by Ben Gurion in the early 1950's, seeks to maximize the Israeli influence in an area that is vital to the Arab national security. This is why some observers believe that the danger of resumption of Ethiopian-Israeli diplomatic relations does not lie just in the fact that this resumption is a new link in the chain of the Israeli infiltration of the black continent, but also in the fact that it harbors an immediate threat to the Arab security.

Egyptian specialists in African affairs explain Ethiopia's tendency to resume these relations at this time with the pressures it is facing in each of Eritrea and Tigray where the Ethiopian army's military position has deteriorated in an unprecedented manner. This has required President Mengistu Haile-Mariam to seek prompt military aid from Israel.

This deterioration has reached the point where Tigray Province, which has a population of nearly 4 million people, lives now under almost full military control by the front opposed to the Ethiopian regime. A number of Eritrean liberation movements have been recently able to control an evergrowing part of Eritrea, nearly two-thirds of the province.

Meanwhile, the Ethiopian regime can no longer rely on the Soviet Union as strongly as it did in the past because of the great changes in Soviet policy. To the contrary, Moscow has turned into an element pressuring Mengistu to at least agree to a just settlement in Eritrea. Since withdrawal of the Cuban forces (nearly 150,000 troops) from Ethiopia, the Ethiopian regime has also lost the advantage it had when these forces were present in the country.

Arab Movement

Within this context, it is evident that a serious threat is being posed to the Arabs as a result of the continued Israeli infiltration of Africa. Therefore, observers in Cairo believe that it is necessary to develop a concerted Arab movement to confront this infiltration that has reached areas that are vital to Arab national security. These observers expect Egypt to play a major role in this Arab movement, especially under the umbrella of its current interest in strengthening Afro-Arab relations. Egypt's current chairmanship of the OAU offers this movement, which may begin with a reassessment of Afro-Arab relations and with exploiting Egypt's expertise in this area, which are good possibilities.

It is worth noting that Egypt made a major effort in this regard in the wake of the 1973 war and that that effort achieved tangible progress which figured most prominently in the holding of the first Afro-Arab summit in Cairo in March 1977. But this effort did not encounter the right conditions for its continuation as a result of the then escalating Arab divisions. The following period

witnessed a number of tensions on the borders between the African Arab countries and the African countries of the southern Sahara, the most significant of which were the Ogaden war in the Horn of Africa, the Chad crisis and, recently, the Mauritanian-Senegalese dispute, not to mention Ethiopia's role in the crisis of Southern Sudan.

Therefore, Egypt's return to the Arab arena, the improvement in Arab relations generally, and Egypt's chairmanship of the OAU all seem to be factors which promise the likelihood of resumed Egyptian efforts to bolster the Afro-Arab relations and to reshape these relations within the framework of a complete cooperation plan that serves the joint interests, which are numerous, and that creates a climate to overcome the sources of tension, which are few and which fall mainly within the sphere of the colonialist legacy. Such a movement offers the hope of creating a barrier that obstructs the continued Israeli infiltration of Africa with all the dangers it poses to the Arab security.

Writer Sees Israel Trying To Conquer African Horn 90OA0138A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 15 Nov 89 p 6

[Article by 'Abdallah Khalil: "This Is How Israel Penetrated Africa, Dr Butrus: Garang Does Not Really Want the South, but He Also Wants the North"]

[Excerpts] Dr [Butrus Butrus] Ghali contradicts himself when he admits that Israel's interests in the African continent are based on setting up a special security system whose purpose is to protect the heads of state in African countries with which Israel has relations. In addition, Israel is interested in matters that have to do with diplomatic appearances.

Dr Butrus goes on to say that Israel has no real interests in the African continent, but that Arab countries, with Egypt being first on the list, have many interests there.

Dr Butrus spoke about Sudan and Eritrea, and he spoke about what was happening between Libya, Chad, Senegal, and Mauritania. He said that Egypt's policy was one of attempting to avoid any Arab-African confrontation.

Dr Ghali made it clear that John Garang, the rebel leader in the south of Sudan, had notified African leaders of his opposition to separation from Sudan. Garang said he was calling for the unity of all Sudan.

Dr Butrus Ghali expressed Egypt's hope that the ongoing dialogue between north and south Sudan succeeds, and that the two parties reconcile. He said possibilities for success did exist.

This was what interested us in the minister's statement at this symposium. In our reply to his excellency we will deal with only two of the points he made. These are:

- Israel's penetration of the African continent
- The rebellious movement in south Sudan.

With regard to Israel's penetration of the African continent, we would tell the honorable reader that Israel's penetration of the African continent is an indisputable fact. Israel is trying to control the sources of the Nile in Ethiopia, in south Sudan, and in Uganda because it was unable to control the mouth of the river in Egypt.

Israel is trying to control the southern gateway to the Red Sea by occupying the islands of Halib and Fatimah off the coast of Eritrea, which is occupied by Ethiopia. From these two islands Israel can control Bab al-Mandab, the southern gateway to the Red Sea. This is [important] because Israel also lost control of the northern gateway to the Red Sea in Tiran and the Gulf of Suez.

Israel is also trying to occupy the Halak islands [Dhalaq Archipelago] in Eritrea, which are occupied by Ethiopia. From these islands Israel can threaten the shores of the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. What we are saying has been confirmed; it is not just rhetoric. But we will let SAQIM Magazine [as published], the publication of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front [EPLF], respond to this matter. The EPLF is headed by Isaias Afeworke, one of Dr Ghali's friends and also a friend of former U.S. president, Jimmy Carter. After giving Eritrea weak autonomy, colonialist forces and the church have been trying to have Mr Afeworke installed governor of that Muslim country. [passage omitted]

Church Organizations and Israel

We already said that as far as he was concerned, John Garang, leader of the rebels in the south of Sudan, does not want the south to split from the north. What he wants, however, is to rule all of Sudan. Garang wants Sudan to become a secular, Leninist-Marxist, nonreligious state. He does not want Sudan to have anything to do with Islam or Christianity.

We also stated, among other things we said on the pages of the esteemed newspaper, AL-NUR, that John Garang did not want peace. We said that we would challenge anyone who said he will come to the negotiating table.

John Garang wants to rule Sudan over the dead bodies of the unfortunate people of Sudan, be they Muslims or Christians.

Among the information we received recently is one item indicating that the rebel movement in south Sudan was receiving food through Kenya from more than 70 church organizations. We have also been informed that in recent months the rebel movement received 45 million rockets from Israel alone.

Can Dr Butrus Butrus Ghali, minister of state for foreign affairs and an expert on African affairs, solve this riddle for us? When John Garang and his group are stockpiling

munitions and weapons, does that indicate, Dr Ghali, that the rebels have peaceful intentions?

Dr Ghali, we know where we're going, and we know that the rebel movement under John Garang's leadership will not be disbanded and will not be brought to an end without a holy war. Our fellow Sudanese may know this better than we do, especially in the wake of the recent attack on Kurmuk. The rebels attacked and occupied that city with assistance from Ethiopia.

Dr Butrus Butrus Ghali, the one thing that you must take into account is that we will not sell and sacrifice our faith even if we had to pay for it with our lives.

Editorial Criticizes U.S. Policy Goals in Lebanon

900A0164A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 13 Nov 89 p 20

[Editorial: "Secrets of U.S. Policy in Lebanon"]

[Text] If the U.S. policy on Lebanon seems contradictory and perplexing because of the conflicting U.S. official statements, then this policy does have, despite this contradiction and perplexity, constant axes and goals which do not show up when one examines this policy initially.

We will cite here a number of U.S. official statements on Lebanon which prove the contradictory nature of this policy and the difficulty the serious observer encounters in understanding it:

In the summer of 1988, Richard Murphy and Syrian Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam agreed to give Syria a free hand in selecting Lebanon's president after having given it a free hand in selecting the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies speaker and in supporting Dr Salim al-Huss.

In the same year, Richard Murphy stated that the United States is convinced that "Syria does not plan to annex any part of Lebanon."

The same policy was reaffirmed by a U.S. official spokesman who said that his country "strongly opposes the use of Lebanon as a base to launch attacks on Syria or on Israel."

A change then occurred in the U.S. policy and this change was expressed by John McCarthy, the U.S. ambassador in Beirut, when he said that his country "considers the Syrian policy in Lebanon a negative policy" and that his country "supports Lebanon's independence and sovereignty, the ouster of all foreign armies from Lebanon, and the disbanding of the militias."

Paul Herr, a prominent U.S. State Department official, told the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee in the middle of last June: "Washington is still committed to the efforts to restore Lebanon's unity, sovereignty, and

territorial integrity, to disband the militias, and to oust the foreign forces, including the Syrian forces."

The above statements and facts do not actually reflect the U.S. policy's constant lines and goals in Lebanon but rather skirt and dance around them.

In the following lines, we can cite the fixed axes of the U.S. policy in Lebanon. They are:

First, the Syrian forces' presence in Lebanon does not greatly disturb the United States as long as this presence provokes disagreements and disputes between the Lebanese and Syrian peoples, as long as it affects the morale of the Syrian military personnel, and as long as it gives some of them the opportunity to stray from the true military spirit by engaging in the drug trade.

Second, encourage the Syrian command in Lebanon to implement a major objective of the U.S. policy in the region, namely harass the Palestinian resistance, weaken and drain the Palestinian struggle and resistance, and encourage this command to rush to engage in military battles with the resistance whenever the latter gains strength.

Third, refrain from pressuring Israel to withdraw from South Lebanon or to disband the militias it controls there and postpone this withdrawal so that it may be resolved within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. To put it more plainly, Israel has ambitions in parts of South Lebanon and its water. Kissinger conveyed these ambitions to ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah, to Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh, and to Fu'ad Naffa' when he visited Lebanon in 1974. Because the current circumstances are inappropriate for presenting these Israeli demands and ambitions, Washington is postponing its request to Israel to withdraw from South Lebanon until such withdrawal is compatible with its policies.

Fourth, refrain from pressuring the Syrian leadership to withdraw its forces from Lebanon in order to accomplish two objectives. First, the United States cannot postpone pressuring Israel and not postpone pressuring Syria. Pressuring one side and not the other will show it as a force aligned with one party and not the other. Second, a Syrian withdrawal at this time will lead to restoring unity to the Lebanese and will create the conditions to mobilize all the capabilities and efforts for fighting the Israeli occupation and preserving the unity of Lebanon's soil. This is likely to obstruct the Israeli strategic interests and will not be compatible with the U.S. strategic interests.

Fifth, work to perpetuate Lebanon's crisis so that Lebanon may continue to be sick and ailing, moving from the emergency room to the surgery room to the recovery room. What is important is that Lebanon remain ill and that it stay in the hospital and not leave it until the right time which is, in the U.S. viewpoint, when all agree on settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. Parts will then be severed from Lebanon's ailing body to be given to Israel.

Column Explains Opposition Parties' Unpopularity, Failures

900A0166A Cairo *AL-MUSAWWAR*
in Arabic 1 Dec 89 p 56

[Column by Sabri Abu-al-Majd: "Egyptian Opposition Is Very Weak Because It Is Self-Centered and Because It Is in One Valley and Egyptian People Are in Another"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The opposition we have is constantly distancing itself from the people and stopping itself from moving closer to power. The worst thing our country's opposition has done is that it has not yet learned, and perhaps it will not learn in the future, what issues are the issues that can excite the people and bring them closer to the opposition. The opposition imagines that some of the issues in which it has special interest may attract the masses if it raises the slogans of these issues. It imagines, for example, that the issue of amending the constitution or of forming a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution may be the number one issue for the people, whereas this issue does not surpass the minds of the opposition leaders. The opposition imagines, for example, that lifting martial law could be the number one issue for the people. The opposition is undoubtedly making a grave mistake if it imagines this to be the case. [passage omitted]

Some of our present-day parties, especially the neo-Wafd Party, want to live in the labyrinths of the past so that we may embrace unessential issues. [passage omitted]

It is very sad and regrettable that al-Wafd has been able to draw to it the Grouping Party. Al-Wafd has even been recently able to lure the communists to operate under its umbrella and, very sadly and regrettably, to fly its banners. I can find no explanation to al-Wafd's success in attracting the Grouping and the communists other than that principles no longer count in partisan political action. The principles have died and interests have risen on their ashes. Convictions have disappeared only to be replaced by partisan tactics which do not seek to achieve major popular objectives but seek, very regrettably, to embarrass the government or to achieve what is conceived as embarrassment to the government. If a persistent reporter, as we were in the past, exerted himself and examined all the conferences organized by the neo-Wafd Party since it came into existence, and also examined all the proclamations made by some party leaderships in the past 8 years, he would emerge from this examination of the past with one fact. This fact is that the Egyptian opposition is always self-centered, that it keeps on repeating itself, that it does itself grave harm when it combines contradictions, when principles are diminished, when developments are exaggerated, when this opposition constantly spins around itself, and when it is in one valley and the people in another, as is the case at present. The people are now preoccupied with fundamental issues, such as the issue of the Egyptian expatriate labor that is returning to the country by the thousands. The people are preoccupied with the issue of steep inflation and with the inability of the masses, all

the masses with the exception of the opposition leaderships who live in palaces, to balance their income with their spending. The people are now preoccupied with a severe crisis with the IMF which seeks the adoption of drastic economic measures that may destabilize the country's security. The people are preoccupied with serious and important issues which do not at all include the issues preoccupying the opposition parties, who debate their issues and then issue on them statements which nobody, but nobody, reads.

Article Lists Taba Infrastructure Developments

*90OA0110A Cairo UKTUBAR
in Arabic 8 Oct 89 pp 16-18*

[Article by Isma'il Muntasir: "The First 'October' After the Return of Taba"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Communications Center

Many sites [in Taba] have been completed. Others are still under construction. All are indications that the area will be teaming with life in the near future.

One of those sites, the Taba International Communications Center, has a story. Prior to the Taba ruling, it operated out of a very small wooden bungalow and was the only telephone exchange to connect the region with Egypt. When it was ruled that Taba be reinstated under Egyptian sovereignty, work began on the new center and it was completed in less than two months—a very short period of time.

This very new and very elegant center has become a true communications center connecting Taba to any all parts of Egypt and abroad. Previously, the hotel was the only site in the region capable of outside communications.

Muhammad Rifat Mahmud, manager of the new center, says it incorporates 100 telephone lines, 5 telex lines, one automatic exchange, and an international line capable of reaching any part of the world. Several facsimile lines are also planned.

Taba Electricity

Taba also has a power station that used to be housed in a wooden shack smaller in size than 15 square meters. The station, prior to the return of Taba, used to feed the checkpoints as well as Taba's old gateway. A giant project is currently planned to construct a large facility whose capacity exceeds the needs of the guard houses and the gateway. The old station only had a few generators, according to Engineer Mahir Sha'ban Jamal-al-Din, director of the Taba electrical station. The power station under construction will have a large capacity in order to meet demand in the near future.

The new facility, now nearing completion, is composed of two large power stations. One has 3 units with a total capacity of 1,170 kilovolt/ampères. The other comprises

3 units also, but with a total capacity of 1,600 kilovolt/ampères. The Taba power station will therefore supplement the two existing units with six new ones. The point is that this new station and its massive units will be capable of meeting all future demand [anticipated because] there is indeed a plan to develop the Taba region which includes tourist villages, administrative and residential buildings, as well as utilities and services. The number of workers is [also] multiplying day by day.

The station will also feed the 300-room hotel, all its annexes, and the tourist village affiliated with it. Eng Mahir Sha'ban Jamal-al-Din says that the hotel, which still depends on the Israeli power supply, will be disconnected from its Israeli power source and hooked up to the new Taba power station within the next two or three weeks at the latest. The station manager emphasizes that this should pose no problems since the Israelis, for technical reasons of maintenance, frequently request to interrupt power to the hotel which then gets supplied by Taba's current output. Israel recently asked to shut power down for 8 hours during which the hotel was successfully supplied by the current output of the Taba power station. None of the hotel guests noticed a difference.

While the power station prepares to supply the current and future needs of the hotel and the entire region, the Egyptian water works has been providing all of the hotel's water needs since last September. It formerly relied on the Israeli water supply. More than a hundred engineers, technicians, and workers are currently involved in the construction of the new power station. [passage omitted]

The Taba hotel used to be unable to receive Egyptian television broadcasts because of disparate broadcasting technologies. When Taba returned to Egyptian sovereignty, technicians at the Taba relay station were able to modify the equipment system and provide hotel guests and employees with strong Egyptian television signals.

The new gateway is another sophisticated feature of the area's development and growth. The gateway, its workers assert, was built in a mere 72 hours, and was ready for departures and arrivals the moment Egypt took over the contested region.

The new gateway is replete with such facilities as customs, immigration, and numerous security apparatus. A gateway official said that departures and arrivals, which declined sharply immediately after Taba's return to Egyptian sovereignty, have since rebounded and risen by about 80 percent to more than 1,300 passengers daily.

Three types of visas are obtainable at the new Taba gateway. The first, which must be issued by one of our consulates abroad, allows arrivals to visit all parts of Egypt. The second gives access, after payment of the prescribed fee, to the southern Sinai region only. The third is issued without cost and restricts the visitor to the Taba area.

The point is, the new gateway is well-ordered and operates with great care and precision. Those arriving and departing are more cognizant than anyone else of the speed and care

with which visas are issued and formalities are handled. How the picture has changed! [passage omitted]

Another striking phenomenon is that Taba has become a favorite of honeymooners. I met at the hotel many such newlyweds who heard of the region's beauty and magic and came to Taba to begin their married lives. [passage omitted]

Editorial Calls for Forming Islamic Party

900A0138C Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 15 Nov 89 p 6

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad al-Najjar Fuwah: "The Egyptian Islamic Party"]

[Text] Islamicists were pleasantly surprised by the announcement, which was made by the Algerian government, that the Islamic Rescue Front Party was being established under the leadership of Dr Mustafa Madani. With the establishment of Algeria's Islamic Front Party, that party became the only Islamic party in the nation of Islam, and its establishment was tantamount to a heavy blow to all the plans which secularists had made. Secularists were the ones who were promoting the notion that the establishment of religious parties was tearing up the fabric of the nation and fanning the flames of the fires of separation, division, and conflict. Secularists have always held up Lebanon as an example of conflict between religious sects, even though they are well aware of the truth about the Lebanese conflict and the international forces which are moving behind the scenes to maintain the status quo in Lebanon. Although we in Egypt do have a pressing need for establishing an Islamic party to keep the Islamic movement together, express its demands, and articulate its views on society's issues and problems, just as any party that is recognized by the state would, Mr Lam'i al-Muti'i summarized the secularists' point of view in the establishment of such a party. He said, "We object to the establishment of a party on a religious basis, whether that party is for Copts or Muslims. Quite clearly and unequivocally we advocate the establishment of political parties on a national basis. A political party in Egypt must be for all Egyptians of various religious persuasions." What Mr al-Mati'i said, of course, does not express his personal view of Islam. It rather represents the secularists' view of Islam and their flawed understanding of it.

It was the great professor Fahmi Haridi who understood all the secularists' plans and was aware of all their ongoing attempts to restrain Islam and confine it to marginal issues which have nothing to do with people's lives. That is why he said that an Islamic party was a party that was neither religious nor sectarian. Such a party was not only for the devout, nor was it exclusively for Muslims, even though it is natural that devout people and Muslims would be the ones advocating it. Such a party would serve the entire nation, and it would address the pious, the disobedient, those who worship more than one god, Muslims and non-Muslims. Each one would have a role to play, and each one would have his rights. It is both incomprehensible and inconceivable that a plan for change based on communist ideology

would be accepted in our Arab and Islamic world while a similar plan is thwarted simply because it is based on Islamic doctrine.

I believe that now that we have such a firm, comprehensive view of an Islamic party, it is time for all Arab-Islamic regimes to know the measure of active Islamic forces in the political mainstream. Arab, Islamic regimes must try to encourage these Islamic forces to work out in the open. We are living in an age in which old and calcified ideas have no place. What was forbidden years ago is a must today. The Algerian regime has demonstrated that it has a great deal of boldness and courage when it determined that opposing the establishment of an Islamic party would harm the entire regime. Thus, it chose the lesser of two evils. When will the day come when we won't have to ask for the establishment of Islamic parties because all Arab regimes will have chosen Islam as a way of life, a system of thought, and a course of action?

ISRAEL

Rabin's Positions on Talks, Territories Examined

Rabin Reportedly Changing Position

900L0082A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 22 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by Yesha'ayahu Ben Porat: "Rabin's Change"]

[Text] One of the most flattering things one can say about a veteran politician whose best years of work are behind him, is that he is still able to surprise people with his decisions and unexpected stands. A compliment like this is due this week to Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. With the pretended innocence typically used in these situations, he could have acted surprised at the shock of the prime minister who, early in the week, was the first to admit openly that the defense minister, his faithful partner, confident and strong support in times of trouble at home and abroad, surprised and disappointed him with the picture being painted of his political position.

But no innocence or pretense will help Yitzhaq Rabin. Something serious, almost dramatic, which touches the roots of the Palestinian problem, happened to him somewhere between Washington, Jerusalem, and Cairo. The details of his conversation with Secretary of State James Baker are still not known, because neither he nor Shamir have given out any details of the face to face talks held after Rabin's return from Washington and before his departure for Cairo. For understandable reasons, more is concealed than known of Rabin's long talk with the Egyptian president in Cairo.

One thing, however, is clear. Along the way, after Washington and before Cairo, and more so after his return from Cairo, Yitzhaq Rabin became acceptable and part of a different audience than in the past. The transformation that occurred for him, which Shamir was the first to

point out, is apparently so significant that leftist elements in his party and outside of it, who, until now, criticized him for being a sworn hawk, closer to Likud than to Labor, are now prepared to accept him into their hearts, almost like a wayward son who has come home.

On the other hand, the Right is stunned by him. It is beginning to understand that it has, for the most part, erred in relation to Rabin and is now ready to hang him from a tall post. By the way, both sides have probably been wrong for quite some time regarding Rabin. He was never a ferocious hawk, and even now is still not a pure and total dove. But everyone agrees that changes are occurring in him, and certainly not towards the Right.

Let us set aside the question of why this is happening. At least in part, that is an issue for psychologists who will try to explore the changes that must take place in a person who, for the past 2 years, has borne the brunt of the decisions concerning the intifadah, and who must deal with matters that were never taught in PALMAH [Strike Force of the Hagana] or in command and staff. Let us be content, at this point, to examine the question of what is actually happening to Yitzhaq Rabin and how this change is being expressed.

In a graphic way, we could say that if, until now, Yitzhaq Rabin has been of one mind with Yitzhaq Shamir, after Washington and Cairo, it would be more accurate to say that he is now of one mind with Husni Mubarak.

In political lingo, we would say that the change is being expressed in the fact that the defense minister, although he is still not prepared to make peace with the PLO, understands that without the PLO nothing will happen.

It was enough to listen this week to what Mubarak and Rabin said publicly after their talk to feel their mutual closeness, perhaps as the result of the chemistry between them. Both grew up against a military background, and served in senior command posts in their countries. Both speak simply and purposefully and without intellectualizing. Both are somewhat distant from traditional Western diplomacy which tends to sacrifice the important for the unimportant. They are experienced war horses, and know the secret of breaking through fortified objectives and positions.

This is not an arbitrary assessment. It is drawn from a comparison of the things that Mubarak said in Cairo and Rabin in Tel Aviv. Almost all of what they said was very similar, to the point that one might think that the president of Egypt and the defense minister had coordinated what they would say and what each would emphasize.

And here is the essence of the agreements between them: Egypt will help to advance the process paralleling the Israeli initiative to conduct elections in the occupied territories; Egypt will take upon itself the task of arranging a meeting between the two delegations, Israeli and Palestinian, in order to discuss the question of how to move the process along; Egypt will form a Palestinian delegation and will announce its composition in explicit

coordination with Israel and in implicit coordination with the PLO; Israel will come to the meeting on the basis of the peace initiative, and the Palestinians on the basis of the Egyptian president's 10 points, which Mubarak calls "declarations," to distinguish them from a mandatory program. On this last point, Mubarak did not have to convince Rabin because the "declarations" do not include self-determination for the Palestinians, an independent state, recognition of the PLO, or even hint at the right of return.

It is still not in these specific points of agreement, however, that the fact that these two personalities are on the same wave length is expressed. Above and beyond the foundation described above, the two are imbued with the understanding that, for the sake of realization of the initiative and movement of the process, Israelis and Palestinians must, finally, sit down at the same table and begin a dialogue. And the emphasis is on sitting and talking. It is less important to them exactly who sits and exactly what they discuss.

Both of them know, however, that without a green or yellow light from the PLO, nothing will happen. Mubarak, of course, says this out loud. No one has heard anything similar from Rabin, and if anyone tries to put such words in his mouth, Rabin would be justified in denying it. All the signs, however, attest to the fact that Rabin arrived at that conclusion long ago, even if he does not admit it. Furthermore, if he did not see things that way, the understanding would not have been reached with the Egyptian president.

Let there be no mistake. It would be wrong to give the impression that behind someone's back, Rabin is trying to manipulate PLO-Tunis in direct talks with Israel. Rabin, like Shamir, would like to sit down with a delegation composed entirely of residents of the occupied territories. But everyone knows that most, if not all, of the potential representatives of the territories identify with the PLO. And these people, without a green light from Tunis, will not sit down with us at the same table, even if some of them would love to get away from their excessive dependence on 'Arafat and his organization.

As clearheaded as he is, Rabin is aware that it is impossible to conceal anymore the fact that indirect discussions are taking place between us and the PLO through the Americans and Mubarak. But he also knows how difficult it will be to persuade Mubarak to squeeze an agreement out of the PLO to a Palestinian delegation without the participation of two or three "exiles," in Shamir's unequivocal and final expression.

There is one more point of agreement between the two personalities, paradoxical as it may sound. Mubarak hopes, no less than Rabin, for the continuation of the unity government. Both are convinced that only Likud and Alignment together are capable of moving the process along. For this to happen, they need the fundamental approval of the Government of Israel for the agreements reached by Mubarak and Rabin. But do not

ask Rabin how things will go when the subject comes up in the cabinet meeting at the beginning of next month. Even Rabin, it can be assumed, can only guess.

Commentator Denies Position Change

900L0082B Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Sep 89 p 7

[Article by Teddy Preuss: "Dr Jekyll and Mr Jekyll"]

[Text] The defense minister recently found a crack in the Arab wall through which one can reach elections in the territories and beyond. His words are reminiscent of things which the late Moshe Dayan said after returning from the Leeds Conference in July 1978. There is a break in the clouds. Let us take advantage of it and try to work for peace. "A crack, perhaps a chance," said Yitzhaq Rabin in his speech at the Labor Party's headquarters last week. He was especially cautious in order not to arouse false hopes among party members.

In "Herut," the winds are howling. Rabin changed his position, Yitzhaq yes or no, the minister of defense is tired of the intifadah. These were just a few of the rumors flying in the movement and its groups. Some of the leaders of "Herut," including the prime minister, wondered publicly and thought aloud that the screws holding the two parties together had come loose. Rabin emphasized, again and again, that it is especially the 'crack-chance' combination that requires that the life of the cat and dog in the same bag continue in order to find together the hidden opportunity in the noninitiative of the president of Egypt.

Whoever sees transformation/retreat/fatigue in Rabin has forgotten what he has said and written since 1967. Few politicians remain as consistent and unequivocal as he has been for 22 years. When he was still chief of staff, he said that not only the enmity towards the Arabs would have to be gotten rid of but also the roots of the enmity. He has always been in favor of territorial compromise, for territories in exchange for peace, for progress for peace in stages (a 'piece of land for a piece of peace' was his saying), against Gush-Emunim ("dissidents") while being ready to travel to Gush-Ezion with a visa, and against foreign rule. This was a tested design for doveness, but not everyone wanted to see.

People from the Left, including Yosi Sarid and other blind politicians, frequently announced that there was no difference between Likud and Alignment and that Rabin as defense minister was essentially no different from Sharon: Sharon deported less, destroyed less, and was less an advocate of breaking bones.

The same wise guys refused to see the vast difference between the two, Alignment and Likud. The former put peace above all while the latter say that the completeness of Israel is the most important thing. Rabin sees tough military rule as a transition stage until a modus vivendi can be found, while Sharon wants conquest as a permanent situation, and that, if it is to be changed, it will be towards expansion of territory rather than reduction.

And, as for the iron fist, Rabin did not use it out of cruelty but, rather, out of his position as minister of defense. Abba Eban or Mother Theresa, 'Ezer Weizmann, or Bertrand Russell—if these were ministers of defense, they would not have acted very differently from Rabin. At most, they would have watched their language and not bragged about the "masses" that they deported and would not have praised the breaking of bones. For these slips, Rabin deserves to have hot peppers poured on his tongue, but he should not be put in the same league as Sharon.

If there is a slight change in Rabin's position, it is in the recognition that without agreement on the PLO's silence, there cannot be any movement towards elections in the territories. The 10 points of President Mubarak mean that Egypt is returning to political activism. They are likely to win the same agreement to be silent. But the PLO, in this capacity, is still not a partner in the talks. Rabin still supports Husayn. It is true that the king has lost some of his prestige because of the decline in his economy and his disappearance from the discussion of the territories, but that is only until the transition that the elections will bring about. Later, he will return to the scene and be a participant before the final settlement. Rabin guesses that his participation in the final round of talks will strengthen the position of the Hashemite name.

Rabin does not admit that he has arrived at the conclusion that, without the PLO's agreement to be silent, it will be hard for the discussions before the elections to take off. He describes that as "speculation of the news media," and does not think there has been any movement in his position. One can debate this with him, but in every other way, he remains steadfast in all the political ideas he has held since the 6-Day War. The theories about Yitzhaq yes-or-no and about the upheaval in his views are nonsense. At most, the metamorphosis is between Dr Jekyll and Mr Jekyll with no Mr Hyde. Despite his desire to continue for now with the national unity government, Yitzhaq Rabin is still faithful to his moderate viewpoint of former times.

National Policy Said To Have 'Bankrupted' Nation

44230043E Tel Aviv AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 22 Oct 89 p 7

[Article by Tzvi Kisse: "A Country of Quality, Rather Than Quantity"]

[Text] Are we stupid? Yes, will answer any computer, if fed with the relevant data. After the complete bankruptcy of the national policy, the problem no longer concerns merely differences of views, but our intelligence itself. Herewith some evidence, in order of its importance.

The first proof concerns the source of our strength. Israel's strength rests on American support. Consequently, had we not been governed by stupidity, we would have asked: "How do we use this support to

speedily resolve problems?" Instead of doing that, we try to be clever and ask: "How do we survive with the problems."

A simple abacus suffices to calculate how American and Soviet world interests are changing and how American public support for Israel is fading as a result of the intifadah. Only a particular kind of brain will not perceive that U.S. interests do not coincide with the colonialist visions of our fanatic current. One has to be stupid not to realize that we cannot go against the entire world, and maddeningly stubborn not to grasp the changes that are occurring in Soviet interests, which make the USSR fit to participate in the peace process.

One has to be a hopeless denier not to notice the irony of history: Begin left the government in 1970 because of resolution 242 ("You might even return the Sinai..."), then proceeded to return all of Sinai. Shamir, who opposed peace with Egypt, and in spite of all his lofty talk, is conducting negotiations with the PLO through the United States. Can anyone come up with a worse ideological bankruptcy than this?

Negotiations With Underlings

Rabin and Shamir say that we will prove to the Palestinians that violence will not bring them any gain. But they have already gained. We are negotiating with them. If so, why have negotiations with underlings and not with the bosses? Why have negotiations with 'Arafat's subordinates rather than with him directly? Would al-Sadat have won all of Sinai had he not negotiated with an extremist Israeli leader? Who can make greater concessions, a moderate or an extreme leader? Carter could not have twisted Golda's or Rabin's arm, only Begin's.

A second proof of stupidity concerns our relations with American Jewry. We do great injustice to world Jewry by forcing them to support a policy that runs counter to all their humanistic struggles in every generation and every diaspora. It is colossally idiotic to treat in this manner Israel's most important source of support and to alienate many of the best Diaspora Jews. Demographs tell us that by the year 2030, 50 percent of the U.S. population will be Hispanic, Puerto Rican, black, and Asiatic. Is there any doubt that the status of the Jewish community is declining? In view of this threat, where is the wisdom in rejecting regional agreements?

One Million Arab Citizens

The third proof concerns Israeli Arabs. After the need to preserve U.S. support, our greatest problem is the position of Israeli Arabs in Israeli society, with whom we will have to live forever. In another 15 years there will be 1 million Arab citizens in Israel. How can you keep a state going when 20 percent of its citizens don't wish it well? And they will not wish it well if there is no compromise with Palestinians. Worse than that, in the absence of a compromise, the intifadah will spill over into Israel.

What is more in keeping with the national interest, to cast Israel's Arab citizens into national and social despair, or to allow the development of an Arab-Israeli identity—a process possible in the State of Israel, but not in Greater Israel? How obtuse must one be not to understand a simple thing like that? Discriminating against Israeli Arabs (the Maccabi Sick Fund refused to treat the daughter of an Israeli Bedouin lieutenant colonel) is unspeakably stupid, as is thinking that one can preserve a state without a foundation of "equal citizenship."

The fourth proof concerns the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. There is no need for military expertise to grasp that the IDF—the apple of Israel's eye—is losing its lustre in the territories. Ordering the IDF to suppress the Palestinian spirit is humiliating, and a humiliated army develops base standards.

One has to be extremely simple-minded not to understand that what is happening between us and the Palestinians is not a political matter, but the same historical matter that brought us here in the first place.

In 1917 two Poles grabbed a 12-year-old Jewish girl (who was to become my mother) and rubbed her mouth with a piece of pork. Because of this experience, she decided to emigrate to Israel. Four years later, the girl said to her parents: "Goodbye mother, goodbye father. Humiliation does not come from God, but from people, and I am leaving for a place where neither I, nor my children, nor my grandchildren will suffer humiliation." And miracle of miracles, 41 years later Jews can be hated, killed, and exiled all the way to Siberia, but they cannot be humiliated.

The Humiliator Became Humiliated

Keeping in mind all the differences, in 1977 members of the Sefardi community in Israel stood up and said: We are not like our parents. We will not be humiliated. We will be equal members of Israeli society. And they chased the Alignment out of power. Again keeping in mind scores of differences, the same thing is happening with Palestinians. In 1948, two shots made an entire village run away and five shots were enough for a whole town. Now, however, the sons of those Arabs step in front of machine guns and say: "We will not be humiliated any longer." That's all there is to it. Middle East scholars, military administration experts, and the defense minister are selling us a bag of goods when they choose to ignore this simple truth. And when young men stand up to machine guns, things are reversed and the humiliator becomes humiliated.

There is only one answer to our traditional main question: How can 5 million defeat tens of millions, how can a small army resist a large army, in peace as in war. And the answer is itself a question: How many strands of truth are there in the social and military fabric? That is the entire philosophy. In the West Bank and Gaza the strands of truth are unraveling from the military fabric. Everyone is deceiving everyone. The deceptive tune of settlers' colonialism that the IDF is forced to play is off

key. If the false norms of Judaea and Samaria are added to the little training done for the next war—which our generals admit—where are we and where is the IDF we dreamed of? How can one do this to the IDF?

History will mock the best fighter if he attacks the wrong hill. That is what happened to Shim'on Peres. He understood the situation, but he failed, because he attacked Husayn's hill instead of the Palestinian hill. This will happen to Rabin and Shamir, too, if they don't change maneuvers.

What's So Terrible About It?

Amid such confusion, small wonder that we are subjected to perhaps the biggest absurdity in human history: An entire nation is worried and upset and keeps wondering what will happen. What a terrible situation, how can we get out of it? Ladies and gentlemen, what is so terrible about it? We forced Egypt to recognize us. The Palestinians are begging to talk to us. The prime minister says that 'Arafat wants to meet with him, the Jordanians are willing to recognize us, and after them the rest of the Arabs, too. Ye gods, we are being threatened with peace. How else can you describe this phenomenon, if not as stupidity?

The fifth proof concerns our economy. The question that must be asked is, why, among all democracies, Israel is the only one which has not recovered from the 1974 oil crisis. Why is it that an economy that for 20 years grew at one of the fastest rates in the world suddenly stopped growing? Why is it that a small and poor country like Ireland has exceeded us in gross national product—\$9,300 per capita as opposed to \$7,000 in Israel (almost like 15 years ago)?

A Crooked Line Between Two Points

Unlike other areas, the economy is measured in figures, and thus distortions can be perceived more easily. In the Israeli economy it is impossible to draw a straight line between two points. Everything is crooked. There must be some genetic code that trips us up. No, it's not that our genes are defective, we are simply being killed by stupidity. And until we recover from this illness—the Palestinians—and realize the contradiction existing between the State of Israel and Greater Israel, we can expect any idiocy to befall us. From the moment we began striving for Greater Israel, the State of Israel began failing in almost everything. Instead of investing the huge aid we received in productive projects, capital, and growth, we are wasting it on capital-burning investments.

The sixth proof of stupidity is our social behavior. If the economy is so poor, what can we expect from society? After all, economic activities were designed to afford us the necessary resources to attain social objectives. And if the former is failing, what is left for society? What can you say when thousands of Jews leaving the USSR don't come here. And if they have no choice but to come, how are we to absorb them? How will they find employment amid our stagflation? All one needs to do is listen to a family of new

immigrants from England explain why they decided to go back. Or read in a memo of the Zionist Committee that, according to estimates, by the end of the century there will be about 1 million Israeli emigrants in the world—20 percent of our sons and daughters. Where else can one find such a society? Suffice it to examine our educational system to see that the main means of upward mobility in modern society, education, is not working properly. What else does one need to know other than that growing social and economic gaps are about to become a record in the Western world?

From Major to Minor League

What more is needed than to observe the settlement crisis, the thousands of apartments standing empty in the Galilee, and the 120,000 unemployed? Or to read Professor Gur's article in HADASHOT about our hospitals and medical services? Or to hear the president of the Weitzmann Institute describe how our science is slipping from major league to minor league? And to know that only foreigners will purchase all the inventions of our research and science institutes, after which the world will be flooded in products based on foreign know-how, while we stand there gaping and powerless. To be honest, in our entire history no other generation ever left such a burden of debts, problems, and complications as we will leave behind us.

Today we resemble a man who dies of thirst because the sound of water splashing on the other side of the hill sounds to him like the footsteps of his pursuers. All our enemies today know that you cannot destroy without being destroyed. People don't normally opt for mutual annihilation. That's why al-Sadat came to Jerusalem. Get up, man, perhaps the sound is the sound of running water. Perhaps the Arab world is indeed ready to recognize us. Perhaps we have indeed come to the high point of our dream to be sovereign and recognized by all the nations. Perhaps 150 million Arabs, hundreds of millions of Indians, Chinese, Indonesians, Russians, and others will come knocking on our doors to share in Israeli technological, scientific, and cultural creation.

Perhaps for the price of concession on Greater Israel we can free the creative capabilities of Israelis. Five million people will stand in the forefront of the scientific revolution (of information and knowledge) that is the name of the game in the 21st century. And even if we only have a 50-percent chance, who are Lewinger and Katzover and Cohen to block little Israel's great chance at a real breakthrough toward becoming a country of quality rather than quantity and to be the solution, rather than the problem of the Jewish people.

This vision of peace does not contradict the need for great caution regarding security and for long-term and multistage processes. The Palestinians must prove to us that we will be getting peace and security, in exchange for which we must permit them self-determination. We must be stupid not to hang on to such processes and to think that there is any other solution for our two nations.

Enlisted Men To Bear Brunt of Fighting Intifadah

44230031E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 17 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Dan Sagir]

[Text] Within the security establishment, the next 2 months are expected to bring an escalation of activities in the territories, which will be concentrated in general strikes and demonstrations on a large number of remembrance days on the calendar of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Apart from the usual historic dates, such as the protest against the UN partition vote on 29 November, the territories this year will mark the date of the first anniversary of the declaration of a Palestinian state in Algiers on 14 November, the second full year since the beginning of the intifadah on 9 November, and other dates.

In contrast to the past 2 years, in which the reserve forces bore the brunt of the activities in the territories, a large number of regular army units will be sent this year to suppress the intifadah in the territories. The decision to send enlisted soldiers for service in the territories derived from the pressing need to restore the training rotation of the various reserve units in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. The IDF emphasizes that training at leadership seminars and at the various command courses has not been affected this year as a result of the activities in the territories.

As for the IDF's coming work year, the plan is to return to a full schedule of regular training. Right now, the IDF is studying the scope of reservists' training in light of the need for them in the territories. In any event, there is no intention just now to increase the number of days of reserve service each year, which now stand at about 44 days for soldiers and about 50 for officers.

Releases To Relieve Prison Crowding Suggested

44230031D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 3 Oct 89 p 24

[Article by Moshe Ronen]

[Text] The prison administration is in trouble. It has too many prisoners. It definitely could manage with half the number, but the "demand" for prison spaces is constantly rising and the supply is limited.

Statistics show that, in the past 5 years, the prison population has grown 40 percent. Crime is rising, the intifadah is continuing, and more people have been sent to prison. The forecast is for a growth of 5 percent in the number of prisoners in every year to come.

The prisons are clogged. Overcrowding is terrible. The average living space for a prisoner today, after new wings have been opened in a number of prisons, is about 3 square meters. In crowded cell blocks, the living area per prisoner is 1.8 square meters.

One may understand the significance of these figures with the aid of a simple example. Take the average Israeli

apartment, with three rooms and 75 square meters of floor space. If an average Israeli family of two parents and two children lives there, each of them has an average living area of close to 19 square meters (and they spend part of the day out of the house). To make that apartment as crowded as the average prison in Israel, we would need to put 25 prisoners in it. To equal the even more crowded conditions that prevail in some wings, the average Israeli apartment would need to be stuffed with 42 sweating men.

The crowding, of course, is causing tensions and violence. "This is a punishment that the court did not intend to impose," says deputy squadron leader Hayim Shmulvitz, legal adviser of the prison service.

In the existing situation, the prison service is not adapted to absorb additional prisoners. The courts announce the verdicts, and there is no place to send the guilty. Without any choice, they remain in police station jails, filling them up. The police are unable to hold anyone else, for there is no room for a detainee. Not long ago, police officers received orders to begin a "policy of selective detentions," that is, to arrest fewer suspects, because there is nowhere to put them.

Holding prisoners in station house jails is against the law. Prisoners are not receiving what is due them. Attorney Moshe Aloni, chairman of the committee on criminal affairs of the lawyers' association, filed a petition in the Supreme Court on behalf of five such prisoners, who were held in police station jails. He demanded their transfer to prison. The prison service knew that his request was justified and rushed to transfer the five prisoners to a prison. But that action did not solve the problem of 600 other prisoners still held by the police.

The obvious solution is construction of new prisons. Necessary for that, however, are budget allotments that the Treasury is not providing. To that we must add the opposition of local authorities, who do not want prisons in their districts. In any event, even if construction of a new prison were to begin, it would not be completed for about 3 years, and the overcrowding is an immediate problem.

Even the plan offered by the prisons commissioner, squadron leader Levi Sha'ul, for expanding wings in a number of prisons, creating space for about another 300 prisoners, would cost 2.5 million sheqels, for which there is no money.

The other solution for the overcrowding is a judicial one. The commissioner of prisons and the minister of the police have turned to their joint legal adviser, attorney Hayim Shmulvitz, a former investigator and prosecutor for the police, who has raised a number of ideas. One can assume that the prisoners will love them.

The first proposal, which apparently will soon be enacted into law, is administrative release of prisoners. Under this proposal, the decision will be placed in the hands of the police minister, the man who will strike a balance between the interests of the prison service (to release as

many prisoners as possible) and those of the police, who do not want the prisoners released before their time. It will be the police minister's responsibility to establish a maximum for the proper number of prisoners at a given time. Whenever the number of prisoners exceeds the maximum, the minister will be able to decide on an administrative release.

When such a decision is reached, the terms of all prisoners approaching their release will be reduced (their numbers may run into hundreds or even a thousand or more if the police minister sets a low standard). The reductions will be uniform and equal, 2 weeks for every year of prison time imposed. Anyone sentenced to 5 years in prison, for example, will enjoy a reduction of 10 weeks from his term.

These releases will not apply to security prisoners or prisoners who have committed additional crimes during their incarceration.

The maximum period for such an administrative reduction will be 6 months. Therefore, a prisoner sentenced to 20 years in prison will not be able to receive a reduction of 40 weeks, because that period exceeds half a year. The term will be cut by just 6 months.

A second proposal developed by Shmulvitz is raising the sentencing limit under which defendants are eligible for work release to 9 months. Under a new law passed in July 1987, a judge can send a prisoner to work release instead of to prison if the term of the sentence is less than 6 months. Since the law was enacted, 3,800 defendants have been sentenced to work release.

About 600 defendants are currently serving their sentences on work release. For the prison service, that means a saving of 600 places. Raising the period will allow sending additional prisoners from the prisons to work release.

Another improvement, supported by Police Minister Hayim Bar-Lev, is a change in the law permitting discharge of a prisoner on completion of two-thirds of his term if he has shown good behavior. The minister believes in discharging prisoners on completion of one-half of their terms.

Judges and senior legal authorities in the Justice Ministry oppose this proposal, contending that it will have no value because judges will raise the sentences they impose. Today, when a judge imposes a sentence of 3 years in prison, he knows that if the prisoner behaves properly, he will serve only 2 years. They argue that the judge intends the prisoner to serve 2 years because that, in the judge's opinion, is what he deserves. If the judge knows that the prisoner expects to be discharged on completing half of the prison term imposed on him, he will impose a term of 4 years imprisonment to assure that the prisoner serves 2 years.

Meanwhile, additional, more innovative proposals for "house detention" are under consideration. An experiment

in the direction of this revolution has been set up by the police department in the Be'er Sheva region. Judges are releasing suspects and defendants from detention on condition that they carry electronic bands. The bands transmit signals to a computer that monitors the location of the house detainee every second of the day. If he leaves the house, the computer alerts the police within moments.

If the experiment succeeds with house detainees who have not yet been found guilty, the system may work also with convicted defendants. After amendment of the law as needed, "house detention" will become routine. A person will have to serve a sentence, but, restrained by the electronic band, will pass the time in his own home at his own expense, and not by taking up a space in prison.

Jerusalem Police Force To Be Reinforced

44230043C Tel Aviv *HADASHOT*
in Hebrew 17 Oct 89 p 7

[Text] In the wake of increased auto arson in Jerusalem, the city police forces will be reinforced by dozens of detective and intelligence teams, as well as IMM [Special Police Unit] fighters. General Police Commander David Kraus reported new regulations and suggested to apartment house residents that they establish night watches on parking lots. Vehicles were set on fire yesterday, too, this time in the western neighborhood of Gila. A BMW and a Renault 12, parked on Levona St, corner of Justman, were heavily damaged. A third, Golf car, parked nearby, was slightly damaged.

New police regulations were yesterday morning announced at a meeting with the police southern district commander Rahamim Qomfort, and Jerusalem district policemen. Several police officers in the city complained to the commander general about the fact that they are not permitted to use the same means that defense forces use to put down riots in the territories. "Our work is thus infinitely more difficult," one officer complained at the meeting.

The police commander general warned that "There has recently been an increase in the number and seriousness of incidents in the city. We are concerned about auto arson, and we intend to seriously deal with masked individuals roaming the streets of East Jerusalem at night and frightening residents. Those two phenomena compel us to change our thinking and deployment. Until now Jerusalem's police force was adequate, but now we have decided to bring in additional forces in order to facilitate the work of the police in the city."

The commander general added that he was not planning to change police policy on dispersing rioters. "In Jerusalem we must act according to the law, and we do have other, more sophisticated and more professional means of achieving good results. I do not intend to change the law and do what is done in other places, where the law is different." The commander general yesterday urged Jerusalem residents to volunteer for the Civil Defense.

Minister Ari'el Sharon also referred to auto arson in Jerusalem yesterday. "No country would put up with daily cases of cars going up in flames in its capital city," Minister Sharon protested before hundreds of Likud activists touring the Old City with their families. "If 300, rather than 30, Jewish families lived in the Muslim quarter, things would be different."

Hospitals Conceal Number of Jewish Casualties

44230043B Tel Aviv *HADASHOT*
in Hebrew 17 Oct 89 p 7

[Text] "Almost every day we encounter manifestations of a peculiar, inflexible, and failing policy conducted by Jerusalem hospitals and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] spokesman when we attempt to report injuries and stories of Jewish intifadah casualties," claimed 21 Jerusalem journalists in a letter to the health minister. They added that concealing news of Jewish casualties from them seriously damages Israeli propaganda abroad on the intifadah.

Reporters from YEDI'OT AHARONOT, MA'ARIV, and HADASHOT said that city hospitals, especially Hadassa 'En Kerem, are interfering with their work. According to them, when a Palestinian casualty comes in there is full cooperation between the hospital and reporters, but when it comes to Israelis, there is a strange tendency to cause delay through bureaucratic procedures and various difficulties whenever they attempt to talk to and photograph Jewish casualties.

Hadassa spokesperson Ruth Meqel responded that Admissions does not report the arrival of casualties to her, and that is why she does not report them to the media. Reporters claimed that she often did know about casualties but did not cooperate with them and did not do her duty. "We are sick and tired of stupid demands from the rear and complaints by the public, who accuse the Israeli media of being hostile and partial and of presenting only the Palestinian side," the letter added.

The journalists' complaint was sent to Knesset Members Bibi Netanyahu, Imanu'el Zussman, Ge'ula Kohen, Dadi Tzucker, and others. Knesset Member Zussman sent urgent letters to the defense and health ministers on the subject, and reported that he will bring the matter up in the Knesset. The Alignment spokesman in Jerusalem reported that his faction will not let go of the matter until it is resolved.

Religious Academies Opened for Arabs

44230031A Tel Aviv *HA'ARETZ*
in Hebrew 10 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Atalla Mantzur]

[Text] Two academies for training Muslim clerics will open in Israel by the end of this month, in Baqah al-Gharbiyah and in Umm-al-Fahm. These two will join the first of the Muslim religious training academies, which opened in al-Tayyibah 4 months ago.

Until this year, the Muslim public in Israel lacked a religious school for training preachers, religious teachers, and mosque assistants. The young people who requested the right to receive such training for these positions were compelled to study in Nablus, Hebron, or Gaza. Even the teachers at the academy that recently began to operate in al-Tayyibah were from the territories.

Three years ago, the Ministry of Education promised to grant academic recognition to an academy planned by the Darawishahs in Kfar Baqah al-Gharbiyah. The public officials in al-Tayyibah, however, moved ahead of those backing the academy in Baqah al-Gharbiyah and opened the first class with 25 students, high school graduates, with the aid of the "World Muslim Organization" based in Saudi Arabia.

Haj Muhammed Dasuqi, head of the academy association in al-Tayyibah, told HA'ARETZ yesterday that a class of an additional 25 students had enrolled for the next academic year. Meanwhile, the founders of the academy in Baqah al-Gharbiyah have completed their preparations and published announcements inviting candidates for study at the academy.

The Muslim movement will operate the academy in Umm-al-Fahm, which advertised in its own publication for high school graduates to sign up for classes.

Educator Claims Dehumanization Among Youth

44230031C Tel Aviv *HA'ARETZ*
in Hebrew 12 Oct 89 p 11

[Article by 'Amram Sheer]

[Text] Madam Freddie Bloom, who was held prisoner by the Japanese during World War II, writes in her book, "Dear Philip," that "even today, there are people who ask me if I hate the Japanese. My answer was, and still is, 'no.' I hate violence, greed, brutality for its own sake, stupidity, arrogance, intolerance and indifference. Those things deserve to be hated wherever they arise, and the Japanese have never held a monopoly over them."

I was reminded of her words when I spoke with some high school seniors; one of the subjects was the report in the newspapers that Palestinians killed during hostile acts in the territories were buried in mass graves "like dogs," some have said. The reaction of most of the seniors with whom I spoke was "They are dogs and so were buried like dogs." I took issue, remarking that the Palestinians, too, were born of mothers and therefore deserved a human burial, to which they answered that "They are not human beings, they are animals."

Notice this: Even before a tense situation, even before meeting the enemy, even before the heat of battle, even before the first stone, even before an "ambiguous order," even before the sight of a wounded comrade, all those elements by which some attempt to explain the possible "mental state" behind irregular acts, we already have an alibi for every despicable act. No problems, no ethical

dilemma, no heavy yoke of moral precepts. The "enemy" is cast out, pure and simple, from the family of nations, beyond the accepted moral norms and the commands of the laws of man. He is a dog and judged as a dog. The students I spoke with had arrived at these views perhaps without realizing it, the way it has been done for ages, by dehumanization, removing the adjective "human" from the enemy. Something that sometimes goes with it is the act of demonization, that is, imposing a satanic image upon the enemy, or an act of stigmatism, of the sort "all Arabs stink."

Every attempt I made during my debate with the students to establish that "a child is a child" was rejected out of hand with the argument that "they are not children but maniacs."

It should be emphasized here that we did not come in our discussion to the "dispute" or to a "solution"; we did not turn to "politics." We sought to limit ourselves to matters of principle.

I asked myself from where had these students, who had not yet been called into the Army, absorbed these ideas which, by a twist of the lips, turn an entire people into "dogs," "stinkers," and "maniacs." First off, I noticed that the students sorted people into categories and judged them according to their national affiliation, communal or racial, and not according to other criteria, for example, their intrinsic value. Second, I saw that their approach to normative, ethical types was not universalist-fundamental, but "tribal." When one speaks, for example, about "Jewish children" and "Arab children," they do not treat them as common matters but as separates, that is, by their existence as "Jews" and "Arabs."

From where has our youth absorbed these basic values, these criteria? In my opinion, in the first place from the very system responsible for these things, that is, from the educational system in its various levels. From kindergarten to high school, from radio and television to the daily newspaper, from the bible lesson to the history lesson, they absorb those primary values from which they will form in great part, in an appropriate constellation, whether consciously or not, that ideology of dehumanization of "the enemy." These primary values are characterized above all else by a preference they give to the national, the communal, and the religious over the general and the humanistic, to the separate over the common, to the adjective (Jewish, Muslim, Israeli, Palestinian), over the noun (man, woman, the old, the young).

In these preferences, and not in the necessity for "unfortunate orders," I see the chief cause (but not the only one) of "irregular actions"; not only in Israel, but wherever they are dominant, whether in Nagorno-Karabakh or in Beirut.

Balfour: 'Israel, Turkey Can Claim Territories'

44000060 Jerusalem *THE JERUSALEM POST*
in English 2 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by David Rudge: "Jordan Is Palestine"]

[Text] The Palestinians already have a state, east of the Jordan River, and have no rights whatsoever to the West Bank or the Gaza strip, declared Lord Balfour, great-nephew of the author of the Balfour Declaration.

"Israel must preserve her present boundaries and no alteration of these borders should be considered, at least until Israel has full diplomatic status with all her neighbouring countries," he asserted.

"Israel must keep the Golan Heights for strategic reasons and to ensure control of the head waters of the Jordan. The West Bank and Gaza must also remain part of Israel."

Lord Balfour expounded his views in a special interview with *THE JERUSALEM POST* on the eve of Tuesday's symposium at the Haifa University marking the 72nd anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.

The symposium, sponsored by the Reuben Hecht chair of Zionism and Zionist Historiography explored the ramifications of the Declaration and its relevance to the present day.

Lord Balfour was only four years old when his great-uncle, the first Earl of Balfour died in 1930 and has only vague memories of the devout Christian whose Zionist beliefs laid the foundations for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

"I can just recall him because he had great charm of a young child and gave the impression of giving me all his individual attention. Everything else that I have learned about him and the Declaration has been from books and articles and my own research," said the 63-year old Earl.

From his research, Lord Balfour has concluded that Israel has the right to rule the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while the Palestinians living there have none.

"The Declaration granted all of Palestine, including what is now Jordan, to the Jewish State, while giving civil and religious rights to non-Jewish communities living in that area," said Lord Balfour.

"The Palestine Mandate was granted to the British at the 1920 San Remo conference and approved by the League of Nations as a Jewish national home in 1922. In that same year, the area east of the Jordan (then called Transjordan) was bestowed by Britain on King 'Abdallah.

"We also have to consider the promises made to the Arabs by Lawrence of Arabia that they should rule over whatever territory they took the trouble to fight for. I have searched far and found no evidence that any Arabs fought west of the Jordan.

"In this context the only other nation which would conceivably have any right to what is now Israel would be Turkey.

"The Arabs have no right to the West Bank and Gaza. If they were domiciled in the area they can continue living there, which the State of Israel allows. But to put forward

the woolly, impossible ideas of the PLO that they should have a state of any sort within Israel's border is a non-starter," declared Lord Balfour, who is honorary president of the "Jordan is Palestine Committee" of Great Britain.

"I am quite certain my great-uncle expected Jerusalem and no other city to be Israel's capital. In fact, only since Jews have ruled Jerusalem has it been possible for people of all faiths to visit and worship there," he said.

Lord Balfour, who was interviewed in Haifa on the evening before the symposium, was equally adamant about the rights of Arabs in Israel and the territories, and whether it would be reasonable to expect them to swear allegiance to the Jewish State. "No Arab or Jew living in Britain would have any political (electoral) rights except as a UK or Commonwealth citizen, over the age of 18 and living at a certain address in the UK and recorded on the electoral role. I suggest these are the minimum qualifications for the right of anybody to vote.

"As a member of the House of Lords in Britain I have to take the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen, her heirs and successors, before I can take my seat. In the U.S. a person is required to take an oath of allegiance to the flag of the United States.

"I suggest we should confine ourselves to those Arabs domiciled in Israel and Israeli-held territory. I believe that they should be asked to take an oath that they would never propose or countenance any act that may have a tendency to subvert the peace and good order of Israeli society and that they would pay due obedience to the law of Israel."

Lord Balfour maintained that residents of the West Bank with Jordanian citizenship would have full civil and religious rights if they continued living in Israeli-held territory, but could not expect voting rights. "You can't hold allegiance to two countries," he stated.

Speaking on the uprising in the territories, Lord Balfour said this was a form of terrorism "pure and simple" and Israel had to meet "force with force."

"You can't mollycoddle people who are out to destroy. This situation would not be tolerated in Arab States such as Jordan, Syria, Iraq or Libya, nor in Western countries," he declared.

"Israel must be firm and ruthless in putting down terrorists who don't care who or what they destroy. There's no alternative, in my opinion, but to meet force with force."

Lord Balfour said he strongly advocated and supported the Zionist principles of his great-uncle that the Jewish people, "like all people," deserve a homeland.

He noted that during his years in the Merchant Navy he visited many countries and met many people from his native Scotland.

"Scotland is a small nation and Scots have migrated to virtually every part of the world. Wherever I went, when I was at sea, I met Scottish emigres, sometimes second and third generation and they would invariably say to me: 'I'm going home next year.' By home they didn't mean their house in whichever country they were living. They meant Scotland.

"Until 1948, the Jews had nowhere they could call home and I think Christendom should not be oblivious of its ancestry and background in this respect. Israel is the national Jewish homeland.

"The Arabs who have lived in Israel (including the territories) all along cannot be thrown out. I would hope, however, they would realise, through education and the development of the State, that they would be better off living in Israel than outside it," he added.

Commentator Criticizes Pollards' 'Noisy' Campaign

44230031B Tel Aviv *HA'ARETZ*
in Hebrew 12 Oct 89 p 9

[Article by Eliyahu Salfter]

[Text] The spy affair of Jonathan Pollard has not been very pleasant for Israel's image in the United States, but events like this occur even between friends. No country tells everything, even to an ally. Britain, for example, worked vigorously to gather information in the United States during World War II. It seems that the primary matter with which Israel's leaders must deal in the Pollard affair touches on the procedures (or lack of them) that came to light in the wake of the revelations in America.

Even someone not familiar with all of John Le Carre's works knows that, in intelligence matters, professionals observe certain rules. These rules apply not only to enemy states but also to states that maintain friendly relations. The first rule is that an agent who is caught keeps his mouth shut, certainly in public, and does not malign those who sent him, especially if he wants them to help him.

The second rule says that the better the relations between the two countries involved, the less noise the injured party will make. In any event, the state that sent the agent denies everything while working behind the scenes to mitigate his punishment and to trade him for one of the other side's agents caught in the past or seized specifically for the purpose of an exchange.

The first sign that the Pollard affair would not be conducted according to the accepted rules was the vociferous demands of the couple made through the newspapers that Israel was obliged to pull them out of the mud immediately. They drew Congress' attention and that of the American media, and magnified Israel's entanglement.

The second sign was the exceedingly strict attitude the authorities struck toward the Pollards, as though they had spied for the Soviet Union or China and not for Israel's benefit. Caspar Weinberger, who was then secretary of defense, described the information transferred as of the utmost importance to the United States. He contended that this was not information about Arab political matters essential perhaps to Israel if not to America. The sentence imposed was also harsh. Pollard was sentenced to a term longer than that imposed on the Walker family, which spied for the Soviet Union for 17 years. Anne Pollard, too, received a jail term, unlike Mrs Howard and Mrs Walker, who also assisted their husbands.

Everything created the impression that someone in Washington wanted to teach Israel a lesson or intimidate the Jews of the United States, or both.

But the strangest phenomenon was the conduct of the Pollards after they were sentenced. From inside the walls of their prisons, they began a campaign, primarily in the Jewish and Israeli press, accusing the U.S. Government of a conspiracy against them and the Israeli Government of evading its obligation to save them. Sometimes, it seemed as though the Pollards were conducting a full public relations campaign, with a skill and effectiveness easily capable of rivaling the public relations agents of those convicted for participating in the Jewish underground, to advance the dates of their release and to put pressure on the Government of Israel. Articles about the couple and interviews with them appeared in the newspapers, government ministers publicly gave them their blessing, the Voice of Israel quoted them at length, and Pollard's sister, on the Army radio channel, declared that "a single word from Shamir to Bush would put an end to the entire business."

Whatever the wisdom and professionalism of Pollard's recruiters, it is reasonable to assume that he and his wife acted out of ideological reasons, and their work contributed to Israel's security.

Even one who spies for ideological reasons, however, assumes risks, which are part of his dues for the operation.

Undoubtedly, Israel is working (and has been working without publicity) behind the scenes for their release. Public relations experts working on their behalf and with their aid perhaps are proving their amateur nature and indicating their state of mind. But it is doubtful if they are helping the Pollards. They are reviving the affair again and again on television and in the newspaper headlines, the last thing needed for quiet negotiations between the two governments.

Sometimes, the question arises whether the purpose of the noise is actually to help the Pollards, or rather whether it is designed to push the Government of Israel into a quarrel between Washington and Jerusalem.

KUWAIT

Study Examines Kuwaitization of Government Positions

*90OL0138A Kuwait AL-WATAN
in Arabic 12 Nov 89 p 6*

[Article by 'Abd-al-Karim Ya'qub: "New 'Kuwaitization' Bill in Next 5-Year Plan; 63 Countries Observe Kuwait's Experiment With Interest; More Than 144,286 State Employees; Population Is Nearly 2 Million; 6 State-Adopted Methods, Most Significant of Which Is Attention Given to Graduates and Training; Kuwaiti Youth Have Achieved Major Success in Managing Financial and Oil Investments"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi—According to surveys made this year, the number of workers employed by Kuwait's various ministries and official departments, authorities, and organizations totals 144,286 employees, of whom 64,203 or 44.5 percent are Kuwaitis. The rest, totaling 80,083 employees, are non-Kuwaiti.

This was stated in the study presented by Dr Nasir Jasim 'Abdullah, the Civil Service Commission assistant deputy director for administrative development affairs and chairman of the Kuwaiti delegation to the manpower management conference. This conference was organized by the Abu Dhabi Administrative Development Institute, concluded its activities in Abu Dhabi last Tuesday, and was attended by delegations representing 63 Arab and foreign governmental and private organizations specialized in workforce management and development.

The participating delegations received this Kuwaiti study with great interest for more than one reason and because Kuwait has scored major successes in its efforts and plans to Kuwaitize or nationalize government jobs, and because the study itself was conducted scientifically and is supported by statistics and graphs. Moreover, the study presented the latest results achieved after explaining with concentrated brevity the methods adopted by the government management to achieve its administrative development and Kuwaitization objectives.

The study also included two supplements: The first concerning the provisions of the current development plan which demonstrates that Kuwaitization is a developmental objective and the second concerning the articles in Kuwait's constitution pertaining to the educational and labor policies.

Youth and Investment

In its prelude, the study focused on the Kuwaiti youth's role in the success of Kuwait's investment of its oil revenues. It asserted that the yield of these investments is now comparable to the income from the Kuwaiti crude oil sales, thanks to the efforts and experience of the Kuwaiti youth entrusted with managing and investing

the Kuwaiti funds, consisting of the state's general reserve and the reserve for the future generations. This is in addition to the youth's role in Kuwait's new oil strategy, which is embodied in the full and complete cycle of investing the oil, beginning with production and ending with possession of a network of gas stations selling oil derivatives in various parts of the world. Kuwait's youth are also playing a distinguished role in the success of the Kuwaiti air transport activity—the Kuwaiti Airways Organization. This success is one of the clear imprints in national management.

Population...Two Million

The study revealed that the 1989 statistics confirm that Kuwait's population, including both citizens and residents, has totaled 1,915,000 people exactly, i.e. nearly 2 million people, of whom 27.92 percent are Kuwaiti citizens whereas in 1957, Kuwaiti citizens numbered 206,000 citizens representing 55 percent of the total population. But the growing number of incomers has had its impact on the population tide. The government has viewed this issue from the angle of two fundamental considerations:

First, boosting all dimensions of the development process. This dictated enlisting the help of foreign labor.

Second, Kuwaitization of jobs as a national developmental objective. The mechanism of the interaction between these two considerations is what can explain to us the graph of Kuwait's population and labor structure.

Means of Kuwaitization

The study also dealt with the means and policies of Kuwaitizing government jobs and pointed out that the government has employed the means of appointing Kuwaiti citizens to replace others in the supervisory positions—manager, supervisor, and section head. Kuwaitis now hold more than $\frac{2}{3}$ these positions. This replacement has been coupled with the attention paid to the quantitative and qualitative output of higher education. A statistical report on the development of the number of graduates from Kuwait University and from among scholarships sent abroad shows that by the end of 1988, these graduates amounted to 18,365 graduates, of whom 7,153 graduated on scholarships abroad and 11,212 graduated from [Kuwait] university.

The study noted that education spending doubled in the past 8 years, rising from 299.2 million dinars in 1980 to 419.6 million dinars in the 1987-88 budget, amounting to nearly 13.6 percent of that year's total general budget.

Second, is the policy of banning the filling of vacant positions and of allocating supplementary appropriations. This policy has contributed to accomplishing several immediate objectives, the most significant of which is curtailing the job inflation. This curtailment has prevented the problem of providing greater job opportunities for Kuwaiti graduates from worsening.

All the ministries and official agencies refrained from filling job positions vacated for any reason. Because the ban on those positions also included the appointment of Kuwaitis, it has been decided to adopt the policy of allocating supplementary appropriations in the budget for the appointment of Kuwaitis. It has been decided to allocate two appropriations: The first is not tied to a specific number of jobs and is designed for Kuwaitis. The second is limited and has been established to meet the urgent and emergency need to appoint non-Kuwaitis.

In the past 12 years, i.e. from 1977 to this year, a total of 83,861 employees, of whom 53,495 are Kuwaitis, have been appointed in accordance with the two annual supplementary appropriations, keeping in mind that the rest are teachers, doctors, and engineers, all of whom are scarce cadres or cadres needed urgently. Their number has amounted to 30,366 appointees. It should be noted, however, that throughout the past 12 years, a total of 2,741 Kuwaitis have been appointed to positions allocated to non-Kuwaitis.

Third, is the system of counterparts. This system is intended to provide the middle-level Kuwaiti leaderships with the expertise of non-Kuwaiti advisers and experts by including this leadership in the symposiums, conferences, and meetings which Kuwait organizes or in which it participates at the local, regional, or international level, so that they may gain the experience that enables them to subsequently shoulder the responsibility of top management. A decree has been issued requiring all government agencies appointing a non-Kuwaiti expert to appoint a number of these middle-level leaderships to stay with the expert. The decree also requires that the agencies set a maximum duration for the non-Kuwaiti expert's occupation of the position.

Fourth, training and preparation: This system is implemented by the General Authority for Applied Education and Training, which is an independent authority. Kuwait University takes charge of the training during service and undertakes to train 700 employees annually. Meanwhile, the authority undertakes to train 1,000 employees annually. This is in addition to the training provided by the Civil Service Commission and the centers controlled by other government agencies. A total of 2,976 employees were trained by these centers in the past 4 years.

Fifth, the Youth Preparation and Manpower Planning Bureau which has been created within the Civil Service Commission and has been attached to the commission chairman directly so that it may act as a liaison between graduates seeking employment and the agencies wishing to employ them. The bureau prepares new graduates and works to familiarize them with the available work opportunities. The bureau has employed 90 percent of those who registered their names with it last year, i.e. from the time it was established to the present. The bureau has filled a significant gap which existed previously and of which graduates were complaining.

Sixth, the program to train new appointees and to prepare them psychologically and in job-related areas, to familiarize them with the rights and duties of their positions as

spelled out by the law and the service regulations, to provide them with general information on job behavior and on the administrative development tendencies and methods, and to infuse them with a national sense and feeling so that they may give government work the importance it merits.

In conclusion, the study noted that in the context of preparing for the new 5-year plan, 1990-95, a bill has been included to modify the manpower structure through the proper replacement of non-Kuwaitis by Kuwaiti citizens. The implementation of this bill depends on specific steps, of which the most important are:

- Surveying and recording the number of employees according to job classification.
- Determining the future labor needs and the specializations needed.
- Drafting manpower plans that spell out the numbers, qualifications, and conditions required for filling jobs, the means to replace non-Kuwaitis by Kuwaiti citizens in every agency, and a timetable for implementation.

Table Demonstrating Number of Kuwaitis Graduating From Kuwait University and on Foreign Scholarships

Year	Kuwait University Graduates	Graduates on Foreign Scholarships
1972-73	—	516
1973-74	—	446
1974-75	—	520
1975-76	—	834
1976-77	—	1,112

Table Demonstrating Number of Kuwaitis Graduating From Kuwait University and on Foreign Scholarships (Continued)

Year	Kuwait University Graduates	Graduates on Foreign Scholarships
1977-78	503	1,311
1978-79	645	370
1979-80	899	285
1980-81	1,116	510
1981-82	1,181	430
1982-83	—	—
1983-84	1,041	170
1984-85	1,280	185
1985-86	1,426	271
1986-87	1,194	113
1987-88	1,927	80

Government Spending on Educational Services

Year	Educational Spending in Million Dinars	Percentage of Total Annual Budget
1979-80	299.2	—
1980-81	256.5	—
1981-82	256.9	—
1982-83	309.9	—
1983-84	326.6	10.8
1984-85	355	11.1
1985-86	370.2	11.9
1986-87	374.5	12.2
1987-88	419.6	13.3

Total Number of Jobs Created With First and Second Supplementary Appropriations—1977/78-1988-89

Fiscal Year	First Supplementary Appropriation		Second Supplementary Appropriation		Total		Grand Total	Percentage	
	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti		Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti
1977-78	1,913	—	1	1,151	1,914	1,151	3,065	62.4	37.6
1978-79	2,002	—	2	6,234	2,004	6,234	8,238	24.3	75.7
1979-80	2,548	—	2	7,051	2,550	7,051	9,601	26.6	73.4
1980-81	2,103	—	7	3,935	2,110	3,935	6,045	34.9	65.1
1981-82	3,472	—	2	4,295	3,474	4,295	7,769	44.7	55.3
1982-83	4,890	—	302	1,778	5,192	1,778	6,970	74.5	25.5
1983-84	5,989	—	565	2,379	6,554	2,379	7,933	73.4	26.6
1984-85	4,828	—	436	275	5,264	275	5,539	95.0	5.0
1985-86	6,298	—	547	1,887	6,845	1,887	8,732	78.4	21.6
1986-87	5,121	—	304	411	5,425	411	93.0	7.0	—
1987-88	6,286	—	141	244	6,417	244	1,661	96.0	4.0
1988-89	5,522	—	224	726	5,746	726	6,472	88.8	11.2
Total	50,962	—	2,741	33,207	53,495	30,366	83,861	—	—

Chart Demonstrating Development in Number of Employees and Workers Employed by Ministries and Government Agencies

Year	Number of Employees			Percentage	
	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Total	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti
1965-66	26,881	42,639	69,520	38.3	61.3
1966-67	32,637	43,842	76,749	42.7	57.3
1967-68	34,974	44,695	79,669	43.9	56.1
1968-69	25,187	45,138	70,325	35.8	64.6
1969-70	26,531	44,391	70,922	37.4	62.6
1970-71	28,888	48,282	87,032	40.3	62.7
1971-72	35,055	51,977	87,032	40.3	59.7
1972-73	39,299	54,118	93,417	42.0	58.0
1973-74	40,244	54,855	95,099	42.3	57.7
1974-75	43,340	60,711	104,051	41.7	58.3
1975-76	45,422	67,852	113,274	40.1	59.9
1976-77	48,121	80,387	128,508	37.4	62.6
1977-78	48,328	85,325	133,653	36.2	63.8
1978-79	48,402	87,709	136,129	35.6	64.4
1979-80	49,401	96,050	125,451	34.0	66.0
1980-81	46,443	91,671	138,114	33.6	66.4
1981-82	49,740	97,693	147,443	33.7	66.3
1982-83	50,623	93,824	144,447	35.0	65.0
1983-84	50,989	89,588	140,577	36.3	63.7
1984-85	53,049	88,989	142,038	37.3	62.7
1985-86	57,285	87,756	145,041	39.5	60.5
1986-87	59,067	83,404	142,471	41.5	58.5
1987-88	61,983	81,270	143,253	43.3	56.7
1988-89	64,203	80,083	144,286	44.5	55.5

SAUDI ARABIA

Minister of Finance Discusses Trade With Pakistan

44000067 Jeddah ARAB NEWS
in English 29 Oct 89 p 2

[Text] Riyadh, 28 October (SPA) [SAUDI PRESS AGENCY]—Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, the minister of finance and national economy, highlighted the existing strong relations between the Kingdom and Pakistan.

In a statement to SPA following the inauguration of the meeting of the Saudi-Pakistani Joint Commission for Economic, Commercial and Technical Cooperation here today, Aba-al-Khayl said the participants in the meeting will review the draft of the economic accord between the two countries as well as means of enhancing commercial exchanges.

The joint commission has two goals; the enhancement of bilateral commercial exchanges and increasing the number of joint companies, he said.

Concrete steps to enhance commercial exchanges between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, establishment of joint industrial and agricultural projects and aspects of cooperation in technical and scientific fields are priority subjects of the 2-day joint commission meeting.

Aba al-Khayl and Wasim 'Awn Ja'Fari, the adviser to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, are leading their respective delegations. Senior Saudi and Pakistani official and businessmen are attending the commission's proceedings, which was set up in 1977 to strengthen further cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in areas of joint interests.

Speaking on the occasion, Aba al-Khayl welcomed the Pakistani delegation and hoped that the meeting would open new horizons for economic cooperation between the two countries.

Aba al-Khayl termed the Saudi-Pakistani relations as "fraternal and deep-rooted." The meetings of the joint commission symbolize the keenness of the two countries in enhancing their relations, he said.

He pointed out that the proposals presented by the Pakistani side on bilateral agreements for economic cooperation have found a positive response from the Saudi side. "The bilateral agreement for economic cooperation will be presented before the Saudi and Pakistani governments in its final shape," he said.

"The proposed agreement will enhance commercial exchanges between the two countries. It will cover customs and non-customs duties on a number of agricultural and industrial products," he continued.

Aba al-Khayl noted that the value of the Kingdom's imports from Pakistan amounted to SR505 million in 1986, SR489 million in 1987 and SR465 in 1988.

Regarding the value of the Kingdom's exports to Pakistan, Aba al-Khayl said it reached SR1,000 million in 1986, SR1,138 million in 1987 and SR1,292 million in 1988. "But the prospects for exports of the two countries are larger than these," he added.

"As a result of expansion of the productive base and the increasing role being played by the private sector, Saudi exports have witnessed remarkable changes in recent years. The Kingdom's petrochemicals, refined petroleum products, fertilizers and sulfur can meet the requirements of the Pakistani market," he pointed out.

In the field of investment cooperation, Aba al-Khayl said the number of joint Saudi-Pakistani companies is now 13. They are working in the fields of construction, production of minerals, digging wells, maintenance and operation.

Aba al-Khayl said the number of the Pakistani companies which have signed contracts with the Kingdom is now seven. They are working in the fields of electric installations, contracting, housing and engineering investments.

The Saudi-Pakistani Company for Industrial and Agricultural Investments, established in 1981, provides good evidence of the increasing economic cooperation between the two countries, he said.

By the end of 1988, the Saudi-Pakistani company has participated in 42 Pakistani companies in industrial, agricultural and services sectors.

For his part, Wasim 'Awn Ja'Fari, the adviser of the Pakistani prime minister for finance, economic affairs, planning and development, said the participants at the meeting will explore prospects of economic, commercial and cultural cooperation between the two countries.

He noted that a number of joint projects in Pakistan had been established in collaboration with the Saudi private sector. "Pakistan has been receiving assistance from the Kingdom to develop its projects," he said.

Ja'Fari said that the Saudi-Pakistani joint commission will review the possibility of an exchange of commodities

between the two countries. The joint commission has been playing a pioneering role in enhancing bilateral relations, he said.

Industry and Electricity Minister 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Zamil and Labor Social Affairs Minister Muhammad 'Ali al-Fayiz met here today with Wasim 'Awn Ja'Fari. They exchanged cordial talks and reviewed issues of mutual interest.

Meanwhile, a joint meeting of Saudi and Pakistani businessmen, who represent the private sector at the joint Saudi-Pakistani joint commission, began at the venue of Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry today. It deals with boosting of bilateral commercial ties and ways of bolstering cooperation.

Ibrahim al-Tuk, chairman of the board of directors of Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said the meeting of Saudi and Pakistani businessmen came within the framework of the meetings of the Saudi-Pakistani joint commission.

The meeting of the Saudi-Pakistani businessmen aims at fostering commercial exchanges between the two countries, he said.

He noted that there were 83 Saudi-Pakistani projects licensed for implementation in the Kingdom. It is possible to increase the number of joint Saudi-Pakistani projects implemented by the private sector, he added.

Industry Official Discusses Industrial Development

44000069 Jeddah ARAB NEWS
in English 25 Oct 89 p 11

[Article by Javid Hassan: "Industry Soars on the Wings of Hi-tech—al-Khafrah"]

[Text] Riyadh—Around 2,000 licensed factories are operating in the Kingdom involving a capital investment of over Sr70 billion, deputy minister of industry, Mubarak al-Khafrah, told ARAB NEWS. He said that of these factories, around 24 percent are in the engineering and fabricated metal products sector, 22 percent in the building materials, 16 percent in plastic and chemical products, and 12 percent in the processed food industries. The number of joint ventures is more than 400.

"A recent survey showed a significant increase in their output, profitability and exports compared to last year which indicates that in spite of a more competitive business environment, the factories are able to maintain and even improve their performance," the deputy minister said.

The Saudi national industry, he pointed out, was capital-intensive with a high degree of sophistication. High technology had reached a high point with the induction of the Offset Program under the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. "The Peace Shield Project was the first Offset

Program and we have so far licensed four projects with a total capital investment of around SR1,280 million," Engr. al-Khafrah explained.

Referring to the projects to be taken up under this program, the deputy minister said these include the International Systems Engineering with a capital investment of SR61 million. It will undertake a full range of services related to the computer systems. The second project is Advanced Electronic Company for the manufacture of communications systems, advanced radar equipment and other defense-related products. The capital investment here is around SR630 million. A third project licensed is Accessories and Components Company for the design, manufacture, installation and maintenance of aerospace and defense-related systems with a capital cost of SR132 million. Finally, there is the Al-Salam Aircraft Company for the modification, manufacture, assembly, repair and maintenance of civil and military aircraft, spareparts and systems. The capital investment involved is SR460 million. All projects will be located in the high technology industrial park to come up near the King Khaled International Airport complex in the next 2 years.

"The Al-Yamamah Offset projects are still in the formulation stage and no projects have yet been licensed, though other formal arrangements in these projects have been completed," the deputy minister pointed out.

Asked what other investment opportunities are available to the private sector other than the petrochemical industries, al-Khafrah mentioned food processing, engineering and fabricated metal products are areas with a good potential for growth. "There is also a good scope for the manufacture of intermediate products for use by other industries as well as for the production of agricultural equipment, machine tools, maintenance equipment, air compressors, power generators, household appliances, and, finally high-tech industries to cater to the ancillary needs of the major off-set projects."

Answering a question on the trend toward privatization in the Kingdom, the deputy minister said this is being spearheaded by the industrial sector. "Even SABIC [Saudi Basic Industries Corporation], the public sector holding company, has joint ventures with leading foreign private companies. We believe firmly in the strength and ability of our private sector to invest in and operate industries as has been proved so far," he observed.

Privatization, al-Khafrah continued, has also received a fillip through such major public- and private-sector companies as the National Industrialization Co (NIC), and more recently, the Saudi Industrial Development Company and the Saudi Venture Capital Group which have been pooling the resources of Saudi businessmen to operate companies under a consortium. "Such holding companies would be able to identify new projects as they have better resources to commission studies and implement them more efficiently in the present competitive environment," the deputy minister said.

Asked to comment on the findings of the Riyadh Development Authority [RDA] that the capital's population has been growing by 65,000 every year with half the population belonging to the youth, al-Khafrah said the study is significant both for planners and developers. Even the Ministry of Industry, he observed, commissions feasibility studies on the market and export potential for the Kingdom's finished products, both in the Gulf and Arab countries as well as the United States, Europe and the Far East.

Such studies have been helpful in identifying new markets for Saudi products which are already being exported to those regions. Referring to the scope for new projects for the emerging youth market, the deputy minister said a beginning has already been made with the coming on stream of sports factories and those for the manufacture of educational equipment. Operation and maintenance [O&M], he explained, is another promising field, since the massive investments in infrastructural and industrial development will have to be protected through the O&M sector.

The deputy minister referred in this context to the role of technical institutes which have been supply[ing] skilled manpower to answer the Kingdom's various needs. According to the RDA report, there are in Riyadh along 214,000 persons who have either completed or are enrolled in technical or university training, constituting 45 percent of the total work force. "The number of workers in Riyadh more than doubled between 1977 and 1988. Projections indicate that by 1995 the working age population will increase by another 177,000 to reach a total of 1 million," the report points out.

The sharp increase in the worker population is a testimony to a vibrant economy which is more diversified and less dependent on any one sector, such as construction or oil. The RDA report notes this aspect when it estimates that employment has grown annually at the rate of 4.5 percent since 1986 to reach a figure of 518,000 at the end of last year. "Of this, approximately, 313,000 were employed in the private sector, up from 289,000 in 1986 and 137,000 in 1977. Sales are strong in the city in nearly all areas; for instance, retail sales are estimated to have increased by 6 percent in 1988 alone, reflecting continued growth in household incomes and spending."

The business community in Riyadh also reflects this buoyant mood. Describing the findings of the RDA as an eye-opener, Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Isa, a leading Saudi businessman, said the RDA study should have been undertaken much earlier to enable the businessmen to reap its benefits. "The fact that half of the population of the capital are the youths indicates tremendous business opportunities, such as those in the fields of sports, education and entertainment. On the agro-industrial front, production of tomato paste and wheat germ would be highly lucrative lines of business, since we have a bumper production of those crops," he added.

Industrial Growth, Foreign Competition Discussed

44000070 *Jeddah ARAB NEWS*
in English 25 Oct 89 p 18

[Article by K.S.R.—"Industrial Sector Records Phenomenal Growth"]

[Text] **Jeddah**—The tremendous growth of national industries has been instrumental in reducing imports. In fact, there is, by and large, a general preference from buyers for good quality Saudi Arabian products which has been greatly responsible for the unprecedented expansion of the industrial sector of the oil-based economy of the Kingdom.

By last year-end, there were more than 2,060 operating national industries established at a cost of over SR95 billion and their sales reaching SR25 billion, according to official statistics. The ever-increasing returns of the national industries have not only been cutting down imports but also helping in saving large amount of hard currency, Deputy Minister for Industrial Affairs Mubarak al-Khafrah reportedly remarked.

The Kingdom, which has made remarkable strides in the agricultural sector—like it has been exporting surplus wheat to some countries, has attained self-sufficiency in a number of consumer products such as refrigerators, air conditioners, aluminum products, biscuits, toothpaste, beverages, fruit juices, tissue papers, pampers, etc. "Our products have started penetrating foreign markets," according to various ministerial statements.

The facilities and incentives offered by the government to the business community have helped a great deal in boosting the industrial sector. Last year, in Riyadh alone there were 686 factories worth over SR12.2 billion specializing in multifarious products including building materials, chemicals, foodstuffs and metal products. The Eastern Province had 474 industries with a capital investment of about SR45 billion, and Jeddah had 600 operating industries. Besides, Mecca had 55, Medina 87, 'Asir 57, Ha'il 25, Tabuk and Jizan 23 each, al-Baha 15, Najran 13, and al-Jawf 6, according to available official figures.

The Saudi economy, which has succeeded in maintaining a degree of strength and diversification with more than 2,000 factories and commercial centers now operating, has been warned that it is facing a serious problem from the phenomena of cheap foreign goods flooding the Kingdom's open market.

The term flooding is described by economists as the selling of an exported item at a price less than its price in the country of origin or at a price lower than that prevailing in the market. In both cases competing firms find themselves in a critical position.

The warning comes from the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry in its study which has found that 56 percent of the samples of goods covered face

acute and unfair foreign competition. It said the phenomena is a reflection of the composition of the Saudi market, which is similar to that of other gulf countries, where there is a free market that depends to a large extent on imported foreign goods, especially industrial products and equipment, means of transport and electrical products.

The study, which was extensively published in AL-SHARG AL-AWSAT, a sister publication of ARAB NEWS, said that in order to promote their goods, commercial firms rely on the fact that the consumer in the Kingdom is used to certain makes which are mostly foreign brands. This category accounted for 98 percent of the samples covered by the study. Forty-three percent of the industrial firms surveyed said they suffer from the partial flooding of specific types of goods while 57 percent complained from total flooding affecting all types of goods they produce.

The study has recommended, among others, that a way to curb this threat is to enforce proper protection of national products by finding an effective mechanism whereby foreign competition could be closely monitored and controlled. It suggested that the Department of Industrial Protection and Promotion at the Ministry of Industry should receive complaints on such cases and a specialized body be entrusted with investigating and preparing detailed files on the matter at the expense of the parties filing the complaints. Lists of the violating firms should be referred to a committee made up of representatives from the Ministries of Industry, Commerce and Finance which will recommend appropriate action.

More strict action to fight the phenomena could take the form of imposing total bans on the imports of a company found flooding the market for up to 1 year. Another step is the imposition of counter tariffs equaling the amount of damage inflicted on the national industries. Such measures will be in line with the resolutions of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) which call for imposition of charges on such goods equaling the difference between the import price and the price of selling the item in the local market where it is produced.

Other recommendations include additional taxes imposed on a gradual basis on imports in order to lessen the competitive nature of these goods. A total ban to be imposed in future on similar products produced locally or fixing certain quotas of imports from outside were also suggested as solutions.

The study noted that although the government has given great priority to the protection of certain goods, many of these are still suffering from foreign competition and flooding, including detergents, pipes, metal and wooden furniture, polyethylene products, plastic goods and house utensils. It recommended the formation of a local committee from representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and the Ministries of Finance and Industry to be

charged with preparing a comprehensive study on each industrial sector in the Kingdom.

The committee should work to stabilize prices of raw materials, reduce charges of ports services, provide encouraging prices for the shipment of local products, monitor the imports by national factories that have not yet started production and those producing at a lower capacity, and oversee strict adherence to the regulations requiring the parties engaged in contracts with the government to refrain from using foreign products in case these are produced locally.

It is now generally accepted that the locally produced goods, despite their high cost of production, are found superior to those coming from abroad or other Gulf states, mainly because the Saudi manufacturers do not tend to compromise on quality.

Official Discusses Growing Role of Private Sector

44000068 Jeddah ARAB NEWS
in English 25 Oct 89 p 11

[Text] Jeddah—The private sector in the Kingdom is playing a much bigger role in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country as indicated by official reports, including those issued by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and has managed to maintain a much lesser negative effect during the recession of 1982-1986, according to 'Abdallah Tahir al-Dabbagh, secretary general of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

During 1987-1988 both the private sector and the public sector registered an increase in their rate of growth, but in terms of non-oil activities it was the private sector which registered a higher growth. The general outlook is optimistic and it is expected that a moderate growth ranging between 1 percent and 3 percent will be sustained for the next 5 or 6 years. With an anticipated economic revival and improvement in oil prices by the mid-90s, the figure could multiply since oil prices usually reflect on the GDP, al-Dabbagh said in an interview with ARAB NEWS.

Asked how he views growth in the non-oil sector, al-Dabbagh said it is not easy to separate oil and non-oil activities because government income depends mainly on sales of oil and petroleum products. The state expenditure comes from this source and this in turn has a tremendous effect on many activities of the private sector which are themselves government related including industry, contracting and other activities. The private sector has learned the lesson by greatly cutting down its overhead expenditure, running itself in a more efficient way than it used to be and expanding in new fields.

Al-Dabbagh said although some sectors are still suffering like industries and services (namely contracting, operating and maintenance) there are two elements linked to this. The first is the unnecessary foreign engagement in

these projects which could take the form of dumping since dumping is not only restricted to goods but could also cover services. The second element is the lack of clear policy for the infusion and participation of capital and this means the expansion of the stock market and its reorganization. These two factors should be tackled because if there wasn't infusion of capital then this kind of participation should be secured, he added.

Answering a question on how these obstacles could be overcome and the infusion made available and whether the commercial banks could implement this, al-Dabbagh said the problem is complicated. The banks have the liquidity to infuse capital into the economy but there still remains a lack of trust between the financial institutions and the borrowers. In his meeting with businessmen earlier in the month the Minister of Finance and National Economy Muhammad Aba al-Khayl called on them to honor their pledges and said if this was done there will be more money available. "I believe this is correct and the government should also shoulder part of this participation by creating more projects to infuse liquidity," al-Dabbagh said.

The establishment of a capital market, specially bonds, will induce the capital lot of which is now in the hands of individual citizens looking for an outlet. There are many people who, for one reason or another, are hesitant to put their money in the banks, al-Dabbagh said. What these people really need is some sort of structure to organize this process. The stock market which has around 64 companies is still regarded as relatively small and its reorganization will create a lot of liquidity for companies, he explained.

When asked if the foreign capital could constitute a viable source, al-Dabbagh answered in the affirmative but said there is lack of enthusiasm on the part of foreign firms or countries to enter into joint ventures. However, he said, this does not cover projects of the Offset Program, specially American and British projects and possibly French projects in future which will infuse some capital and create new opportunities. The lack of enthusiasm was attributed to the Gulf war and the impression carried in the minds of decisionmakers in many foreign countries that there was a risk, he said. There are still some procedural problems associated with recruitment arrangements and differences in the legal points of views and the interpretation of such legal situations.

Another issue relates to the limited size of the Saudi market and that of the GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] market in general although this is partly offset by the high purchasing power of citizens living in these countries. This is also coupled with the lack of a meaningful mechanism involving the government participation in exports. Other problems, said al-Dabbagh, fall within the category of protectionism where once the foreign capital arrives to start an industry it demands to be viably protected and this requires an anti-dumping mechanism which does not yet exist in the Kingdom.

Regarding the progress of investment in other fields, al-Dabbagh cited four categories the first of which is consolidating the country's exports. The second is the agro-industries field which is backed by the Kingdom's tremendous progress and experience in this field as witnessed by the creation of specialized companies in this field. The third category is the petrochemicals and here there are some problems associated with the pricing policy of the Saudi Basic Industries Company. Some believe that the competitive advantages enjoyed by SABIC [Saudi Basic Industries Corporation] have not been passed to the private sector for secondary and tertiary industries but this matter is now under consideration. The fourth segment covers minerals including extraction and processing operations. Al-Dabbagh said this field is a new one where very little has been done so far. There is serious consideration on the part of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to adopt a new mining code that would allow the private sector to enter the field of extraction and processing perhaps in conjunction with the government. There is now joint cooperation between Petromin and the Swedish government in gold mining and the private sector could enter into similar projects.

Asked if the presence of two prices, one for the local market and the other for the international, would prompt producers to buy SABIC [Saudi Basic Industries Corporation] products and then re-export them. Al-Dabbagh said it is easy for the Saudi products to be monitored to guard against this practice. One should have faith in the integrity of the international community, he said. Despite the fact that there might be those who do not abide by the code of ethics, the majority should not be punished for this and the government could initiate stringent measures to face this issue, he said.

SUDAN

Ministry Official Discusses Labor Issues, Reform Measures

900A0148A Khartoum *AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH* in Arabic 12 Sep 89 p 4

[Interview with Kinga George, minister of labor and social insurance, by Salah 'Uthman: "Providing Stability Linked With Just Distribution, Supporting the Production Process"; first three paragraphs are *AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH* introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] The ministry starts from the revolution's attitudes as contained in its first communique and subsequent resolutions. The ministry will work within this framework to implement the following policies and strategies: providing stability linked with just distribution, supporting the production process, preparing an environment and climate suitable for raising productivity, and contributing to the realization of balanced development for all regions and areas of the Sudan. This will be

accomplished by: expanding vocational training services, developing the work force, developing employment services, and expanding the base that participates in economic and social building.

With this program, Mr Kinga George anticipated the ministry's concerns and problems and the program that it will follow.

We leave the reader the opportunity to follow the transcript of the conversation.

Review of Legal Tools

[*AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH*] What is the nature of the ministry's work? What are the goals it has been assigned to achieve?

[George] The Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance is an old ministry whose activities and functions were established in various periods. The most prominent goals that the ministry will achieve in the coming period are:

- Reviewing legal tools, to keep step with the demands of the period by harmonizing the aspirations of workers and the abilities of the economic sectors.
- Developing employment services.
- Raising and expanding the base of vocational training occupationally and geographically.
- Providing needed stability in labor relations.
- Providing needed protection for the work force as regards the terms, conditions, and environment of work.
- Covering larger numbers of workers with the umbrella of social insurance, and expanding benefits on the basis of changing wages and rising standards of living.
- Expanding worker educational services to serve larger sectors of workers, and developing concepts of worker education to foster effective participation by the parties to production in the process of economic and social building.
- Emphasizing and expanding labor-intensive projects aimed at creating productive jobs in rural areas, and creating infrastructure projects to give citizens an incentive to remain in rural areas.

Ministry Has No Role

[*AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH*] In past years, some workers and employees in government-owned corporations were eliminated by retirement in the public interest. What does the ministry think about these people returning to service, especially since their elimination took place for purely partisan reasons?

[George] The legislation that confers authority to move someone into retirement does not empower the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance to review decisions and measures taken under that legislation. Thus the ministry has no role in this regard.

Rural Development Projects

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What are the ministry's projects for absorbing migrants?

[George] "Migration" is a new expression for the phenomenon of inhabitants moving from their original areas to other areas for various reasons. As Sudanese citizens, migrants have the right to move throughout the Sudan. In consideration of the circumstances under which they may be living, relief and assistance services are provided through specialized agencies. But employment is governed by the principles of equal opportunity and fair competition. It is therefore not possible to favor one citizen over another in this area. Everyone is employed according to his abilities and skills. Opportunities to compete in the labor market are expanding.

It should be mentioned that the ministry is working so that its role will not be limited to helping the migrants be absorbed. It works actively to remove reasons for migration, especially nature-related ones such as drought and desiccation, by originating and implementing labor-intensive projects aimed at developing rural areas and their economic and social life and providing a base of infrastructures and vital services.

Expansion of Vocational Training Centers

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] Unemployment in the Sudan has reached a very serious level, contributing to the corruption of most young people. What is the ministry's role in combatting unemployment?

[George] Contrary to all predictions, the seriousness of this problem is evident among graduates of the educational system—schools, universities, and higher institutions. The other groups in the work force are trying to find alternative opportunities in sectors other than government work, taking advantage of various skills.

As for graduates of the educational system, especially the so-called "educated failure," one of the most important problems in the unemployment of this group is economic stagnation and the fact that the products of the educational system do not match the requirements of the labor market. The ministry is working diligently in the context of rescue policies in the following areas:

- Expanding vocational training centers, so that graduates of the educational system can acquire skills and vocations that will help them be employed and earn income
- Working to encourage and support small self-employment projects.

Attache Offices To Play Central Role

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What about the idea of labor attache offices? To what extent have they helped [the ministry] carry out its assigned role?

[George] At the conference on expatriates recently held in the context of the Salvation Revolution's interest in helping Sudanese working abroad, it was decided to establish labor attache offices. We in the Labor Ministry

are confident that these offices will be able to play a central role in expanding job opportunities in foreign labor markets. They will enable the ministry and other relevant agencies to follow changes and will provide information and statistics for setting policies and establishing programs to provide guarantees and resolve conflicts that sometimes arise between employees and their employers. They will regulate the conversion of savings and remittances, as well as providing other kinds of economic, social, and educational services needed by Sudanese working overseas.

Contacts To Find Places for Craftsmen

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] Craftsmen are suffering from a lack of places in which to carry on their activities. To what extent can the ministry contribute to finding places for them?

[George] The ministry can make contacts and coordinate with the agencies concerned with allocating land and approving its uses, so as to highlight the feasibility of removing the problem of lack of places for craftsmen to carry on their activities. This would be done in the context of the growth of the employment opportunities that this sector could provide, if the elements for stability were provided to it.

Incentive to Those With Scarce Professions

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] The enticements of expatriation have left vacancies in some civil service institutions. How can we reduce the opportunities for expatriation?

[George] Free choice of job and free movement are guaranteed rights. While respecting this right, the state, through the Ministry of Labor, works to insure the national need for scarce professions that must be available, if a decrease of development and services is not to occur. These are defined according to labor market indexes. In this area, incentives to those working in scarce professions strongly influence the decision of citizens to remain.

It should be mentioned that in the context of the Sudan's pan-Arab commitment, the Sudan's contribution to providing Sudanese expertise to fraternal countries remains great. We hope that they will strengthen our educational and training institutions, thus making it possible for these to fulfill their local needs for talents and the needs of brethren and friends.

Proposed New Insurance Law

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What about the ministry's plans to provide social security to workers?

[George] The ministry's relevant agencies have finished drafting a new proposal for a social insurance law. Important changes have been included in it to keep pace with new conditions. It gives me pleasure in this regard to point out that these changes will realize large and appreciable gains for the base of those insured. The

proposed law will be submitted to the Council of Ministers in the next few days for approval.

Violations To Be Remedied by Law

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] The employment terms of some foreign companies contradict international employment terms. What measures will you take to restore rights to the workers who work in those companies?

[George] In the context of its authority in labor affairs, the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance is working so that national labor legislation keeps pace with the levels of international and regional labor. We compare, update, and adjust provisions in the context of our international obligations. In this regard, any violations by national or foreign companies are remedied in a legal context, taking into consideration the laws that are in force. Regional and branch labor offices located throughout the Sudan carry out this task.

We Will Put Forward Our Point of View

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What do you as minister think about the idea of reducing work hours, so that Thursday and Friday will be days off?

[George] A committee has been formed by resolution of the Council of Ministers to review the matter. As far as I know, the committee will present its recommendations to the honorable council so that a decision can be made. We in the ministry will work to put forward our point of view in the context of the committee's activity.

The Law Again

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] Private-sector workers are complaining of injustice and domination by employers. What are your plans to protect them?

[George] As I mentioned before, any violations in any establishment that aggrieved persons bring to the attention of the ministry through their complaints will be remedied in the context of the laws that are in force. These laws provide protection for all parties in the production process, both employees and employers.

Foreign Intermediary Corporations

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] There are foreign corporations that enter as intermediaries between workers and the companies that employ them. They receive payment from the employing companies in dollars and give the Sudanese worker the local equivalent. Are you making immediate efforts to solve this problem?

[George] If there is no relevant labor office, the intermediary's role is limited to employment services in the initial stages, when some employers may need to have a particular kind of skills or professions provided. Expert firms, if they are to be found, sometimes carry out this task, working to match the demand for these professions and talents with the supply of them.

Under provisions of the 1974 work force law, such operations may be entered into only under supervision by the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance and its authorized offices. As for dealing in foreign currency to settle transactions between companies, that is not within the ministry's jurisdiction.

Payment of Workers' Wages

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What is the ministry's position on the displaced workers at the Sudanese Textile factory.

[George] The ministry's position on the Sudanese Textile factory problem is a position defined by the law to deal with problems of establishments that get into economic difficulties. The process of implementing the law requires submitting such problems to the economic committee. I have already submitted this problem in order to find a radical solution for it.

In the context of the search for solutions, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning has undertaken to pay the wages of all the employees, beginning August 1989.

Journalists' Rights

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What is the ministry's role in restoring rights to which journalists are entitled from the newspaper companies that dismissed them?

[George] Again, the ministry's role in restoring the rights of workers in newspaper companies is defined by provisions of the 1981 individual labor relations law, which protects worker rights according to the details of each case.

It should be mentioned that none of the cases relating to journalists' rights has been submitted to the labor offices. If they are submitted, they will receive the required treatment according to the provisions of the law.

Refugee Count Will Help Us

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] Some refugees from neighboring countries have immigrated and taken control of most jobs that Sudanese are more entitled to hold, as long as we are still facing hidden unemployment. What is the ministry's role in this regard?

[George] There are international agreements regulating refugee and providing [words illegible] the relationship of the host countries to the refugees and those affected in terms of rights and obligations.

By virtue of its membership in international and regional organizations, the Sudan is bound by these agreements. The condition of refugees is handled in this light. There may be some exaggeration about refugee domination and inroads upon the labor market. The reality may be otherwise. In this regard, I would point to the current count of refugees, especially in the jurisdiction of the

national capital. The ministry is a party in this matter and will use the results to shape the necessary policies and measures.

Interministerial Coordination

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] From time to time there are contracts unfair to the rights of some workers. What is the ministry's role in dealing with this issue?

[George] First, we want to state that the ministry is concerned that labor contracts for overseas employment be rewarding for Sudanese workers. The ministry therefore works at following changes in incomes, prices, and living standards in the countries that receive Sudanese workers. Based on the indexes obtained, minimum wages and other benefits are set for various cadres and professions. In its effort to achieve better wage levels and employment terms, the ministry is now working in coordination with other agencies and units to establish labor attache offices in countries with a concentration of Sudanese workers.

NIF Reportedly Fundraising Via Front Companies, Investment

90OA0121B London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 23 Oct 89 p 3

[Article: "National Islamic Front Investments"]

[Text] Staff Brigadier-General Makki al-Kinani, chairman of the committee for the compilation of party assets in the Sudan, revealed that foreign companies used to operate under assumed names to the benefit of [political] parties and that the National Islamic Front (NIF) alone has foreign investments in 25 countries.

Brig Gen al-Kinani disclosed NIF domestic investments with certain corporations inside the Sudan in addition to foreign investments connected to expatriate workers.

He added that NIF funds entered the country as liquid free currency delivered to NIF secretary-general Dr Hasan al-Turabi. Brig Gen al-Kinani explained that returns on those investments were used to finance the Front's party.

He further added that his committee seized 93 automobiles, wireless sets, and dogma books found at party quarters, and that it has filed complaints for the loss of a number of cameras and computers against persons who appropriated them after breaking and entering party quarters.

Brig Gen al-Kinani explained that funds seized by the compilation committee were deposited in its account with the Bank of Sudan.

In a related development, Staff Colonel Faysal Madani, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Deputy Chairman of the Services Committee, said that the findings of the compilation committee will influence how the services committee handles assets and properties [seized from the various] parties and that it is fully empowered to do so.

INDIA

Japanese Visitor Suggests India Curb Military Spending

46001095 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 23 Oct 89 p 7

[Article: "Japan Wants India To Reduce Military Spending"]

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 22—A high-ranking Japanese official has suggested that India should curb its growing military expenditure and also settle bilateral relations with some of its smaller neighbours.

The Deputy Director-General of the Asian Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Seichiro Otsuka, told presspersons here that in the capacity of a good friend of India, Japan would like to give some "friendly advice" that "India might consider the wisdom of spending a little less on military build-up and spend some more on economic development." He also suggested that "India should respect the search of identity of some of the smaller nations" in its neighbourhood.

Mr. Otsuka was briefing presspersons on the outcome of exchanges that took place between the Deputy Chiefs of Japanese missions in south-west Asia, consuls from Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Karachi and representatives of Japanese firms based here. The Deputy Chiefs came from Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. Bhutan was represented by the staff of the Japanese embassy in New Delhi.

According to Mr. Otsuka, the discussions focussed on the domestic and international environment of the six countries, the technological and economic cooperation between Japan and these nations and the cultural and other ties between Japan and the countries of this region. The group emphasised the Japanese perception that prosperity and stability in south-west Asia was essential for peace in the entire Asian region and in this India has a large role to play. In this context, Mr. Otsuka felt that it was necessary to promote as political dialogue between India and Japan at the highest level to cover issues of bilateral interest as well as common concerns in the global context. The recent political developments in India, particularly the announcement of general elections, had come as a surprise but the group had made some assessments about the possible outcome. He, however, declined to share these assessments but said that any possible change of Government in India would not alter the attitude of the Japanese Government towards India.

Questioned about the "advice" to India to curb defence spending and to improve relations with its neighbours, Mr. Otsuka said this was in keeping with the international trend of moving away from confrontation to conciliation. In this context, he mentioned the U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente, the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and other peace efforts round the world. Quoting

the case of peaceful co-existence between the U.S. and Canada, he suggested that India should be more tolerant towards its neighbours since small gestures by India had amplified ramifications in these nations.

The Japanese official emphasised that his country was deeply interested in the stability and prosperity of the south-west Asian region and this was reflected in the fact that as much as 17.28 percent of the Japanese official development assistance was destined for this region. Even Africa had a lower share at 14 percent. East Asia, however, accounted for 45 percent, he added.

About specific issues of economic cooperation between India and Japan, Mr Otsuka said the "fast track" mechanism for easier clearance of investment and other proposals was working rather smoothly and trade interaction was on the increase. Still, he felt that compared with India's economic exchanges with the U.S., West Germany and U.K., Japan fared poorly, both in terms of trade and investment.

Representatives of Japanese enterprises based here had given the assessment that the investment climate in India was improving, but, said Mr. Otsuka, the problems of infrastructure continued as also some of the procedural delays.

Population: Rethinking of Policy, Pragmatic Steps Urged

90010071A Bombay *NAVBHARAT TIMES*
in Hindi 17 Oct 89 p 6

[Article by Neelam Giri: "Review of Population Policy Needed"]

[Text] Among the multitude of problems that the Indian government has been facing since independence, the family planning program has been a permanent worry. Even a minor success in solving other problems is satisfying, however, the family planning issue has been a total bust. It is very distressing to see that the government did not learn from this failure and try to rethink the whole policy. Instead, it advertised various statistics to fool the people and itself.

To keep the flag of this false propaganda flying, the government schedules activities like annual fairs in various states and meetings of health ministers and secretaries. The ever-faithful government's own radio and television are there to cap this effort with their own brand of advertising. They blame the people for the increasing population and lash out at them with rude and merciless parodies.

Repeated warnings by our own and foreign population specialists, economists, social scientists, family planning institutions, population experts, science academies, the World Bank, and the United Nations have failed to stir our government's fascination with its own statistics. During the recent 20th anniversary meeting of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the

Indian government was taken to task by population experts for not reviewing its family planning policy. The main theme of this convention was "Rethinking Population Policy: past and future." The experts called the present rate of population growth explosive and warned that if measures are not taken soon, India's population in the next 50 years will balloon to 960 or 970 million.

Mr J.R.D. Tata, chairman of the Family Planning Commission, cited Kerala and talked about the lack of enough emphasis on family planning education. Ashish Bose, director of the Indian Association for Population Studies, advised the government to devise and implement a realistic and viable policy honestly in the future instead of inventing statistics. Among other people, Mussimo Bummy, head of the International Union for Scientific Population Study, and Satpal Mittal, director of the Indian Association of Parliamentarians on Population Development, said that while population usually is the source of strength for other nations, it has become India's weakness. They do not consider the present family planning program a solid plan for solving India's population problem.

In addition to these warnings by population experts, the statistics on our population and a look at government efforts to curb it are shocking. India's population, according to the 1981 census, was 685,984,692. It has surpassed 800 million now. According to a United Nations Population Fund estimate, this number will increase to 161,531,000 [sic, the real number perhaps is 1,615,310,000] in 11 years or by 2000 AD. Interestingly enough, India's geographic area is only 2.2 percent of the world, but it holds 15 percent of the world population.

It should be noted that India was the first country in the world to initiate a family planning program and, despite using all kind of strategies, we did not have any success. When the national birth rate policy was formulated in 1976, the goal was to limit 21 births per 1,000 by the year 2000. Family planning programs were implemented during that time, and despite spending over 3.5 billion rupees and persuading about 60 or 70 million couples to practice family planning, our birth rate is still fixed at 33 per 1,000. Even today, a baby is born every 1.2 seconds in our country. Which means that we add 50 children in a minute and 3,000 children each hour. We can also say that a Sri Lankan or an Australian is added to India's population every year. This population is twice that of Britain and France, and five times that of Canada, and little more than half of the United States' population. China is the most populated country in the world at present, however, we will surpass it in the first half of the 21st Century. The question arises: Why didn't the population growth rate fall during the last decade, despite the increase in the number of couples practicing birth control or getting sterilized? Doesn't this contradiction expose our government's efforts to deceive us with statistics?

What are the results of the government's efforts in sterilization, birth control, infant-mother care, vaccination, and female education to control our birthrate? Sterilization of 60 or 70 year old men and the parents of five or six children is a common practice. Such couples can be used in the "safe couples" categories to buildup statistics. A realistic program would require sterilization of couples between the ages of 20 and 30 who have one or two children. The government, however, had no success in making such couple "safe." Many population experts believe that 20 to 40 percent of the government figures on birth control activities are false.

The government thought that after strong propaganda about using birth control pills, condoms, and Copper-T, the people would adopt them willingly. This kind of government mentality has ignored the social atmosphere of the country. Who doesn't know that despite the government slogan about "two children are perfect regardless of sex," 95 percent of the people want only sons. The desire to have a son does not die even after having five or six daughters. Most of the people in our country do not have the courage to wait between having children in this kind of situation and mentality. They are more easily convinced if they have two or three sons. In a country where blessings to "have a baby soon" are given at weddings and a bride's fertility becomes suspect if she does not bear a child within a year of her marriage, it is not surprising that the advice to wait for a long time between having children does not sit well.

The birth control pills that our television advises couples to remember alongside the wedding garland are also proven to be bad for health through scientific research. According to a report published in London recently, the British doctors have found that women using birth control pills are more susceptible to cancer. According to this report, women under 36 who used these pills for 4 to 8 years have 40 percent more danger of breast cancer. Continual use of these pills after this age increases this danger to 70 percent. Women using Copper-T develop problems such as irregular menstruation.

Better health services is imperative for the success of a family planning program. The health services situation in our country, however, is scary. According to the World Health Organization, the lives of 250 pregnant women are threatened every 6 hours in our country. In India, the number of women who die in childbirth each month is equal to the number of such deaths in the United States, Europe, Japan, or Australia in 1 year. According to the Indian Medical Research Institute, only 10 percent of the pregnant women get the services of trained midwives. Babies and mothers die of blood poisoning, insufficient care, or anemia in most cases. There are no health services for miles in the villages. The question of proper care and medication during pregnancy just does not arise.

The success of family planning in Kerala is mainly given to female education. It is important to mention here that the birth rate in Kerala is only 25 per thousand as

compared to the national average of 33 per thousand. Kerala's birth rate in 1950 was higher than the national average.

The population study department of the Gandhi Peace Foundation published a book on this issue. Population expert Moni Nag has pointed out the reasons for the reduction in Kerala's birth rate. These include late marriages of girls, better health facilities, efficient distribution of consumer goods, and improved economy. According to Mr Nag, the average age of Kerala girls at marriage in 1971 was 21 years, while the corresponding national figure was 17. He also compared West Bengal, another leftist state, with Kerala. In Kerala, 86 percent of the children between the ages of 6 and 10 were attending school in 1978. In West Bengal, this percentage was 68. While 74 percent of the girls between the ages of 11 and 15 were in school in Kerala this year, there were only 32 percent attending school in this age bracket in West Bengal. Similarly, while there are two doctors employed at each health service station in Kerala since 1974, only 30 percent of the health centers in West Bengal have two doctors. It is clear that a total effort and government support is necessary for the success of a family planning program and not just a philosophy and propaganda.

We would have believed the optimism expressed in "we shall be successful someday" by our central government and its family planning bureaucracy if they had learned anything from their drastic failures for the past 40 years.

Trade Board Gives Priority To Export Infrastructure

46001115 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 2 Nov 89 p 9

[Article: "Trade Board To Give Priority to Export Infrastructure"]

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 1—The Board of Trade at its meeting here today decided to focus on immediate development to avoid bottlenecks in exports. Infrastructural constraints came up as a major area of concern and the Union Commerce Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, urged the Ministries concerned to expedite action on proposals for removing such constraints in terms of expanding handling capacity of export cargo at sea and airports. The Minister welcomed suggestions from industry representatives that interim arrangements be made to accelerate expansion of port facilities over the next two years, pending finalisation of the Eighth Plan.

Members at the meeting suggested that the 'open sky' policy for facilitating export movement should be extended for three years instead of up to August 1990 so that other airlines could schedule their programmes in advance. It was suggested that Air India should step up its efforts to attract import cargo in bulk from abroad to avoid losses in operating additional flights out of India.

Call to industry: Mr. Dinesh Singh impressed upon trade and industry representatives the need to strengthen further the export effort in the coming months to cross the target of Rs. 28,025 crores and to try to reach the target of Rs. 40,000 crores set by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The encouraging trend in exports was continuing this year with April-August figures showing a growth of 38 percent in rupees terms and 17 percent in dollar terms. Import growth had slowed down considerably this year and in dollar terms, there was virtually no increase in import growth in the first five months, the Minister said.

In response to industry suggestions to sort out some matters regarding finance, it was decided that a meeting with the Finance Secretary, Mr. Gopi Arora, would be held next week.

The Reserve Bank of India Governor, Mr. R. N. Malhotra, also clarified the doubt among members that export credit had been reduced. Only the quantum of refinance for banks had been cut and not credit for exporters, he said. About some recent problems regarding finance for the International Price Reimbursement Scheme (IPRS) affecting engineering exports, it was indicated that proposals for release of funds and major modifications in the scheme were likely to be finalised soon.

Another important suggestion at the meeting was endorsed by the members that the Board should consider the issue of imports since this was vital in the context of overall balance of payments management. It was also agreed that the draft proposal on the setting up of India Trade Centre abroad would be considered in line with the suggestions made by the Board members.

Daily in Trouble Over Allegations Against Chavan

Allegations Reviewed
46001094 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN*
in English 25 Oct 89 p 9

[Article: "THE INDEPENDENT in Hot Water Over Y. B. Chavan Report"]

[Text] Bombay, Oct. 24—Bombay's newest daily paper, THE INDEPENDENT, finds itself in hot water following a front page banner headline lead report carried on Thursday, October 19, stating that former Deputy Prime Minister, Yeshwantrao B. Chavan, was a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] agent.

The story came a few days after the news that Mr Morarji Desai, named by Mr Seymour Hersh in his book "The Price of Power" as a CIA agent, had been unsuccessful in his libel case against Mr Hersh in the American courts. It was reported around that time that the alleged spy had been a former Finance Minister, a deputy Prime Minister, and a Chief Minister. Y. B. Chavan had also held

all three positions. However, till THE INDEPENDENT report, it had not crossed anybody's mind to name him as an alternative.

Last Thursday, THE INDEPENDENT carried a seven column headline in bold type as its lead: "Y. B. Chavan, not Morarji, spied for the CIA". The report went on to state that this had been indicated to Mr Rajiv Gandhi by a letter from the Forum of Civil Liberties within RAW and independently confirmed to this newspaper by a source in "bombay today". The report went on to add that Y. B. Chavan had been under surveillance by both the Indian intelligence bureau and RAW [Research and Analysis Wing (Intelligence Agency)], and had "paid frequent visits" to the home of American woman diplomat in Bombay. The report further quoted the RAW wing letter to the Prime Minister as saying that Mr Hersh had been deliberately given false information that the agent in question was Mr Desai and not Y. B. Chavan.

The report, with its splashy display, drew immediate attention and immediate flak. The local Maharashtrian Press was outraged that such a charge could be made against Y. B. Chavan who is highly venerated in Maharashtra. The general thrust of these arguments have less against the type of evidence on which the report was printed, and not that Y. B. Chavan could be spoken about in this manner.

THE INDEPENDENT, and its sympathizers, as well as objective observers, have pointed out that it is regrettable that no outrage was displayed in any section of the Press when Mr Morarji Desai, "whose reputation and service to the country is no less than Y. B. Chavan's was accused of being a CIA agent".

The matter also took on the aspects of a family feud "when THE INDEPENDENT's sister publication, THE TIMES OF INDIA, attacked the report in a strong editorial last Saturday. Also standing on the point that Y. B. Chavan is "a symbol of Maharashtra's pride and rekindled sense of dignity", the editorial blasted THE INDEPENDENT for playing up reports based on evidence that even the junior most sub-editor would view with "scepticism".

On Monday, THE INDEPENDENT replied with an equally sharp editorial, asking how THE TIMES OF INDIA could lecture on investigative journalism when it knows nothing of the subject.

INDEPENDENT Editor Resigns

46001094 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 26 Oct 89 pp 1, 3

[Article: "INDEPENDENT" Editor Quits"]

[Text] Bombay, October 25: Mr Vinod Mehta, editor of THE INDEPENDENT, resigned today in the wake of a controversial report maligning the former deputy prime minister, the late Mr Y. B. Chavan.

The resignation has been accepted by the management.

Prior to his resignation, Mr Mehta, in a front page box in today's issue of THE INDEPENDENT, tendered an unconditional apology while withdrawing the allegations in the article.

It may be recalled that a lead report in the issue dated October 19 of the recently-launched morning had accused Mr Chavan of being a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] mole, sparking off widespread discontent in the press and the state.

In his apology, Mr Mehta said: "The report on the late Shri Chavan in this newspaper on October 19 was published in good faith without any intention of hurting anyone's reputation or hurting the sentiments of any group or community."

The article was published "on the basis of documents received by us. We withdraw the allegations in the article."

Furthermore, Mr Mehta said, "We have the highest esteem for Shri Chavan who had an illustrious career as a freedom-fighter, chief minister of undivided Bombay and Maharashtra, as a senior Union cabinet minister of the country. He was one of the foremost patriots of India."

"We also have the highest regard for the people of Maharashtra who played a major role in securing freedom for the country and have continued to work towards contributing to the unity and integrity of the country. We apologise for having hurt the feelings of the people of Maharashtra by publishing the article. We would like to reassure everyone concerned that the publication of the item had nothing to do with the high regard we have for Sri Chavan."

He concluded, "Finally, I would like to tell everyone that Maharashtra and Bombay are close to my heart and their progress and welfare have always been and continue to be vital to me."

As soon as the news of Mr Mehta's resignation spread, the indefinite hunger-strike by 11 members of the youth wing of the Y. B. Chavan Pratishthan was called off. The agitation was led by Mr Dilip Shinde, convenor of the youth wing, and was supported by Mr P. B. Patil, general secretary of the Pratishthan, and the women's wing of the Pratishthan.

Earlier, the civic standing committee adjourned its meeting condemning the paper for its malicious report.

Cabinet Condemns INDEPENDENT

46001094 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 26 Oct 89 p 3

[Article: "Cabinet Condemns 'INDEPENDENT'"]

[Text] Bombay, October 25—The Maharashtra government will obtain legal opinion on taking action against

THE INDEPENDENT and all the other papers which published defamatory writings against the late Mr Y. B. Chavan.

Mr Ramrao Adik, state law minister, gave this piece of information to reporters here today after presiding over a cabinet meeting, which unanimously condemned THE INDEPENDENT. The chief minister, Mr Sharad Pawar, is camping in New Delhi in connection with the Lok Sabha elections.

Mr Adik said the state government will also contact the Union home minister, Mr Buta Singh, in a bid to establish the veracity of the alleged RAW [Research and Analysis Wing (Intelligence Agency)] report about Mr Chavan.

This is perhaps the first time that the state government has condemned a daily newspaper through a cabinet resolution.

Mr Adik announced the resignation of Mr Vinod Mehta, editor of THE INDEPENDENT, at the press conference, quoting Mr Govind Talwalkar, editor of the MAHARASHTRA TIMES.

Earlier, Mr Adik told an all-party delegation at Mantralaya that he would contact the Prime Minister and Mr Buta Singh with a request for a clarification.

The delegation was led by the mayors of Bombay and Thane, Mr Sharad Acharya and Mr Manohar Salvi. Other leaders, too, participated.

The delegation included nearly 200 demonstrators, most of them corporators from Bombay and Thane. Mr Chhagan Bhujbal of the Shiv Sena, Mr Kaka Thorat of the Congress, Mr Baburao Ramishte, mathadi leader, Mr Namdeo Dhasal, leader of the Dalit Panthers and Mr Jagannath Kothekar, leader of newspaper vendors were prominent among them. Mr Vivek Khadye of the Janata Del and Mr Raj Purohit of the BJP also were present.

The delegation was allowed till the sixth floor of the Mantralaya. After hearing the delegates, Mr Adik promised that necessary action would be initiated.

Mr Bhujbal said a clarification by a government spokesman would not suffice in view of Mr Chavan's stature. It must come either from Mr Rajiv Gandhi or Mr Buta Singh. Many speakers expressed anger over today's apology published by THE INDEPENDENT. They pointed out that the newspaper had not admitted that the news item was baseless.

Mr Kothekar said the vendors' organisation ought not to be blamed if it tried to prevent the paper from reaching the public in case there was no proper apology. He said the apology should be issued within 48 hours.

More Protests Noted

46001094 *Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 26 Oct 89 p 3

[Article: "More Protests Over Chavan Item"]

[Text] Pune, October 25—Semi-urban areas in Maharashtra have started reacting slowly but vigorously to the news item carried by the Bombay daily, THE INDEPENDENT, alleging that Mr Y. B. Chavan was a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] agent.

In Pune, the general body meeting of the municipal corporation was adjourned to protest against THE INDEPENDENT and the NEWS TIME of Hyderabad for villifying the late Mr Chavan. The grandson of Mr Chavan has already filed a case against the editor in a Pune court.

In Karad in Satara district—the hometown of the late Mr Chavan—young boys burnt the copies of THE INDEPENDENT. They later went in a procession to the memorial of Mr Chavan and offered flowers.

The former finance minister of Maharashtra, Mr Y. J. Mohite, strongly condemned the report. He said the journalists who described Mr Chavan as the CIA agent, would also go to the extent of describing Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj as the agent of Aurangzeb. He warned that when the discontent began to spread throughout the state, the office of THE INDEPENDENT would be turned to ashes.

Mr Laxmanshastri Joshi, a prominent Sanskrit research scholar, said the report betrayed the editor's animus against Maharashtra. He appealed to the people to launch an intensive agitation against the daily.

Public meetings were held at different places to condemn the report. At a meeting in Ahmednagar, the speakers demanded that the state government file a case against the editor and correspondents of the paper who were responsible for the report. At Nagpur, copies of the paper were burnt. Similar reports landed here from different parts of the state.

Journalists in Pune also appeared to have been hurt by the report in the Bombay daily. The Brihan Maharashtra Vruttpatra Sampadak Sangh (Editors' association) has demanded that the declaration of THE INDEPENDENT be cancelled.

The Pune Union of Working Journalists (PUWJ) has strongly criticised the editor of the paper for a gross breach of professional ethics and norms which are followed by responsible journalists.

The PUWJ executive committee meeting, which was chaired by Mr Anand Agashe, president, unanimously adopted a resolution which said it was a serious matter that THE INDEPENDENT chose to rely only on the insinuation by the forum for civil liberties in the research and analysis wing (RAW), for carrying its report. The

report itself said that the letter on which it was based bore an indecipherable signature.

The report was written in bad taste, as it went on to describe how the wife of the late Mr Chavan was a patient of tuberculosis. This was done only to substantiate a reference that he was visiting an American woman diplomat when he was the chief minister of Maharashtra, to insinuate that he had a relationship with this woman.

The PUWJ took a strong exception to the report also because the late Mr Chavan was not in a position to defend himself. The stand taken by the editor of THE INDEPENDENT, in the editorial of October 23, could not be supported by right-thinking journalists as it was fraught with contradictions, the resolution said.

The PUWJ supported the sentiments expressed by journalists, leaders of society and members of the public in the wake of the publication of the report. The resolution said newspapers should shun sensationalism practised in the name of investigative journalism.

Journalists should observe decorum and decency while writing about individuals in public life and even lay members of society. The PUWJ made its view unequivocally clear that while journalists should be ever vigilant in safeguarding the freedom of expression, they must also discharge their duties with utmost integrity and with full responsibility.

IRAN

IRI Ready To Export 5,000 Tractors To USSR Annually

46000041 Tehran TEHRAN TIMES
in English 25 Nov 89 p 2

[Text] Tabriz (IRNA)—Iran is ready to export 5,000 messy Fergessen tractors to the Soviet Union annually, it was announced during an inspection tour of the Soviet Deputy Heavy Machine Building Minister Artunyuv of several machine building factories here Tuesday.

During the visit the Soviet economic delegation also reviewed a plan for the manufacture of heavy machinery in Tabriz machine building plant, as well as providing technical, educational and research assistance for expansion of the plant.

The delegation also inspected the Montogen factory here, where it announced that the Soviet Union would propose a project for manufacture of 50-kilo-watt electromotors in the factory.

The factory would produce an annual 50,000 18-kilo-watt and 50-kilo-watt electromotors to meet the country's needs, once the project is implemented.

Oxalic Acid Produced Domestically for First Time 46000051 Tehran KAYHAN HAVAI in Persian 18 Oct 89 p 1

[Text] Esfahan, 14 Oct—The organic substance, "oxalic acid" which is widely used as a chemical in producing plastics, as well as in textiles, was developed for the first time in Iran.

Oxalic acid, of a high degree of purity, was synthesized by the chemical branch of the Industrial University of Esfahan from an easily obtainable organic substance in our country.

With the development of the plan to establish and produce it, we could substantially reduce the annual loss of foreign exchange.

PAKISTAN

No Confidence Vote: Aftermath Analyzed

COP Versus PPP Tussle

46000045 Lahore THE NATION
in English 14 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Aziz-ud-Din Ahmad

[Text] The abortive attempt by COP [Combined Opposition Parties] on 1 November to unseat the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government has raised questions about the future of the alliance. Dissention and mutual recrimination are a necessary concomitant of a defeat but COP, consisting of veteran politicians as it is, may overcome these in good time. The real test of wisdom, however, will be to keep the alliance together in the present of the sharp ideological differences within the COP ranks. It may be easy to come together for a brief period to demolish a common hindrance, but it is a ticklish acrobatic feat to continue the unity over a long period in the presence of sharp differences regarding important foreign and domestic matters. A number of dissensions, hitherto lying dormant, could surface and weaken the united front.

ANP [Awami National Party] and BNA [Baluchistan National Alliance], for instance, with six National Assembly votes between them, have a point of view diametrically opposite to that of the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] on basic foreign policy issues like attitude to the U.S., the present Afghan situation and relations with India. The leadership in these parties is already under pressure from the rank and file for joining hands with IJI for the reason mentioned above. As time passes the Afghan issue might increase differences between them.

ANP and BNA stand for complete provincial autonomy, the least quantum acceptable to them being that defined by the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] which gave only four subjects to the Centre. Even this much is insufferable for the IJI, the components of

which have traditionally stood for a strong Centre. A section of MNA [Member of National Assembly]s belonging to different parties has recently been trying to work out a common bill on provincial autonomy and some ANP and BNA MNAs who were earlier carried away by the ballyhoo raised by Nawaz Sharif against federal interference in the provinces now feel they were tactical manoeuvres rather than expression of a genuine desire for provincial autonomy. An enthusiast working for the proposed bill was bemused when an IJI leader insisted that provincial autonomy must conform with a really strong Centre! The proposed bill has naturally made little headway so far. Differences on this vital issue could grow with the passage of time, thus weakening the COP.

Then there is the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], for the aspirations of which only the sky is the limit. Their never ending demands led to the break up with the PPP and no party which aspires to gain popularity in the interior of Sindh can go on yielding to their demands. MQM broke up its alliance with the PPP under the illusion that the non-confidence move was going to succeed. Now it feels stuck to a COP which wields power neither in the Centre nor in the province where the MQM is based is of little use to them. They could have benefited if the PPP government had been replaced at the Centre and the present Sindh Government dismissed. Pressures may form in MQM ranks now to again negotiate and make up with the PPP and to be content for the time being with whatever they were getting out of this alliance rather than lose all.

Other contradictions might also spring up; those between the PML [Pakistan Muslim League] and the Jama'at-i-Islami and between the factions of PML itself, and between Jatoi and the rest.

In case COP succeeds in overcoming these dissensions within the alliance, the task before it would be to expand its ranks and to make another bid for power sometime around the next budget session. The COP has so far kept a better record of making allies and expanding itself than the PPP. If it maintains this, the next move made by a united and expanded COP could prove to be fatal to the PPP regime.

Much depends also on the PPP whether COP emerges as a unified and formidable force or is split up and weakened. The PPP record of keeping good relations with its allies has not been exceptionally glorious in the past and at times one has wondered if it had learned anything other than how to lose friends and make enemies. That is how it lost its MRD allies, who had provided it the much needed shelter in the early Martial Law days and had accompanied it during painful ordeals all the way. The PPP must recognise the fact that it cannot rule alone and that it must share power with whatever allies it makes. It must learn to treat its allies with respect and on equal level and abandon its condescending, even contemptuous attitude, to them. Above all, it must never take them for granted.

Efforts to win over former allies will have little chance to succeed if a genuine change of heart does not take place and only superficial attempts aimed at averting the present crisis remain the principal objective.

There seems to be little chance of such a change of heart on the part of the PPP. This can be gauged from the signals that are being currently sent to the MRD parties. A couple of ministers who have issued statements on the subject have chosen to use language reflecting the customary condescending attitude.

Possible defections in PPP may further strengthen the COP in future if the PPP top leadership continues to treat its MNAs as mere pawns with no will of their own. This sort of overbearing attitude has already estranged the PPP allies. The PPP MNAs have been consigned to the status of the numerous wives of the ruler of a former princely state who found it difficult to even recognise each one of them as they would hardly come across the potentate once in a life time. The PPP MNA feels neglected and slighted as he has to wait for months for a brief audience with the Prime Minister. The number of defectors from the PPP would have been larger this time if the Sindhi MNAs had not been forced by the Sindhi public opinion to support PPP after the MQM deserted it. The MQM departure led to the resurgence of Sindhi nationalist sentiment and consolidated Sindh PPP ranks almost unexpectedly. This may not happen again. If on the other hand the provincial autonomy issue gathers importance, which most probably it will, defection, in PPP ranks may not take long to come.

Another source of constant irritation to the PPP MNAs is the large contingent of special advisers that stands like an impregnable curtain between them and the Prime Minister. There are widespread complaints that these innumerable wiseacres act as demigods besides messing things up. The PPP top leadership has so far failed to recognise the fact that the MNAs after reaching the National Assembly assume an importance of their own and as recent history has amply shown, they resent it if they are treated as mere automatons and are ordered about. Individuals, no less than parties, want to be treated with sensitive consideration and necessary respect. Otherwise they tend to challenge even those who rightly or wrongly regard themselves as their benefactors or authors.

Will the Prime Minister rid herself of this burdensome baggage called special advisers and personally attend to people and important national matters? Will she come off her high horse in her treatment of allies and party MNAs is all open to speculation. If she does, she may foil the next no-confidence move by increasing the number of her allies and strengthening the ranks of the party. If not, she is definitely going to lose more friends and expand the number of her enemies. This would provide COP the chance of a lifetime!

Opposition Efforts to Continue

46000045 Lahore *THE NATION*
in English 13 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] The COP [Combined Opposition Parties] meeting in Quetta has reportedly decided to continue its efforts to topple Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's government through another no-confidence move. The causes of failure of the first no-confidence move are reported to have been examined and the need to evolve a different strategy agreed on. Although the exact nature of the moves to be made has not been revealed, one gathers that another momentum will be generated to persuade PPP [Pakistan People's Party] MNA [Member of National Assembly]s to defect to the COP—with the difference that all contacts with them will be kept totally secret. And as and when a suitable opportunity presents itself the no-confidence motion will be sprung as a surprise on the government. The other plank of the strategy will be to go to the constituencies of the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] MNAs who have defected to the PPP and tell their followers how reprehensible the act of their defection was. This will, COP hopes, build such public pressure on them that they will come back to the fold.

An objective assessment of the situation would leave little cause for optimism for COP. First, because whatever the strategy, the element of surprise would be hard to get. Second, the alternative to the Central government having, in all its starkness, been presented to the MNAs and its implications and hazards seen by them, it is not likely to seem any rosier now. A soul-searching about the chances of stability of a Jatoi-led government is likely to be done more seriously now than ever before. Third, as the implications of the IJI-MQM [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad-Muhajir Qaumi Movement] accord sink in further, it would become increasingly hard to win over any Sindhi MNA. The bidding henceforth will have mostly to be for the Punjab MNAs. The choice before these MNAs would now be to get the fruits of power from the government in power or risk one's reputation or future on an untried and apparently more vulnerable alternative. The claim that another no-confidence move is perfectly constitutional cannot be disputed. But whether such a divisive move is in the best interest of democracy, is doubtful. This is a game in which both the government and the opposition will ultimately be the losers.

Cabinet Performance, Reshuffle

46000045 Lahore *THE NATION*
in English 15 Nov 89 p 6

[Words in italics as published]

[Text] In the wake of *en bloc* resignations by the federal ministers and advisers obtained by the Prime Minister, it has become obvious that the anticipated reshuffle in the Bhutto administration is now in the offing. By all indications the Prime Minister is poised to go for a 'big chop' and many familiar faces may not find a berth in the new

set-up. The non-elected component of her team is likely to suffer the highest casualty rate, since it has been the main target of public criticism and source of discord with elected representatives. But quite a few ministers may also be sent home for poor performance if the exercise is aimed at giving the cabinet a new look and a better image. Another factor likely to influence the choice of the new team will be the imperative of drawing maximum defectors from the Opposition and influential Opposition MNA [Member of National Assembly]s willing to play ball with the government are likely to be rewarded with ministerial positions. How large the new cabinet would be is anybody's guess. But if the Prime Minister is seeking efficient functioning and also has the political will to dispense with her party advisers hitherto acting as watch-dogs on elected ministers, she may be able to cut the cabinet size to a reasonable limit and ensure its smooth functioning.

The Bhutto 'cabinet'—albeit a misnomer, since it included categories of members not akin to parliamentary form of government—has been under fire on a number of counts. Besides allegations of incompetence and corruption against individual ministers, the cabinet as a whole was deemed to have mismanaged things. "An under-19 team" is how the Opposition would ridicule it and the 'taunt' was not entirely far-fetched. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was said to be under a variety of pressures when she constituted her first cabinet, to reward the party loyalists being on top of it. Now that the 'honeymoon' is over and almost a year has been spent on 'rehabilitating the victims of martial law,' it is time to get down to the serious business of governance. If the new cabinet is just 'old wine in new bottles,' the purpose of reshuffling the cabinet would be lost. The Prime Minister now has the opportunity to make a cabinet of her own choice and should pick a team of mature, balanced and competent persons who besides improving the performance level should be able to carry the majority in the House.

Deteriorated Relations of MQM, PPP Discussed

46000044B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM*
in English 12 Nov 89 pp 4, 7

[Text] The consequence of the souring of relation with the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] is, that the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] faces the unavoidable challenge of improving its position and earning goodwill in the Mohajir constituency. The compulsions which brought about the understanding and agreement between the two parties immediately after the November 1988 elections will not go away. The PPP may have lost its coalition partner in the Sindh government, and fourteen votes in the National Assembly, but it cannot afford to write off "Mohajirs" and a significant vote bank. This is why to let the Karachi Accord die would be an act of political thoughtlessness. We are not sure if the Sindh PPP leadership is aware of this, despite a passing but recent reference of the Chief Minister on the walking over of the MQM to IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad], to

the effect that this sad end did not mean the abandonment by his party of its responsibilities under the Accord. It is unfortunate that his awareness is not shared by some members of his Cabinet who enjoy themselves in crossing swords with Altaf Hussain and other MQM leaders.

New Scenario

What brought about the termination of relation between the MQM and the PPP, and how it happened is a matter of history from which much can be learnt. But spending time over this in recrimination will certainly not suit the PPP. It is clear, however, that one of the promises of the November 1988 elections, which came out in the understanding and alliance between the party which dominated the Karachi electoral field, and the other supported overwhelmingly by the rest of Sindh, not only failed to produce desired results, but came to an end fraught with dangerous possibilities against ethnic accord and peace. Not only the MQM and the PPP party cultures clashed, but the rushed ambition of the former did not find accommodation with its partner in whose ranks the vast majority at all levels held back to its support leader. Now that Altaf Hussain stands opposed to Benazir Bhutto in the company of Mian Nawaz Sharif and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, and will be travelling to Quetta to plot new strategies for her departure from power, her task can be said to have been made both difficult as well as easy. The MQM will fight all the way through attempts which the PPP has no choice but to make to find favour with Mohajirs. Even a small success to this end will be worth great efforts. It would be naive to overlook the yet another in-house adversary she will have to contend with: the PSF [Pakistan Student Federation] and those elements in her Karachi and Sindh party whose own propensity to violence of speech and action may be second to the APMSO [All Pakistan Muslim Student Organization] and MQM not in desire, but in dedication, organisation and clout. Yet another side which possesses awful capability of creating mayhem of good intentions and honest approach, the Karachi and Hyderabad administrations, would pose greater dangers. In the absence of leadership in the Sindh PPP, and the desire of a large number of party's members to settle score with the MQM for what they see as its betrayal, the Prime Minister's task looks impossible, but worth addressing for this very reason.

According to political pundits, the MQM helped the Prime Minister win the dissident votes from her Sindh party which the COP [Combined Opposition Parties] had counted on its side in moving the no-confidence motion. This may be partially true, but offers a promising opening which she cannot let go. Those who were reported to be ready to ditch her, belong to the Sindhi nationalist wing of her party. From the very beginning they were opposed to her dealings with the MQM. Having come out clean, and thanks to the way Altaf Hussain chose to administer the coup de grace on the Prime Minister, she and those associated with her in negotiating and signing the Karachi Accord may have

been redeemed in the eyes of their accusers. This could be called the relatively easy and certainly far more promising side of the issue.

Lurid Stories

Under the circumstance even the Sindhi nationalists in and out of the PPP have to understand that a solution to the "Mohajir issue" needs to be found in the context of the larger ethnic perspective to avoid the genocidal conclusion berserk extremists on the several sides of the perilous ethnic divides may have in mind. It is with relief that one should recall a statement of Qurban Ali Shah in which he was reported to have said that the MQM became unnecessarily impatient for its demands which would have been fulfilled. While not sharing his appreciation of patience, the brief recognition by way of an aside from him of problems which agitate the Mohajirs, and which need to be addressed, would be of help to the Prime Minister, if she prepared and carries the party with her. Keeping the Sindhi nationalists isolated from the mainstream developments in the country and the province has not paid. The break she has got after the no-confidence move against her coming to a sorry end, may prove luckier than thought of, particularly in Sindh. With courage and wisdom shared between her and the rank and file of her party, she must exploit it.

While we are discussing what should and shouldn't be done, an instant danger of catastrophic proportion faces us. Anyone who has been reading the national dailies, and in particular the eveningers of Karachi, since the defeat of the no-confidence motion, will be pardoned for believing that Karachi is on the verge of an explosion. There are stories of firing on the homes of the MQM leaders; of clashes between supporters of two erstwhile partners now exposed as sworn enemies; of alleged PPP snipers roving wildly and in large numbers in heavily Mohajir-populated "mohallas" and spraying bullets around to kill and maim; and, of Karachi administration raiding homes of MQM workers to catch offenders against the law who until very recently were under its protection. The most lurid story broke stridently in Karachi press on 6 November, saying that sixty to seventy terrorists were believed to be moving in the area of Altaf Hussain's house in Azizabad with the purpose of wiping him out. They were said to have been armed with the required weaponry for forcing entry through the outer, fortified defenses of the MQM chief's residence. Obviously, stories were narrated with no attempt at investigation and corroboration, and it was clear that Altaf Hussain's understandably paranoid fear was matched with widespread, screaming headlines. The interest of the newspapers can be judged from the fact that Karachi administration's denials of earlier stories were given squeezed space and indifferent positions. k We are not suggesting that there is no truth altogether to stories about danger to the life of Altaf Hussain and his colleagues, or, to the very disturbing possibilities of political and ethnic clashes in the city. Otherwise, there was no need for curfew in almost the whole of the area which voted overwhelmingly for the MQM. But what is

the truth, its nature and scope no one knows, certainly not the newspapers. A rumour galore has paralysed people with fear, thanks to the unwitting collusion of political leaders, workers, the media and the Karachi administration, each ironically seized with the belief that it is doing its best for the province. The obvious that if something disastrous really happens, everyone is going to lose is not receiving attention in the state of a universal blindness to the consequence.

Having said all this, we can only hope the Prime Minister and her party in Sindh do the right things. We cannot expect much from Altaf Hussain, except that he will queer her pitch as and when he has opportunity. But up hope that he will have recourse to political arguments rather than street fights. The Prime Minister's responsibility is greater, and so is pressure on her political skills. It needs to be said again and again that the MQM and PPP impasse is not an administrative or law-and-order problem. Nor is it the occasion for the PPP to wring its hand in despair of finding a better foothold than a seat or two in the constituency laded over by the MQM. The challenge before the PPP is to proffer political solutions to the endemic ethnic problems of the province, and above all give each linguistic and cultural group the opening which would compel it to see a viable alternative to the political ghettos it has boxed itself in.

PNP Chief Says PPP 'Lesser Evil'

46000046C Karachi *DAWN* in English 20 Nov 89 p 4

[Text] Quetta, 19 November—Pakistan National Party [PNP] is opposed to the idea of any mid-term elections in the country and wants the present elected government to be given an opportunity to complete its full term in office.

This was stated by PNP chief Mir Bizen Bizenjo at a news conference here on Sunday.

He said that his party firmly wanted democracy to flourish in the country and added that the PNP was determined to play its positive role towards that end. Asked about the existing state of confrontation between Centre and Punjab and Balochistan, he said that it was an unlucky sign for the country.

Bizen in reply to a question said that the demand for the convening of the meeting of Council of Common Interests was justified and added that it should be convened without delay. While referring to IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] and PPP [Pakistan People's Party], he said for PNP one was "evil" and the other "lesser evil."

He thought that since the PPP enjoyed majority in the National assembly it had the right to remain in office, and there was no need for a broad-based government at the moment.

He told another questioner that his party was opposed to the framing of a new constitution for the country and added that it would be necessary for bringing about

amendments in the present constitution in accordance with the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] formula on provincial autonomy.

The PNP chief said his party had decided that for the time being it would not enter into any kind of alliance or merge with any other party.

However, he added, that the central committee of the party would review its decision from time to time depending on changing conditions and requirements.

The central committee of the PNP, he said, had decided to constitute a 20-member central executive committee, including the central office-bearers, for the purpose of speedy implementation of the programme and the policies laid down by the central committee.

The newly-constituted central executive committee would have two members from the central committee representing each federating unit; Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab and Pashtoorkhwa. Another two central committee members from the Saraiki unit would be included in the executive committee later, he stated.

He said that in relation to the functioning of the central executive committee and to make it effective, the president's powers under the party constitution had been delegated to Secretary General who would concurrently be the chairman of the central executive committee.

All the actions of the central executive committee, he added, would be subject to ratification by the central committee to whom the central executive committee would be answerable.

Bizen said it had also been decided to form a student wing of the PNP and a sub-committee under the chairmanship of Mr Shah Mohammad Shah had been set up for the purpose.

The sub-committee would study the proposition from all angles and submit proposals, including the student's wing, name and programme, to the central executive committee meeting at Lahore on 30 November.

He also announced the names of Mir Ahmad Nawaz Bugti and Mir Gohar Khan Zarakzai being included in the central committee of the party.

'Fragile' State of Country Analyzed

46000044A Islamabad *THE MUSLIM*
in English 12 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Ikram Azam. Words in italics as published.]

[Text] The current situation in Pakistan is an interesting case study calling for immediate analysis. It reflects tellingly on the frayed and fragmented society that Pakistan is today—ethnically, politically, socio-culturally and even sectarianly. Are we torn asunder and tearing apart? Or is it the teething problems of our nascent democracy? Is such complacency justified under the circumstances?

The year gone by seems to have proved the Prime Minister's inaugural fear or suspicion that a selective rigging had been effected by the operant powers. Perhaps their logic was to induct pragmatic checks and balances in order to keep the ruling party in manageable control, and to prevent authoritarian absolutism, as in the past. The result—vulnerable coalitions, both in the government and Opposition.

Short Cuts

That has virtually taken Pakistan back to the pre-Ayub Khan days when governments were so unstable that they sometimes did not outlive a fraction of their mandate. And so, Ayub Khan's Martial Law. By hindsight, martial law seems to have become a partisan conditioned reflex of Pakistan's political culture seeking deviant short-cuts to absolutist power and perks. Thus, if the government is vulnerable, so is the opposition. Are Pakistanis cutting the national nose to spite the face? Who wins in this zero-sum, no-win game? The historical man on the horse-back, or armoured car? Whither goes democracy, then?—fragmented, fragile and ever-vulnerable.

If Pakistan's single and sole national and nationalistic party is not allowed to hold the national fort, how can a conglomerate of diverse vested interests? Horse-trading, opportunism, floor-crossing and black-mailing (individuals or groups) can hardly be relied upon by anybody, after they expose themselves to the public eye and people's verdict.

The military has already played a political role thrice in Pakistan in the guise of Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Ziaul Haq. Presently, it is playing a becomingly responsible, nationalistic, moral and moderating role. But if politicians do not learn to sober up, the military may well be driven to its third, final and permanent role, sooner than can be feared. That would be a constitutional role, as in Turkey. Only the politicians will be blame-worthy for that. If the present opposition succeeds in upsetting the balanced political applecart, the ruling party would be quite willing to sit in the opposition, by all available indices. But that will render the inherently fragmented opposition-turned-government even more vulnerable.

Even a foreseeable round of mid-term elections may not be able to stabilise the situation. When street power is resorted to by disillusioned people, the military moves in to restore law and order. The history of martial laws in Pakistan is one of lengthening shadows and stalling longevity. Each successor general tries to outlive and out-smart his predecessor. Zia's eleven years overstepped Ayub's nine. But Pakistan has already run out of its political recipes—Islam and democracy—and their easy variants, Islamic Democracy and Islamic socialism or social democracy. Will it be pure and unadulterated, militant, militaristic martial law the next time, whenever that may be?

Pakistan's power base today is a tripod trinity with roots in the political culture and shoots in political idealism. The political trioka comprises the President, the P.M. and the armed forces.

Thanks to the controversial Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, they are *all* under challenge, as never before—by the Opposition, above all, which appears to have helped itself to undue advantage of the constitutional anomalies and taken the trioka for a ride. Otherwise, the vote of no-confidence made no sense, except political pressure tactics and conniving conspiratorial coercion. The trioka owes it to the abiding national interest to take a firm and united stand on the Opposition's challenge, to secure democracy. Any party that fail to do so, may be judged by history as being partisan to thwarting the nascent democratic process.

Make-or-Mar

It is ironic that a popularly-elected Prime Minister's government should be challenged out of office by a microscopic minority of Opposition representatives out of all proportions to the total population (over 100 million) and a significantly substantial voting population. The vote of no-confidence is another destabilising weakness of the Western system, which we have swallowed indiscriminately, hook, line and sinker. Being popularly-elected, only the people should have the right to vote out such a Prime Minister, through a national mandate, i.e., a referendum. Such a nationally make-or-mar decision is too onerous a responsibility to entrust to a narrow coterie. But if at all the elected Opposition is to be given the right to exercise the vote of no-confidence, it should comprise no less than 50 percent of the whole legislative house—both its tiers, lower and upper (as compared to the present mere 20 percent of the lower House.)

The FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] represents another traditional constitutional anomaly—highlighting political favouritism. But why should the FATA be given extra weightage of representation which has no ratio to its population *vis-a-vis* the general national formula? The FATA representation needs to be reviewed and cut to the national size, to put an end to this discriminatory and best-favoured treatment and its misuse. In fact, it's about time that the FATA were integrated with NWFP [North-West Frontier Province], for all practicable purposes.

The vote of no-confidence has already put the fragile Pakistani political system to test. Its loop-holes and lacunae are evident. The policy makers and managers of this system, taking a long-range view of the national interest, are necessitated by circumstances to rise above their pressing personal, parochial and partisan interests, to ensure national integration, stability and security. A five-year term is the minimal period to facilitate any democratic system to strike roots.

If Pakistan fritters away its last decade of the 20th century in counter-productive and personally vindictive

anti-systemic politics, it would have lost a century and not just 5 or 10 years. The progeny will not forgive the present generation of Pakistan's power elite and brokers for that.

The best way to avoid destabilising revolution is to opt for peace fully programmed evolution. A balancing third force or party needs to rise to the occasion, to save Pakistan out of the present crisis. Is the Quaid's Muslim League capable of rising from its ashes, or is it too late for such resuscitation?

Government's Reaction to Indian Muslims' Issue

46000043B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 12 Nov 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Ghani Jaffar]

[Text] Islamabad, 11 November: After a prolonged silence on the issue, leaders of various governments and political parties in Pakistan woke up in quick succession last Friday to take note of the ongoing massacre of Muslims at the hands of Hindu zealots in large parts of (primarily north) India.

Apart from protests registered earlier in this regard by such individuals as the former Prime Minister and head of his own faction of the Muslim League, Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo and the former Foreign Minister, Mr Agha Shahi (who had addressed a cable to the UN Secretary-General asking him to take note of atrocities against Indian Muslims), Mr Nawaz Sharif set the ball rolling in Lahore on Friday.

The Punjab Chief Minister and President of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), the main Opposition group in the National Assembly, is reported to have made a strong attack on both Indian 'pagans' and the Federal government of Pakistan whose 'pro-secularism' and 'pro-India' stance, according to him, may have encouraged New Delhi to launch the Babri Masjid 'plan.' Talking to a group of workers in the Punjab Capital early Friday afternoon, the Chief Minister also gave a call for observation of a protest day all over the country next Friday.

The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) too brought out a procession in the provincial metropolis which criticised the government of Pakistan's attitude towards India. The all-Pakistan conference of the Jamaat-i-Islami, also underway in Lahore, came out with a resolution, again on Friday which charged the Federal government of 'bowing before India.'

A rather unconventional voice to join the instant chorus of condemnation came from the Special Assistant to the Balochistan Chief Minister, Nawab Akbar Bugti, who announced in Quetta on Friday that the provincial IJI would observe a three-day protest beginning Saturday. Mr Anwar Durrani stated that black flags would be hoisted during the period on roads, shops and houses to mourn the killing of Muslims in India.

It was against this backdrop that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto issued an official statement in Islamabad on Friday evening expressing the deep concern of her government and of the people of Pakistan at "the reprehensible plan of extremist Hindu elements in India to construct a temple on the site of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya."

It noted that "the developments in the Babri Masjid issue" were "a matter of the deepest concern for Muslims both inside and outside India," and that "the people of Pakistan share the anguish which these developments have caused to their Muslim brethren worldwide."

According to the statement, the government of Pakistan reiterated that "it is the responsibility of the government of India to take effective steps to put an end to communal killings and to ensure that the Muslims in India are provided full security of life and property and that the sentiments of the Islamic Ummah are respected."

It is doubtful if this marvel of diplomatic inanity has ever been outdone in its sloppiness which makes a painted effort to somehow go round the central issue of untold atrocities being committed on hapless Indian Muslims by their frenzied Hindu neighbours. The aspect which renders the wishy-washy "condemnation"—if it can be so called—ridiculous, is that even this most careful avoidance of the core question is not likely to make the statement any less offensive to a hypersensitive India.

Concerned officials, at Islamabad can perhaps take some misplaced satisfaction in that even as they dished out a seemingly strong denunciation of Indian government's policies towards the beleaguered minority community of Muslims in that country, not a single direct reference to the on-going massacres has actually been made in the statement.

The closest the statement comes to the latter aspect is to recall how the government of Pakistan "has already repeatedly expressed its deep concern over the spurt in the killing of innocent Muslims in various parts of India as the people of Pakistan have deep links of kinship, culture and history with the Muslim community of India."

It hastens to add: "It has been the consistent policy of the government of Pakistan not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. However, the developments in the Babri Masjid issue... (as noted above)." The phraseology here whose originator may have earned the special approbation in the relevant official quarters, is "the spurt" in killing of Indian Muslims. As far as all available record establishes, the government of Pakistan has maintained what its critics have seen as a studied silence with regard to the instant 'spurt' which has claimed the lives of thousands of Muslims in India.

But then, the officials in Islamabad can perhaps argue that it is not the current killings which have been referred to at all. Ridiculous as such a position may seem, that is

exactly what the wording of the statement appears to be providing. Another equally self-defeating premise is the reference to the deep links of "kinship culture and history" between the people of Pakistan and the Muslim community of India. The conspicuous omission of religion as a factor of linkage could have been caused by some highly imaginative consideration not to offend the so-called Indian secularism. But the effect is an avoidance of the aspect central to the issue. The added misfortune is that, as already pointed out, even such a meticulous approach on the part of the government of Pakistan on the question would not in all probability make the statement acceptable to India.

If it was considered politically imperative not to let the Opposition at home walk away with India-baiting, the only credible response would have been to take up the case of Indian Muslims with less of the diplomatic hair-splitting at which our officials so excel.

As it is, the rigmarole of the official statement may bring grist to the mill of Opposition at home which could use it as further proof of Islamabad's alleged 'softness' in dealing with India.

Leader Urges Taking Kashmir Issue to UN

46000046D Karachi DAWN in English 20 Nov 89 p 6

[Text] Karachi, 19 November—Sardar Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speaker of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly has called upon Pakistan Government to take up the Kashmir problem at the United Nation "as there was no other alternative to settle it."

Mr Ayub Khan who is in the city in connection with the speakers conference, was talking to APP [Associated Press of Pakistan] in an interview at Qaser Naz here on Sunday.

He said "It was the last resort to solve the Kashmir issue peacefully." All other remedies to settle this problem during the last 40 years have been exhausted."

"If Pakistan fails to pursue India to settle the issue, then there is no justification to have diplomatic, commercial or any other ties with India," Mr Ayub Khan said.

Kashmiri leader said that the political movement in the occupied Jammu and Kashmir during the last two years have been curbed by use of criminal force, and the basic human rights committees and the United Nations despite repeated appeals by Kashmiris residing all over the world have not received any positive response from the India Government.

The repression of Kashmiris continues unabatedly in violation of the United Nations basic human rights charter and the United Nations agreements between India and Pakistan regarding grant of right of self-determination and the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

Mr Ayub Khan said that four decades have passed since Kashmiris on both side of the ceasefire line which is not

less than a Berlin Wall, have become impatient to break all barriers and unite for freedom.

A full-fledged revolt by the Kashmiris in Indian occupied [] was going on for attaining their political future but they were suppressed by brute force and bullets by the Indian army. Now is the time for the Superpowers and the United Nations to fulfil its commitments towards people of Jammu and Kashmir in the light of United Nations resolutions on Kashmir.

Siachen: The Kashmiri leader said that buring issue today was the Siachen where the Indians have encroached upon Pakistan territory, the construction of the Wular barrage in occupied Kashmir which is also a violation of the Indus basin water treaty signed between the governments under the international forums.

In reply to a question that the two governments were bound by the Simla agreement to solve the Kashmir problem by peaceful means, he said that "in the event of failure to settle the issue peacefully Pakistan can take the issue to the United Nations which is also a forum where the issue can be settled by peaceful means."

Mr Ayub Khan said that "the people of Kashmir have waited enough and their patience exhausted. They would launch a crusade to achieve their right of self-determination if both India and Pakistan failed to arrive at an agreement to solve the problem.

COP Leaders on Induction of Ministers

46000043C Islamabad
THEMUSLIM in English 12 Nov 89 pp 1, 6

[Text] Quetta, 11 November—Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif said on Saturday that the Federal Government had paid the "price" promised to the COP [Combined Opposition Parties] defectors by taking them in the Cabinet.

Commenting on the induction of three IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] members in the Cabinet, he said, it had proved that the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] had taken the props of money and promise" while defeating the no-trust motion.

Nawaz Sharif said that COP could not be weakened by these inductions. Rather, these have strengthened the Opposition, he said.

The Chief Minister said the people would see that the COP which now looked in minority would shortly be in majority in the National Assembly.

Their superficial majority will not last long. We will continue our efforts to establish a representative government at the Centre, he said.

As a whole, the COP leaders were not surprised over the induction of Ghulam Ahmad Maneka and Makhdoom Ahmad Alam Anwar in the Cabinet. But they were really

surprised over the swearing in of Akbar Lasi, who had signed the no-trust motion and later voted for it.

Elderly Nawabzada Nasrullah told THE MUSLIM that though it was the prerogative of the Prime Minister to form and expand the Cabinet, these inductions were undoubtedly 'below morality.' It is a great political excess to lure people into supporting a government by later taking them in Cabinet cannot be described 'clean politics.'

Another COP leader Zahid Sarfraz said these inductions had not elevated the prestige of the 'under-nineteen' Cabinet. They have been made Ministers not because of any merit, he said. 'It is height of corruption,' he alleged. Maulana Fazalur Rehman criticised these inductions and said the COP would issue a statement on the issue on Sunday. He said this was not the way the politics should be.

In a one sentence reaction, Balochistan Chief Minister remarked 'they who have been inducted in the Cabinet, are not our guys. They belong to IJI.'

Analyst: 'Give Democracy a Chance'

*46000046B Lahore THE NATION
in English 10 Nov 89 p 6*

[Article by Altaf A. Shaikh]

[Text] The failure of the no-confidence move by COP [Combined Opposition Parties] against the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto gives us an opportunity to evaluate the political situation in the country and the success of democracy in Pakistan. In the words of Benazir Bhutto "We feel that both the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and the Opposition should take stock of what should be done for the future of the nation," "It is important for us to close as many fronts as possible." She further added that her "doors are open for a dialogue," but she would only 'reconcile with moderates and saner elements.' She has indicated that she would start efforts to put her house in order.

The manner in which the session of the Parliament was conducted is a tribute to the parliamentary skill and acumen of the Speaker as well as the Leader of the House and the Leader of the Opposition. However, one basic point which deals with our parliamentary practice deserves consideration. There was a gap of ten days between the time the motion was tabled and the day voting took place. This gave time for such manoeuvres as pressure on the MNA [Member of National Assembly], allegations of kidnapping, and purchase and detention of MNAs in safe places. In most countries the time gap between the tabling of a motion of no-confidence and voting upon it is between 24-48 hours. This by and large, obviates the possibility of use of various unparliamentary and undesirable methods by the political parties.

As the Prime Minister has rightly pointed out, a no-confidence move against the government paralyses it

and seriously impedes the working of other essential organs of the country. In the 1973 Constitution a second no-confidence move can be tabled only after the lapse of six months. This provision was removed through the 8th Amendment by Ziaul Haq to serve his own ulterior motives. In order to create political stability and to give time to the government to carry out its normal and nation-building activities, it is necessary to restore the original provision. It should be applicable in the case of the federal as well as the provincial governments.

There have been numerous allegations of corruption against MNAs and MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly]s of not only the present government, but also those of the Zia era. It is a normal practice in many democratic countries that all MNAs/MPAs as well as all persons who hold public office i.e. Ministers/Advisors etc. are required to declare their assets (as well as of their family members) on appointment to public office. Furthermore, the ministers etc. place their business assets in trust for management and do not obtain loans etc. from government or quasi-government organisations for the promotion of their family business interests. In her speech in the Parliament, the Prime Minister stated that many leading politicians of the Zia era had obtained loans worth 280 percent of the value of the security provided for these loans. The government should publish the names of these persons along with full details and take steps to recover these loans. It should also be prepared to inform the public of permits/sanctions for industries/ plots etc. given by it and the nature of financing provided for these projects from nationalised banks and institutions. There have been reports of billions of rupees written off as bad debts by nationalised banks; as it is public money, please publish a list of all such persons and take steps to recover billions of rupees or take action against those responsible for the grant of such loans. All democratic societies are open societies. Democracy also means accountability. The above information should not be withheld on the lame excuse of 'bank secrecy.'

Considerable heat has been generated on the issue of "Peoples Work Programme." The basic issue is, who should get the credit and who should get an opportunity to milk it? This problem is not new, I recall that in the Ayub era, Chief Secretary of East Pakistan informed me that Monem Khan (the then Governor) used to personally issue cheques for all public works projects and used to retain 25 percent as his cut. Since then, the situation has not improved. While the ruling party (which provides the funds) should utilise these funds for the welfare of the people, there should be stricter control on expenditure and its audit by the Auditor-General—this is the normal practice in many developing countries. Let us take this nation-building activity out of political controversy and if the provincial governments wish to implement parallel development schemes through their MPAs etc., let them provide funds for these schemes from their own resources.

Scores of non-elected persons have been appointed as Advisors with ministerial rank. As in the case of USA and some other democratic countries, these appointments as well as those to other public offices and of envoys abroad should be kept to the minimum, and subject to confirmation by a joint committee of the Senate and the Parliament. This would reduce public criticism of these appointments.

The real solution to the present fluid political situation is a grand coalition i.e. between the PPP and the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad], but in the present situation it is not feasible. To broaden the base of the federal government and of some of the provincial governments, all political parties should give some thought to the offer of the Prime Minister for collaboration "with saner elements and moderates."

Sindh factor plays an important role in keeping the present government in power and it could also become the cause of loss of confidence in it. The government must, therefore, take effective and speedy steps to restore law and order in the strife torn city of Karachi and the interior of Sindh.

The present crisis has shown the fragility of the present political system, the political parties should, therefore, think of some changes in the long term. In the Zia era, the Election Commission had carried out a study of the electoral systems in various countries. However, as Zia had decided to hold partyless elections no action was taken on this study. Our present electoral system is based on the British pattern, which is 'first past the post.' In this case, the candidate with the highest number of votes, irrespective of the percentage of total votes cast in his favour, is declared elected. For the information of all concerned, I will briefly describe two other major electoral systems which are followed in other democratic countries.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey and some other countries the electoral system is based on the principle of proportional representation. In Turkey, once the parliament has decided to dissolve itself and hold fresh elections, the government allocates funds to the political parties in proportion to their strength in the dissolved parliament. Only parties which are registered with the Election Commission are eligible to contest elections. An essential requirement is that the Party concerned should have offices and members in all districts in the country. This provision has been made to discourage regional parties and to encourage the growth of parties which enjoy countrywide support.

The elections are held on the basis of multiple constituencies and list system. On the basis of population, the country is divided into various electoral districts, which have multiple seats—a maximum of six. Each party submits a list of its candidates in order of priority. The list is prepared on the basis of primary elections held in

the electoral districts by each party, in which members of the party concerned vote for the nomination of their candidates.

On election day, when voting ends, votes are counted and in accordance with the percentage of votes secured by each party, seats are allocated to it from its list on the basis of priority given by the party concerned. However, a party which fails to secure a minimum of 10 percent (50 percent in the case of Germany) of the votes on the national level and a fixed minimum in the constituency concerned is not allotted any seat. The votes secured by the parties which fail to cross these two barriers are redistributed proportionally to the parties which have fulfilled the above two requirements. This prevents the growth of splinter groups/parties and encourages the growth of larger national parties. However, it does give some advantage in the number of seats secured by the largest party. On the other hand, the 'first past the post' British system gives even greater advantage to the largest party. In the elections held in the UK after the Falkland war, while Conservatives secured only 42 percent of the votes, they were able to win approximately $\frac{2}{3}$ of the seats. In the last elections in India, the Congress(I) got 48 percent of the votes, but it secured an overwhelming majority. Incidentally, the Congress which has ruled India (except for a brief two year break) has never secured 50 percent of the votes in any election.

Incidentally, there is no role in the Turkish constitution for the Armed Forces. This was part of the disinformation campaign of the Zia regime.

The channel of communications between the President and the Prime Minister should always remain open. In Turkey, the two meet once a week to discuss informally over a cup of tea affairs of the State. This practice promotes rapport between the two and facilitates their task.

The French system is somewhat different. In the first round of voting, the winner has to secure at least 50 percent of the votes cast. If no candidate succeeds in doing so, second round is held after two weeks between the two leading candidates; in this round, the candidate who scores the highest number of votes is elected. This is an improvement on the British system as it tries to ensure results closely commensurate with the wishes of the voters. Furthermore, party leaders are given time on the television to explain their party manifesto and to canvass for votes.

No system is perfect, each system has its pros and cons. The Turkish system reduces the expenditure of the candidates as well as the party on elections to a minimum. There is no attempt by MNAs to 'collect' money by any means to fight the next elections. Furthermore in Turkey, Sri Lanka, Canada, the MNAs/MPAs almost regularly visit their constituencies on weekends/holidays to maintain contact at grassroots level, something our parliamentarians by and large ignore. This has inhibited the growth of political parties at grassroot level and of

the failure of the parliamentarians to explain the policies of their government/party to their workers and voters.

We have to evolve with the passage of time our own system suited to conditions in Pakistan. We could, however, give some thought to the good points in other systems and incorporate them in our system. The objective should be to encourage democracy and public accountability.

The world has been closely watching the tussle for power in Pakistan. The image of a country and that of its government is based on its strength at home. No active or effective foreign policy or negotiation can be conducted by a weak government. The nation is faced with a domineering and an aggressive neighbour, and the Afghanistan issue is still simmering. We need political and economic support to carry on our development programme, for the achievement of these national objectives, a stable government is an absolute necessity.

In Pakistan, democracy is a young and tender plant, in the course of political infighting and lust for power, we should not trample on it and kill it. Please give democracy a chance to prosper.

Editorial Views Controversy Over Z.A. Bhutto

46000046A Lahore *THE NATION*
in English 10 Nov 89 p 6

[Text] Swapping of allegations among political adversaries is not an unusual phenomenon in the country, given the current style of politicking. But it was a scenario with a little difference the other day when the bewildered audience witnessed a cross-fire between Dr Mubashar Hassan and Mr Fakhr Zaman. Though one of them is a rising star and the other a heavyweight of the

yesteryears, both profess adherence to the same creed and loyalty to the same party. The occasion for public polemics was provided by divergence in the assessment of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto [ZAB]'s historical role. Dr Mubashar Hassan charged his former mentor with distorting the party ideology, manipulating its class character and pursuing authoritarian politics. He mentioned 'atrocities' against J. Rahim and Meraj Mohammad Khan and Tamman's backdoor entry as instances of ZAB's arbitrary functioning and rebuked the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leadership for still scolding him on leaving the party. "We are not among the blind followers," he said. Mr Fakhr Zaman retorted by calling the PPP's left-wing 'misled' doctrinaires who don't have their feet on the ground and had made a fatal error by leaving the party. He refused to admit that ZAB was a feudal lord or had made any serious mistakes.

Apparently the controversy is nothing more than a reflection of infighting among the Bhutto crowd—'loyalists' versus the 'non-conformists' but in historical perspective it has a deeper connotation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a controversial figure, a man of strong likes and dislikes who evoked passionate responses of love and hate. He had scores of ardent admirers and an equal number of sworn enemies. To make an objective assessment of the person and his role in country's history is a tall order. But to elevate him to the status of a redeemer who had only virtues and no shortcomings, is a folly for which the PPP has already paid a heavy price. The self-righteous posture of creating a Bhutto cult as a substitute for a concrete programme or good governance can neither exonerate ZAB of the charge of having squandered away the opportunity to consolidate democracy, nor can it enable his successors to succeed where he had failed.